Japan's relationship with enlarged ASEAN to change

Japan's relationship with enlarged ASEAN to change

By Lee Poh Ping

Japan's relationship with South-east Asia will change when ASEAN expands to include all 10 of the region's states.

One of the major problems that confronted Japanese diplomacy in South-east Asia in the Cold War period was the division of the region into a non-communist ASEAN, and a communist-dominated Indochina and an autarkic Burma.

At the time, some Japanese lamented that they had to deal with a divided South-east Asian "backyard" whereas in other comparable situations of relations between a big power and its "sphere of influence", such as between the United States and Latin America or between the then Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, no significant ideological divisions in their backyards complicated the issue. In the American case, communist Cuba was an isolated example.

That it was not the only big power operating in South-east Asia constituted a second problem for Japan's diplomacy in the region then. Where in the two examples the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the dominant powers in their respective backyards, Japan had to contend with America, the Soviet Union and China in South-east Asia.

The Japanese overcame this complexity by treating ASEAN as though it was South-east Asia. They essentially played second fiddle to the United States politically while concentrating on their economic relations with ASEAN. They also knew that Soviet and Chinese influence within ASEAN was, at the time, not that great. They could be "contained" with American help.

There were three reasons why the Japanese focused on ASEAN. One reason was simply that Myanmar and communist Indochina were not hospitable to Japanese business. Myanmar practiced self- sufficiency for most of the period. It did not allow much foreign economic penetration. The countries of Indochina in the early 1950s and 1960s were politically unstable with their governments confronted with communist movements, which finally triumphed in 1975.

In 1975, a communist-dominated Indochina cut itself off from the international economy, thus allowing for very little Japanese economic participation even if had been wanted by the Japanese. By contrast, the countries of ASEAN were for the most part quite stable political entities linked to the international economy. Japanese business found these countries quite hospitable.

A second reason was that ASEAN possessed those things in great abundance that Japan had always desired in South-east Asia. The ASEAN countries had oil, timber, tin, rubber, iron ore, natural gas and so on which the Japanese found attractive.

Moreover, with a population of around 350 million (and relatively wealthy compared to Indochina and Myanmar), ASEAN constituted a big market, much bigger than the roughly over 100 million population of Indochina and Myanmar.

Added to this, the strategic waterways of the Strait of Malacca in South-east Asia, which some Japanese have called a Japanese "lifeline" because the oil from the Persian Gulf passes through it on the way to Japan, lie within the three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

The end of the Cold War has basically done away with the South-east Asian ideological divide (even if internally Vietnam continues to insist on being a socialist state formally) and has made it possible for the Indochinese countries to join together with ASEAN as members of a South-east Asian entity.

Vietnam has joined ASEAN, and it is quite possible Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar may join later. If these last three were to join such an entity, an ASEAN of 10 South-east Asian countries would affect Japanese policy towards South-east Asia.

A non-ideologically divided, even if not a cohesive, South- east Asia would be less complex for Japan to deal with. If South- east Asia was to speak with one voice, Japan would have a clearer idea as to how the region could be treated.

But less complex need not necessarily mean easier. On the economic front, the clout of ASEAN-10 would increase in relation to Japan. Whatever success is achieved in the diversification of Japanese resources for raw materials and the miniaturization of its economy, Japan still needs South-east Asian raw materials.

The inclusion of Myanmar with its teak and precious metals, and that of Vietnam with its offshore oil (which could conceivably become of even greater importance to Japan and other powers if the supply of Persian Gulf oil becomes uncertain) would make it even more attractive to Japan.

Second, ASEAN as a production base for Japan greatly increases in value with the addition of Vietnam's 70 million disciplined people.

Third, the ASEAN market -- of 10 countries -- would also increase to a population of about 500 million. This would be especially important as Japan turns increasingly towards East Asian and South-east Asian markets as a result of Western protectionist moves against it.

An ASEAN of 10 member countries would also have greater political leverage with Japan. While in the past many believed that an ASEAN of five states was very dependent economically on Japan, the grouping had some bargaining power in the political arena with Japan. How much more will it have when an ASEAN of 10 members actually represents South-east Asia?

Dr. Lee Poh Ping is Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya.