Lenders Cannot Guarantee, and Banks Must Not Let Their Guard Down
OJK’s warning that banks should not partner indiscriminately with online lending platforms is not merely a restatement of the prudential principle. It raises a fundamental question: who bears what responsibility when a partnership between a bank and a platform goes wrong?
As of September 2026, the online lending industry’s rate of default on loans more than 90 days overdue (TWP90) stood at 5.36 per cent, above the 5 per cent safety threshold and up from 4.73 per cent the previous month. Outstanding funding totalled Rp106.48 trillion. In May 2026, bank funding channelled through online lending platforms amounted to Rp67.61 trillion, or 65.17 per cent of the sector’s outstanding total of Rp103.73 trillion at the time. Deteriorating loan quality could affect the quality of assets held by the banks providing the funding.
At the CNBC Indonesia Digital Bank Forum on 10 November 2026, OJK Chief Executive for Banking Supervision Dian Ediana Rae urged banks to review their partnerships with platforms and even temporarily halt disbursements through partners whose non-performing loans had surged. Such guidance can only be acted on if contracts give banks control over disbursements, including the right to pause them, and clearly define the limits of risk transfer. Knowing the platform is not enough.
Banks Own the Receivables; Platforms Act as Intermediaries
Under a channelling arrangement, a bank extends credit to borrowers through an online lending provider (hereafter, the platform). Under OJK Regulation No. 40 of 2024 on Information Technology-Based Joint Funding Services, the bank is the funder, while the platform connects it with the recipient of funds.
The same regulation prohibits providers from acting as funders or recipients of funds. In other words, the bank does not lend to the platform for it to lend the money on. This distinction determines where the receivable and the risk lie.
In civil law, the relationship between a bank and a platform resembles an agency arrangement (Article 1792 of the Civil Code), limited to operational tasks such as verification, disbursement and collection. An agent may not exceed its authority (Article 1797) and is liable for its own negligence (Article 1801). But using a partner does not transfer credit risk away from the bank.
For Islamic banks, this position is even clearer. DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 117/DSN-MUI/II/2018 treats the platform as an agent under a wakalah bil ujrah contract, which covers operational work in return for a fee. Islamic commercial jurisprudence has long distinguished amanah (trust) from dhaman (liability): an agent holds a trust but does not guarantee the outcome. The financing decision remains with the bank.
No Guarantee Does Not Mean No Liability
Article 158 of OJK Regulation No. 40/2024 prohibits providers from giving any form of guarantee for another party’s fulfilment of its obligations. The prohibition prevents a platform from turning from an intermediary into a guarantor of a borrower’s debt.
If a borrower defaults because its business has suffered losses, despite the assessment and disbursement having complied with the rules, that is credit risk and cannot be charged to the platform as though it were a guarantor. The position is different if the loss results from the platform manipulating information, exceeding its authority or acting negligently. Any claim would then be based on the platform’s own fault, not the borrower’s failure to pay.
DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 113/DSN-MUI/IX/2017 on wakalah bil ujrah provides that an agent is liable for damages only if it is negligent, exceeds its authority or breaches the agreed terms. Civil law, OJK regulations and the fatwa converge on one principle: a prohibition on guarantees does not mean an agent can evade responsibility.
The same principle applies to consumers. Article 10(1) of OJK Regulation No. 22 of 2023 requires financial services businesses to take responsibility for consumer losses caused by errors, negligence or breaches by third parties representing them or working on their behalf. A bank cannot hide behind its partner, including when that partner collects debts in the bank’s name.
One Agent, Two Duties of Trust
In some arrangements, the platform acts as agent for both the bank and the borrower. One example is Islamic factoring involving an unpaid supplier invoice. Under DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 67/DSN-MUI/III/2008 and Fatwa No. 117, the product centres on an agency arrangement for debt collection: the borrower authorises the collection of its receivable, and in practice the platform carries it out. The advance is repaid from the proceeds of that receivable.
Both agency arrangements are valid. However, the bank is not a party to the collection contract, even though repayment depends on the proceeds it generates. When a buyer is late in paying, the platform, as the bank’s agent, should report the delay promptly; as the borrower’s agent, however, it may be inclined to grant an extension. One party holds a duty of trust to both sides, while the bank sees only the report coming from that same party.
