Japan faces skepticism over security role

Japan faces skepticism over security role

By Kavi Chongkittavorn

BANGKOK: As China rapidly improves its position in the global
community, in economic, political and security areas, Japan is
shifting its foreign and security policies to safeguard its
interests and maintain its competitive edge in the region.

Japan realizes that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which
has provided security for Japan since the end of World War II, is
no longer sufficient in itself on a broader regional scale. Given
the current strategic environment, it would need additional
assurances from within the region concerning the protection of
Japan's security interests.

But the country is at a crossroads as it tries to reconcile
its security needs and the growing pressure to assume greater
security responsibilities. Beyond that, Japan still must convince
Southeast Asian countries that a militarily stronger Japan is
pivotal to the region's future stability and prosperity.

Therefore, it was no surprise that Japan's latest defense
white paper, presented to the Cabinet last week, has urged the
government to consider lifting a self-imposed ban on collective
self-defense. Such an action, if it were to materialize, would
allow Japan to play a security role in Asia, not only within the
context of security cooperation with the United States.

The call for such a move will definitely draw flak from China
and Southeast Asian countries which suffered directly from
Japan's past military actions. Thailand is an exception, though,
as it wishes to see the balance of power between China and Japan
established as soon as possible.

In Bangkok's view, such an equilibrium can only be discussed
and subsequently achieved if the region adopts an open-minded
attitude. Fear of a potential revival of Japanese militarism is
still alive. Thailand's effort in 1988 to raise the profile of
Japan's defense role in the region was met with strong opposition
by its neighbors.

Japan's right for collective self-defense, which is not
allowed under its current constitution, will continue to dominate
the ongoing discussion within the region, along with the emerging
new regional order, which will witness China as the looming
superpower in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's
government and Foreign Ministry is trying to find ways for Japan
and its war victims to reach "closure" on the past.

China has been working extremely hard with Southeast Asia to
strengthen confidence-building mechanisms. The ongoing
negotiations to conclude the regional code of conduct with the
members of ASEAN, which is expected to be signed in November in
Brunei, is just one of the typical examples.

While such efforts are not totally lacking from Japan, as it
relies mostly on the U.S.-Japan security umbrella, they have not
been given priority. Japan knows the sensitivity involved in
raising the issue of security-related cooperation with Southeast
Asia. There has been limited maritime cooperation between Japan
and Southeast Asian countries on a bilateral basis. But this
process has been moving at a snail's pace.

Japan has yet to convince the rest of Southeast Asia in
sharing its view of China's threat in the white paper's latest
assessment of both China's and Taiwan's militaries and their
impacts. Their defense capabilities have direct and serious
implications on the countries in the region. In more ways than
one, there exists an urgent need to bridge the gap in perception
of security issues that exists between Japan and the region. To a
certain extent, Japan's expanded security role, real or imagine,
will hinge on the region's sharing Japan's views on these issues.

Ironically, as of now, China has succeeded in narrowing the
perception gap between itself and the rest of Southeast Asia.
That helps explain why Japan faces a tougher time gaining
confidence of its desired role in regional security. The
longstanding failure to solicit views from the region on the
U.S.-Japan security cooperation and planning continue to raise
suspicions that insufficient efforts have been made to safeguard
regional security.

Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan confrontation regarding the rape
case in Okinawa will only weaken their mutual security relations
in the long run. Faced with this inevitable trend, Japan covets a
better rapport with the region, which has been slow in coming.

China has argued for years that Japan has been using Beijing
as a bogeyman to urge Southeast Asia to be vigilant against its
military build-up. Beijing has said its defense program has been
moderate and focused on self-defense. Japan's latest defense
white paper was rather obvious in its detailed analysis of the
China's intentions regarding Taiwan. Be forewarned, Southeast
Asia!

While Japan and Southeast Asia both feature China as the power
to be reckoned with in their defense strategies, the absence of a
shared perceived threat has allowed China to establish footholds
in the Southeast Asian scheme at the expense of Japan's security
posture.

As such, Southeast Asia is left to deal with the United States
to counter China's growing influence. This approach has
underlying weaknesses as the region's perception of the United
States has become more varied. For instance, there is no
consensus within the region on the U.S. controversial missile
defense plan.

As long as the region views Japan's perception of China as an
extension of the U.S.' broader containment policy, it will be
hard for Japan to bridge the gap with Southeast Asia, in which it
has far bigger economic stake than China.

-- The Nation/Asia News Network