Making ARF relevant post-Sept. 11

Making ARF relevant post-Sept. 11

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

At this time of year ever since 1994, diplomatic dialogues have been focusing on the future and relevancy of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the region-wide security group. This year is no exemption. But a big question looms large: Will the Sept. 11 event change the ARF? Or will it just push the ARF to the sidelines?

There are many who think the event creates new challenges and opportunities to act. Western countries and non-ASEAN ARF countries believe the ARF has to prove its mettle in the post- Sept. 11 world by responding to the crisis impacting on the region rather than just standing idly by and exchanging views as they normally do

But some Asian members -- such as China, Burma, Vietnam and Laos -- prefer the slow but sure approach. They view the ARF primarily as a consultative forum, not a launching platform to respond to crises. Indeed, they do not want to be left behind by the security dialogue if it moves too fast. As long as it is confined to an annual meeting and inter-session meetings under the rubric of confidence-building measures, they feel secure about the process.

When the ARF started out it was aimed at facilitating dialogue among countries in the region, in particular between ASEAN and other countries that mattered to the grouping's collective security and stability. The major powers, especially the members of the UN Security Council except UK and France, were invited to join. Incrementally, other countries with a geographical footprint in the region such as India, North Korea and Mongolia became members. At least twenty countries including Pakistan, Iran and Kazakhstan are currently on the waiting list.

Frequent criticism against the ARF zeroes on its inability to respond to crises or security developments. Others question ASEAN's ability to handle the expansion of the ASEAN-security model with non-ASEAN countries as the majority. For one thing, ASEAN has yet to seriously focus on the security of the Northeast Asian region. The grouping does not possess the knowledge to make progress on the clear problems on the Korean peninsula.

For the time being, ARF participants only discuss military and security-related issues but have not touched on such transnational issues as anti-terrorism, drug trafficking, haze, drug and human smuggling.

To be fair, the nine-year-old talking shop has inculcated trust building and mutual understanding among members. Once untouchable issues related to Burma, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea as well as nuclear non-proliferation have been discussed -- sometimes candidly and frankly. A series of security cooperative frameworks related to disaster relief and rescue, peacekeeping operations and demining have been touched upon and could be concretised and implemented in the future.

Annual defense white papers from members willing to share, including exchanges of security officials, have improved transparency and the understanding of each other's threat perceptions and security concerns. In the process, some members still want to spend more time talking about these areas to build up mutual trust which they argue is still lacking among major players, particularly China and the US. The inability to form a consensus among them has created a benign environment within the ARF.

In light of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the ARF leaders are expected to set up an inter-session group on transnational crime and terrorism when they meet in Brunei. Furthermore, they will agree to allow the chairman of the ARF to adopt a higher profile in facilitating the discussion and providing updates on regional security.

During the Bangkok meeting in 2000, Australia proposed the establishment of "friends of the chair" who can assist the chairman with specific tasks and issues. This idea could be agreed upon if there is a strong push from non-ASEAN members.

As such, the ASEAN secretary general and the Jakarta-based secretariat will have more work to do related to the ARF. However, ASEAN members still do not want the secretariat to set up an ARF unit to deal exclusively with ARF coordination and documentation even though the paper workload has increased many fold. In addition, Cambodia, as the next ARF chairman, would need help from the secretariat to prepare for the forum.

That much is clear. But the ARF members have not agreed to move to the next stage of preventive diplomacy, let alone the ultimate aim of conflict resolution. Most members think enough mutual trust has been established among the members to move ahead. But China, currently one of the most influential ARF players, does not agree. Beijing still insists that the ARF should proceed at a pace comfortable to all members.

When the ARF reaches its 10th anniversary next year, a major review of its purposes and objectives is necessary. The post- Sept. 11 world is different from the one in 1994 when the Asia- Pacific was economically strong although some of the major issues continue such as unresolved territorial disputes, the China/Taiwan issue, nuclear arms, weapons modernization and acquisition.

Furthermore, the ARF needs to make further progress in addressing preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, without which the ARF process could be render obsolete. The ARF members must be more willing to discuss non-traditional and non- conventional security issues.

Finally, the time must come when a non-ASEAN member can be co- chair of the forum, not just for the inter-session meetings as it is today.

As always, ASEAN wants to bite off more than it can chew. The grouping fears it will lose control if the ARF chair falls into the hands of non-ASEAN members. In more ways than one, ASEAN also realizes failure to do so could drive away active non-ASEAN members demanding a stronger sense of belonging. ASEAN, which has yet to recover from the insecurity resulting from the Asian economic crisis, will still be in the driving seat, but the problem is, it does not know where to go.