Banks therefore need an independent information channel: audit rights and direct access to collection data, as well as control over cash flows through a collection account held under the bank’s control. The distinction is clear: holding the borrower’s collection proceeds is a way to control cash flow, whereas requiring the platform to place its own money as security resembles a guarantee. That is where reassurance can begin to become a problem.
The Trap of Hidden Guarantees
That reassurance is often offered through bridge financing, the repurchase of bad loans, a platform’s obligation to absorb first losses, or the placement of the platform’s funds in a bank account as security. What matters is not the name of the clause, but what triggers payment and which losses it covers.
If the platform must pay whenever a borrower defaults, regardless of any fault on its part, the clause effectively makes it a guarantor. If that conflicts with Article 158, the issue goes beyond compliance with OJK rules.
The validity of such a clause may be challenged under the requirement for a “lawful cause” in Articles 1320 and 1337 of the Civil Code, which encompasses not only regulatory prohibitions but also morality and public order. The prohibition is a prudential rule designed to protect the financial system, not merely an administrative matter.
The need for protection remains legitimate, and there are authorised channels for it: Article 148 of OJK Regulation No. 40/2024 allows credit insurance or credit guarantees through OJK-licensed insurance companies or guarantee institutions. For Islamic banks, the need for kafalah (a guarantee) should be met by an Islamic guarantee company, rather than imposed on the platform. Such protection, however, does not replace the bank’s own credit assessment.
A Bank’s Screening Must Be More Than a Rubber Stamp
The best safeguards are put in place before funds are disbursed. Article 8(1) of the Banking Law requires commercial banks to form a belief, based on an in-depth analysis, in a borrower’s good faith, ability and willingness to repay. Article 23(1) of the Islamic Banking Law sets out a corresponding requirement for financing.
A bank can set Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC). But having criteria on paper does not prove that the bank has control. Who sets and changes the criteria? Who has the authority to approve or reject funding? And does the bank receive enough data to test the assessment’s results?
This is where another prohibition in Article 158 is relevant: a provider may not represent a funder in making funding decisions or provide an automatic funding feature. The rule does not prohibit wakalah bil ujrah for operational work; it prevents platforms from having free rein to allocate funds as they choose.
Such a role would more closely resemble wakalah bil istitsmar, or agency to invest funds, as set out in DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 126/DSN-MUI/VII/2019. The contract is valid under Islamic law, but OJK regulations do not grant platforms that role.
Automation must not blur accountability. Sample checks, monitoring the quality of loans by disbursement period, and exposure limits for each partner can test whether screening is genuinely working. They also help banks know when to pause disbursements. Without these measures, RAC is merely a rubber stamp for the platform’s decisions.
Aligning Incentives
Controls need to be supported by healthy incentives. If fees are tied to volume while deteriorating funding quality has no effect on a platform’s income, the incentive to increase disbursements may outweigh the incentive to maintain quality. Agency theory describes this as moral hazard.
The principle of proportionality in commercial contracts, as explained by Agus Yudha Hernoko, points to a solution: allocate burdens according to each party’s role and control. Fatwa No. 113 allows fees (ujrah) to be set as a fixed amount, a percentage or an agreed formula known to the parties. Part of the fee could be linked to the quality of the platform’s agency work: the thoroughness of verification, compliance with the bank’s criteria and prompt reporting of arrears.
The principle that commercial dealings are permissible by default, which underpins DSN-MUI fatwas, also leaves room for this approach. Any adjustment should apply to fees for future periods, in line with DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 112/DSN-MUI/IX/2017 on ijarah, which allows fees to be reviewed for benefits not yet received, rather than clawing back fees already paid.
What should be measured is the quality of the agent’s work, not whether the borrower repays. Cutting the fee every time a borrower defaults would be equivalent to making the agent a guarantor. The formula must be clear from the outset to avoid gharar, or prohibited uncertainty, under Fatwa No. 117. The aim is to align incentives, not disguise a guarantee.
A Partner Put to the Test
Partnerships between banks and online lending platforms can broaden access to financing, including for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. The benefits will be more sustainable if the limits of authority, information flows and allocation of responsibilities are clear from the outset. Banks bear the consequences of their credit decisions; platforms are responsible for their own obligations and faults. Trust in a borrower is a responsibility that cannot simply be handed over.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/lenders-cannot-guarantee-and-banks-must-not-let-their-guard-down-1794783031)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261115221612-14-785408/pindar-tak-boleh-menjamin-bank-tak-boleh-lengah), translated from Indonesian