Making ARF relevant post-Sept. 11
Making ARF relevant post-Sept. 11
Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok
At this time of year ever since 1994, diplomatic dialogues
have been focusing on the future and relevancy of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), the region-wide security group. This year
is no exemption. But a big question looms large: Will the Sept.
11 event change the ARF? Or will it just push the ARF to the
sidelines?
There are many who think the event creates new challenges and
opportunities to act. Western countries and non-ASEAN ARF
countries believe the ARF has to prove its mettle in the post-
Sept. 11 world by responding to the crisis impacting on the
region rather than just standing idly by and exchanging views as
they normally do
But some Asian members -- such as China, Burma, Vietnam and
Laos -- prefer the slow but sure approach. They view the ARF
primarily as a consultative forum, not a launching platform to
respond to crises. Indeed, they do not want to be left behind by
the security dialogue if it moves too fast. As long as it is
confined to an annual meeting and inter-session meetings under
the rubric of confidence-building measures, they feel secure
about the process.
When the ARF started out it was aimed at facilitating dialogue
among countries in the region, in particular between ASEAN and
other countries that mattered to the grouping's collective
security and stability. The major powers, especially the members
of the UN Security Council except UK and France, were invited to
join. Incrementally, other countries with a geographical
footprint in the region such as India, North Korea and Mongolia
became members. At least twenty countries including Pakistan,
Iran and Kazakhstan are currently on the waiting list.
Frequent criticism against the ARF zeroes on its inability to
respond to crises or security developments. Others question
ASEAN's ability to handle the expansion of the ASEAN-security
model with non-ASEAN countries as the majority. For one thing,
ASEAN has yet to seriously focus on the security of the Northeast
Asian region. The grouping does not possess the knowledge to make
progress on the clear problems on the Korean peninsula.
For the time being, ARF participants only discuss military and
security-related issues but have not touched on such
transnational issues as anti-terrorism, drug trafficking, haze,
drug and human smuggling.
To be fair, the nine-year-old talking shop has inculcated
trust building and mutual understanding among members. Once
untouchable issues related to Burma, the Korean peninsula and the
South China Sea as well as nuclear non-proliferation have been
discussed -- sometimes candidly and frankly. A series of security
cooperative frameworks related to disaster relief and rescue,
peacekeeping operations and demining have been touched upon and
could be concretised and implemented in the future.
Annual defense white papers from members willing to share,
including exchanges of security officials, have improved
transparency and the understanding of each other's threat
perceptions and security concerns. In the process, some members
still want to spend more time talking about these areas to build
up mutual trust which they argue is still lacking among major
players, particularly China and the US. The inability to form a
consensus among them has created a benign environment within the
ARF.
In light of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington,
the ARF leaders are expected to set up an inter-session group on
transnational crime and terrorism when they meet in Brunei.
Furthermore, they will agree to allow the chairman of the ARF to
adopt a higher profile in facilitating the discussion and
providing updates on regional security.
During the Bangkok meeting in 2000, Australia proposed the
establishment of "friends of the chair" who can assist the
chairman with specific tasks and issues. This idea could be
agreed upon if there is a strong push from non-ASEAN members.
As such, the ASEAN secretary general and the Jakarta-based
secretariat will have more work to do related to the ARF.
However, ASEAN members still do not want the secretariat to set
up an ARF unit to deal exclusively with ARF coordination and
documentation even though the paper workload has increased many
fold. In addition, Cambodia, as the next ARF chairman, would need
help from the secretariat to prepare for the forum.
That much is clear. But the ARF members have not agreed to
move to the next stage of preventive diplomacy, let alone the
ultimate aim of conflict resolution. Most members think enough
mutual trust has been established among the members to move
ahead. But China, currently one of the most influential ARF
players, does not agree. Beijing still insists that the ARF
should proceed at a pace comfortable to all members.
When the ARF reaches its 10th anniversary next year, a major
review of its purposes and objectives is necessary. The post-
Sept. 11 world is different from the one in 1994 when the Asia-
Pacific was economically strong although some of the major issues
continue such as unresolved territorial disputes, the
China/Taiwan issue, nuclear arms, weapons modernization and
acquisition.
Furthermore, the ARF needs to make further progress in
addressing preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, without
which the ARF process could be render obsolete. The ARF members
must be more willing to discuss non-traditional and non-
conventional security issues.
Finally, the time must come when a non-ASEAN member can be co-
chair of the forum, not just for the inter-session meetings as it
is today.
As always, ASEAN wants to bite off more than it can chew. The
grouping fears it will lose control if the ARF chair falls into
the hands of non-ASEAN members. In more ways than one, ASEAN also
realizes failure to do so could drive away active non-ASEAN
members demanding a stronger sense of belonging. ASEAN, which has
yet to recover from the insecurity resulting from the Asian
economic crisis, will still be in the driving seat, but the
problem is, it does not know where to go.