KNKT Investigation Results Released, Revealing 6 Factors Behind Anggrek vs KRL Train Collision
The National Transportation Safety Committee (KNCK) has released the investigation results of the fatal accident involving the Anggrek Train (formerly Argo Bromo Anggrek) and a Commuter Line (KRL) at Bekasi Timur Station, which resulted in 16 deaths. The KNKT outlined several findings and contributing factors, ranging from microphone issues to scratches on the locomotive windshield, that contributed to the accident.
According to the report released on Monday (28/09/2026), the chronology of the accident between Train 4B Argo Bromo Anggrek and Train 5568A Commuter Line on Track 1 of Bekasi Timur Station occurred on 27 April 2026, at 20:52 WIB.
The brief chronology outlined by the KNKT is as follows:
27 April 2026
20:48:24 WIB: A collision occurred between Commuter Line Train 5181B, travelling from Tambun Station towards Bekasi Timur, and a Battery-Based Electric Vehicle (e-taxi) at JPL 86 Ampera Road (downstream track).
20:48:55 WIB: Train 5568A (KRL) stopped at Track I (upstream) of Bekasi Timur Station for passenger boarding and alighting.
20:49:19 WIB: Train 5568A (KRL) moved approximately 1.69 metres towards Tambun Station.
20:49:24 WIB: Train 5568A stopped again as the driver observed a crowd of people on the upstream track towards Tambun Station.
20:50:43 WIB: Train 4B (Anggrek Train) proceeded directly on Track III of Bekasi Station.
20:52:12 WIB: A collision occurred between Train 4B and Train 5568A on Track I (upstream) of Bekasi Timur Station.
The KNKT noted that there were 123 victims in the accident, with 107 people injured and 16 fatalities.
KNKT Conclusions
In this report, the KNKT also outlined conclusions divided into two main points: findings and contributing factors. There were 60 specific findings related to this accident.
These findings include discrepancies between actual train movements and the Train Journey Schedule (GAPEKA). The KNKT found that KRL Train 5568A departed from Bekasi Station 8 minutes and 32 seconds later than scheduled, while the Anggrek Train (4B) departed 3 minutes and 17 seconds earlier than stipulated in the GAPEKA.
Furthermore, there were discrepancies in the time references used by various communication radio types at the Daop 1 Jakarta Train Control Centre, locomotive loggers, signalling system loggers, train CCTV, and the Daop 1 Jakarta Train Control Centre CCTV.
Additionally, the KNKT highlighted issues within the communication channels. The KNKT stated that information regarding KRL Train 5568A being held at Bekasi Timur Station due to a crowd following the collision between the KRL and an electric taxi was not conveyed to the South PPKP officers. This occurred because the South PPKP officers were preoccupied with handling the aftermath of the KRL-taxi collision.
The KNKT stated that the driver of Train 5568A contacted the South PPKP via individual calls rather than through emergency calls. The KNKT also noted that the presence of several operating systems and communication equipment at the South PPKP caused noise pollution.
The KNKT also stated that the Anggrek Train (4B) locomotive utilised a polycarbonate windshield which was found to have numerous wiper scratches and swirl marks on the surface. The KNKT stated that this condition caused light sources from the lamps to appear more diffused, with significant light scattering into the locomotive cabin.
The KNKT also found that the driver of the Anggrek Train had never received training for emergency braking scenarios. They also noted the absence of procedures for emergency braking at high speeds on curved tracks.
“The driver of Train 4B had never received training regarding scenarios requiring emergency braking or the tactics of emergency braking. There were no procedures for emergency braking at high speeds on curved tracks,” wrote the KNKT.
The KNKT then outlined six contributing factors to the accident. However, the KNKT clarified that these contributing factors are not intended to assign administrative, civil, or criminal fault or responsibility.
“The identification of contributing factors is not intended to establish fault or responsibility in an administrative, civil, or criminal capacity. The contributing factors are arranged chronologically and do not indicate the level of contribution to the occurrence of the accident,” the KNKT wrote.
The six contributing factors are:
Failure to identify hazard conditions in the signalling between Bekasi and Bekasi Timur Stations.
Communication issues during emergency conditions.
Communication failure of Train 5568A.
Lack of an information delivery mechanism between South PPKP and East PPKP.
Failure to identify aspects of the UB104 Auxiliary Signal.
Absence of emergency braking procedures at high speeds on curved tracks.
The KNKT subsequently provided several recommendations, including speed restrictions for intercity and urban trains on the Bekasi-Tambun route.
The KNKT also stated that trains must not depart from Bekasi Station towards Tambun until there is certainty that the train ahead has passed Bekasi Timur Station. They also requested an evaluation of emergency communication patterns.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/knkt-investigation-results-released-revealing-6-factors-behind-anggrek-vs-krl-train-collision-1790593351)
Originally published by detikcom (https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8682981/hasil-investigasi-knkt-dirilis-ungkap-6-faktor-picu-tabrakan-ka-anggrek-vs-krl), translated from Indonesian