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Maid issue tests ASEAN unity

Maid issue tests ASEAN unity

By Dewi Fortuna Anwar

JAKARTA (JP): Well-wishers of ASEAN must be watching the
escalating tension between Singapore and the Philippines, sparked
by the hanging of Flor Contemplacion, with growing concern if not
alarm.

It is indeed ironic that at a time when ASEAN is celebrating
its expansion, with Vietnam scheduled to become a full member
next July, a crisis between two founding members may threaten
bilateral relations.

President Ramos threatened to sever diplomatic ties with
Singapore if it is found that the executed Filipino maid was
innocent of the crime of which she was accused. Although this
threat may turn out to be an idle one, made at a time of hurt
national pride and anguish, the fact that it was made at all
clearly shows the seriousness of the situation.

Bilateral crises are of course not new among the ASEAN members
and though they occur from time to time, ASEAN has continued to
flourish and regional harmony has more or less been maintained.

In the past the presence of ASEAN has served to contain intra-
regional conflicts. ASEAN members that find themselves in
conflict have mostly shown restraint so as not to exacerbate the
situation and endanger ASEAN unity.

Since 1968 no bilateral differences have been allowed to
threaten bilateral relations or affect the functioning of ASEAN,
until this crisis in Philippines-Singapore relations.

The execution of Flor Contemplacion by the Singapore
government on March 17, 1995, has some similarities to the
execution of two Indonesian marines by the same government in
1968, and the execution of an Indonesian national, Basri Mase, by
an East Malaysian court in 1991.

A few months after ASEAN was founded the Singapore government
carried out the execution of two Indonesian marines who had been
arrested and sentenced to death for sabotage during the
confrontation period.

President Soeharto sent a personal letter to Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew asking for the death sentence to be commuted, in
view of the new friendly ties between Indonesia and Singapore,
and the fact that the marines had only carried out the order of
the earlier and now discredited government.

The Singapore leader, however, stated that he could not
interfere with the judicial process and the execution was carried
out.

Given that Indonesia was just ending its confrontation with
Malaysia and Singapore, and nationalist fervor barely had time to
cool down, it was not surprising that there was a major public
outcry against Singapore.

The dead marines were received home as national heroes and
given a hero's burial. Many urged the government to take action
against Singapore, including members of Parliament and a few hot-
headed generals who advocated the bombing of Singapore. President
Soeharto himself was reported to have been deeply offended, for
he lost a lot of face when his request was turned down by the
Singapore leader.

Nevertheless, despite the great outpouring of nationalistic
sentiment and the anger of the Indonesian leaders against
Singapore, the Indonesian government as a whole behaved with
restraint. The foreign minister told both the Parliament and the
public to remain calm. Although Jakarta remained cool towards
Singapore for about four years, there was never any threat of
severing bilateral ties. Relations, however, were only fully
restored after Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Jakarta and
sprinkled flowers on the executed marines' cemeteries in the
early 1970s.

When an Indonesian national, Basri Mase, was executed by the
Malaysian government in 1991 for allegedly possessing narcotics,
there was also some public protest in Indonesia. Many people also
doubted Mase's guilt, particularly when the condemned man's wife
made a public appeal for his release.

The execution of Basri Mase cut short an Indonesian-Malaysian
youth meeting taking place in Bogor, and the Indonesian
government called home its ambassador in Kuala Lumpur for
"consultation".

There was no doubt that the Indonesian government was deeply
displeased with the Malaysian government at the time and made its
views known to the other side. Yet again, the crisis was never
allowed to get out of hand and bilateral ties between Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur remained basically unaffected.

One cannot but be struck by the differences in response shown
by the government in Jakarta and in Manila to similar
circumstances. There are clearly many reasons why there are such
glaring differences.

In both cases affecting Indonesian nationals, the Indonesian
government, though angered, did not allow the cases to become a
political issue. It can, of course, be argued that President
Soeharto could afford to ignore popular demands for retaliation
against Singapore or Malaysia because of the lack of democracy in
Indonesia, in contrast to the Philippines. Nevertheless, it
cannot be doubted that the most important reason for the
Indonesian government's restraint was its concern for ASEAN unity
and regional stability. The government also did not want to do
anything to project an aggressive regional image and revive
memories of the confrontation period.

Unlike President Soeharto, President Ramos faces a much more
vibrant and contentious political system. It is becoming quite
clear that Ramos's political opponents are seizing the Flor
Contemplacion issue as a weapon to discredit the government on a
number of issues, such as the large unemployment at home and the
government's inability to protect its nationals working abroad.

It is much harder for President Ramos to try to contain the
issue than for President Soeharto. Ramos could easily be
pilloried for being incompetent and heartless and thus may not be
able to hold on to his job.

Yet it is also becoming quite evident that the inhibitions
that have restrained the Indonesian government when dealing with
fellow ASEAN members are largely absent in the Philippines.

Whatever the provocation it is still rather a shock to read
that President Ramos would go to the length of actually severing
bilateral ties with Singapore. What would happen to ASEAN then?

It is clearly to be hoped that this threat was only made in a
moment of great anger and a sense of personal humiliation. Such a
reaction is probably excusable, since like President Soeharto's
letter earlier, president Ramos's letter to the Singapore
President to defer the death sentence until further investigation
was totally ignored by the latter.

This crisis has again demonstrated the need for ASEAN members
to be sensitive when dealing with each other, both at the
government and societal levels. Although ASEAN adheres to the
principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
it is only natural for a government to try to protect its
nationals living in another country, for that is one of the tasks
of governments. Since the death penalty is so final, unlike
caning, it would probably have been more judicious for the
Singapore government to defer to President Ramos's request to
carry out further investigation and lay all doubts to rest.

After all one can argue that it is better to spare a guilty
life than to take an innocent one in vain. President Ramos's
reaction to Singapore probably reflects the fact that an injury
or a hurt is often more deeply felt if it is perpetrated by some
one close and trusted.

It is to be hoped that this current crisis will soon blow over
as so many other ASEAN crises have done in the past, and ASEAN
can pride itself again on being a harmonious and dynamic regional
grouping.

We should praise the investigation team in Manila which has
asked the government not to break diplomatic ties with Singapore
even if it is proven that Flor Contemplacion was a victim of a
miscarry of justice.

The Singapore government should also be lauded for not
reacting to all the open hostilities coming from the Philippines,
and for its willingness to cooperate in further investigations.

Let us pray that common interests and the ASEAN spirit will
again prevail, and that intra-ASEAN relations will become
stronger after this tragic event.

The writer is head of the Regional and International Division
at the Center for Political and Regional Studies of the
Institute of Sciences.

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