Japan's relationship with enlarged ASEAN to change

Japan's relationship with enlarged ASEAN to change

By Lee Poh Ping

Japan's relationship with South-east Asia will change when
ASEAN expands to include all 10 of the region's states.

One of the major problems that confronted Japanese diplomacy
in South-east Asia in the Cold War period was the division of the
region into a non-communist ASEAN, and a communist-dominated
Indochina and an autarkic Burma.

At the time, some Japanese lamented that they had to deal with
a divided South-east Asian "backyard" whereas in other comparable
situations of relations between a big power and its "sphere of
influence", such as between the United States and Latin America
or between the then Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, no
significant ideological divisions in their backyards complicated
the issue. In the American case, communist Cuba was an isolated
example.

That it was not the only big power operating in South-east
Asia constituted a second problem for Japan's diplomacy in the
region then. Where in the two examples the U.S. and the Soviet
Union were the dominant powers in their respective backyards,
Japan had to contend with America, the Soviet Union and China in
South-east Asia.

The Japanese overcame this complexity by treating ASEAN as
though it was South-east Asia. They essentially played second
fiddle to the United States politically while concentrating on
their economic relations with ASEAN. They also knew that Soviet
and Chinese influence within ASEAN was, at the time, not that
great. They could be "contained" with American help.

There were three reasons why the Japanese focused on ASEAN.
One reason was simply that Myanmar and communist Indochina were
not hospitable to Japanese business. Myanmar practiced self-
sufficiency for most of the period. It did not allow much foreign
economic penetration. The countries of Indochina in the early
1950s and 1960s were politically unstable with their governments
confronted with communist movements, which finally triumphed in
1975.

In 1975, a communist-dominated Indochina cut itself off from
the international economy, thus allowing for very little Japanese
economic participation even if had been wanted by the Japanese.
By contrast, the countries of ASEAN were for the most part quite
stable political entities linked to the international economy.
Japanese business found these countries quite hospitable.

A second reason was that ASEAN possessed those things in great
abundance that Japan had always desired in South-east Asia. The
ASEAN countries had oil, timber, tin, rubber, iron ore, natural
gas and so on which the Japanese found attractive.

Moreover, with a population of around 350 million (and
relatively wealthy compared to Indochina and Myanmar), ASEAN
constituted a big market, much bigger than the roughly over 100
million population of Indochina and Myanmar.

Added to this, the strategic waterways of the Strait of
Malacca in South-east Asia, which some Japanese have called a
Japanese "lifeline" because the oil from the Persian Gulf passes
through it on the way to Japan, lie within the three littoral
states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

The end of the Cold War has basically done away with the
South-east Asian ideological divide (even if internally Vietnam
continues to insist on being a socialist state formally) and has
made it possible for the Indochinese countries to join together
with ASEAN as members of a South-east Asian entity.

Vietnam has joined ASEAN, and it is quite possible Laos,
Cambodia and Myanmar may join later. If these last three were to
join such an entity, an ASEAN of 10 South-east Asian countries
would affect Japanese policy towards South-east Asia.

A non-ideologically divided, even if not a cohesive, South-
east Asia would be less complex for Japan to deal with. If South-
east Asia was to speak with one voice, Japan would have a clearer
idea as to how the region could be treated.

But less complex need not necessarily mean easier. On the
economic front, the clout of ASEAN-10 would increase in relation
to Japan. Whatever success is achieved in the diversification of
Japanese resources for raw materials and the miniaturization of
its economy, Japan still needs South-east Asian raw materials.

The inclusion of Myanmar with its teak and precious metals,
and that of Vietnam with its offshore oil (which could
conceivably become of even greater importance to Japan and other
powers if the supply of Persian Gulf oil becomes uncertain) would
make it even more attractive to Japan.

Second, ASEAN as a production base for Japan greatly increases
in value with the addition of Vietnam's 70 million disciplined
people.

Third, the ASEAN market -- of 10 countries -- would also
increase to a population of about 500 million. This would be
especially important as Japan turns increasingly towards East
Asian and South-east Asian markets as a result of Western
protectionist moves against it.

An ASEAN of 10 member countries would also have greater
political leverage with Japan. While in the past many believed
that an ASEAN of five states was very dependent economically on
Japan, the grouping had some bargaining power in the political
arena with Japan. How much more will it have when an ASEAN of 10
members actually represents South-east Asia?

Dr. Lee Poh Ping is Professor at the Faculty of Economics and
Administration, University of Malaya.