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Maid issue tests ASEAN unity

Maid issue tests ASEAN unity

By Dewi Fortuna Anwar

JAKARTA (JP): Well-wishers of ASEAN must be watching the escalating tension between Singapore and the Philippines, sparked by the hanging of Flor Contemplacion, with growing concern if not alarm.

It is indeed ironic that at a time when ASEAN is celebrating its expansion, with Vietnam scheduled to become a full member next July, a crisis between two founding members may threaten bilateral relations.

President Ramos threatened to sever diplomatic ties with Singapore if it is found that the executed Filipino maid was innocent of the crime of which she was accused. Although this threat may turn out to be an idle one, made at a time of hurt national pride and anguish, the fact that it was made at all clearly shows the seriousness of the situation.

Bilateral crises are of course not new among the ASEAN members and though they occur from time to time, ASEAN has continued to flourish and regional harmony has more or less been maintained.

In the past the presence of ASEAN has served to contain intra- regional conflicts. ASEAN members that find themselves in conflict have mostly shown restraint so as not to exacerbate the situation and endanger ASEAN unity.

Since 1968 no bilateral differences have been allowed to threaten bilateral relations or affect the functioning of ASEAN, until this crisis in Philippines-Singapore relations.

The execution of Flor Contemplacion by the Singapore government on March 17, 1995, has some similarities to the execution of two Indonesian marines by the same government in 1968, and the execution of an Indonesian national, Basri Mase, by an East Malaysian court in 1991.

A few months after ASEAN was founded the Singapore government carried out the execution of two Indonesian marines who had been arrested and sentenced to death for sabotage during the confrontation period.

President Soeharto sent a personal letter to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asking for the death sentence to be commuted, in view of the new friendly ties between Indonesia and Singapore, and the fact that the marines had only carried out the order of the earlier and now discredited government.

The Singapore leader, however, stated that he could not interfere with the judicial process and the execution was carried out.

Given that Indonesia was just ending its confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, and nationalist fervor barely had time to cool down, it was not surprising that there was a major public outcry against Singapore.

The dead marines were received home as national heroes and given a hero's burial. Many urged the government to take action against Singapore, including members of Parliament and a few hot- headed generals who advocated the bombing of Singapore. President Soeharto himself was reported to have been deeply offended, for he lost a lot of face when his request was turned down by the Singapore leader.

Nevertheless, despite the great outpouring of nationalistic sentiment and the anger of the Indonesian leaders against Singapore, the Indonesian government as a whole behaved with restraint. The foreign minister told both the Parliament and the public to remain calm. Although Jakarta remained cool towards Singapore for about four years, there was never any threat of severing bilateral ties. Relations, however, were only fully restored after Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Jakarta and sprinkled flowers on the executed marines' cemeteries in the early 1970s.

When an Indonesian national, Basri Mase, was executed by the Malaysian government in 1991 for allegedly possessing narcotics, there was also some public protest in Indonesia. Many people also doubted Mase's guilt, particularly when the condemned man's wife made a public appeal for his release.

The execution of Basri Mase cut short an Indonesian-Malaysian youth meeting taking place in Bogor, and the Indonesian government called home its ambassador in Kuala Lumpur for "consultation".

There was no doubt that the Indonesian government was deeply displeased with the Malaysian government at the time and made its views known to the other side. Yet again, the crisis was never allowed to get out of hand and bilateral ties between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur remained basically unaffected.

One cannot but be struck by the differences in response shown by the government in Jakarta and in Manila to similar circumstances. There are clearly many reasons why there are such glaring differences.

In both cases affecting Indonesian nationals, the Indonesian government, though angered, did not allow the cases to become a political issue. It can, of course, be argued that President Soeharto could afford to ignore popular demands for retaliation against Singapore or Malaysia because of the lack of democracy in Indonesia, in contrast to the Philippines. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the most important reason for the Indonesian government's restraint was its concern for ASEAN unity and regional stability. The government also did not want to do anything to project an aggressive regional image and revive memories of the confrontation period.

Unlike President Soeharto, President Ramos faces a much more vibrant and contentious political system. It is becoming quite clear that Ramos's political opponents are seizing the Flor Contemplacion issue as a weapon to discredit the government on a number of issues, such as the large unemployment at home and the government's inability to protect its nationals working abroad.

It is much harder for President Ramos to try to contain the issue than for President Soeharto. Ramos could easily be pilloried for being incompetent and heartless and thus may not be able to hold on to his job.

Yet it is also becoming quite evident that the inhibitions that have restrained the Indonesian government when dealing with fellow ASEAN members are largely absent in the Philippines.

Whatever the provocation it is still rather a shock to read that President Ramos would go to the length of actually severing bilateral ties with Singapore. What would happen to ASEAN then?

It is clearly to be hoped that this threat was only made in a moment of great anger and a sense of personal humiliation. Such a reaction is probably excusable, since like President Soeharto's letter earlier, president Ramos's letter to the Singapore President to defer the death sentence until further investigation was totally ignored by the latter.

This crisis has again demonstrated the need for ASEAN members to be sensitive when dealing with each other, both at the government and societal levels. Although ASEAN adheres to the principles of non-interference in each other's internal affairs, it is only natural for a government to try to protect its nationals living in another country, for that is one of the tasks of governments. Since the death penalty is so final, unlike caning, it would probably have been more judicious for the Singapore government to defer to President Ramos's request to carry out further investigation and lay all doubts to rest.

After all one can argue that it is better to spare a guilty life than to take an innocent one in vain. President Ramos's reaction to Singapore probably reflects the fact that an injury or a hurt is often more deeply felt if it is perpetrated by some one close and trusted.

It is to be hoped that this current crisis will soon blow over as so many other ASEAN crises have done in the past, and ASEAN can pride itself again on being a harmonious and dynamic regional grouping.

We should praise the investigation team in Manila which has asked the government not to break diplomatic ties with Singapore even if it is proven that Flor Contemplacion was a victim of a miscarry of justice.

The Singapore government should also be lauded for not reacting to all the open hostilities coming from the Philippines, and for its willingness to cooperate in further investigations.

Let us pray that common interests and the ASEAN spirit will again prevail, and that intra-ASEAN relations will become stronger after this tragic event.

The writer is head of the Regional and International Division at the Center for Political and Regional Studies of the Institute of Sciences.

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