Japan faces skepticism over security role

Japan faces skepticism over security role

By Kavi Chongkittavorn

BANGKOK: As China rapidly improves its position in the global community, in economic, political and security areas, Japan is shifting its foreign and security policies to safeguard its interests and maintain its competitive edge in the region.

Japan realizes that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which has provided security for Japan since the end of World War II, is no longer sufficient in itself on a broader regional scale. Given the current strategic environment, it would need additional assurances from within the region concerning the protection of Japan's security interests.

But the country is at a crossroads as it tries to reconcile its security needs and the growing pressure to assume greater security responsibilities. Beyond that, Japan still must convince Southeast Asian countries that a militarily stronger Japan is pivotal to the region's future stability and prosperity.

Therefore, it was no surprise that Japan's latest defense white paper, presented to the Cabinet last week, has urged the government to consider lifting a self-imposed ban on collective self-defense. Such an action, if it were to materialize, would allow Japan to play a security role in Asia, not only within the context of security cooperation with the United States.

The call for such a move will definitely draw flak from China and Southeast Asian countries which suffered directly from Japan's past military actions. Thailand is an exception, though, as it wishes to see the balance of power between China and Japan established as soon as possible.

In Bangkok's view, such an equilibrium can only be discussed and subsequently achieved if the region adopts an open-minded attitude. Fear of a potential revival of Japanese militarism is still alive. Thailand's effort in 1988 to raise the profile of Japan's defense role in the region was met with strong opposition by its neighbors.

Japan's right for collective self-defense, which is not allowed under its current constitution, will continue to dominate the ongoing discussion within the region, along with the emerging new regional order, which will witness China as the looming superpower in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's government and Foreign Ministry is trying to find ways for Japan and its war victims to reach "closure" on the past.

China has been working extremely hard with Southeast Asia to strengthen confidence-building mechanisms. The ongoing negotiations to conclude the regional code of conduct with the members of ASEAN, which is expected to be signed in November in Brunei, is just one of the typical examples.

While such efforts are not totally lacking from Japan, as it relies mostly on the U.S.-Japan security umbrella, they have not been given priority. Japan knows the sensitivity involved in raising the issue of security-related cooperation with Southeast Asia. There has been limited maritime cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asian countries on a bilateral basis. But this process has been moving at a snail's pace.

Japan has yet to convince the rest of Southeast Asia in sharing its view of China's threat in the white paper's latest assessment of both China's and Taiwan's militaries and their impacts. Their defense capabilities have direct and serious implications on the countries in the region. In more ways than one, there exists an urgent need to bridge the gap in perception of security issues that exists between Japan and the region. To a certain extent, Japan's expanded security role, real or imagine, will hinge on the region's sharing Japan's views on these issues.

Ironically, as of now, China has succeeded in narrowing the perception gap between itself and the rest of Southeast Asia. That helps explain why Japan faces a tougher time gaining confidence of its desired role in regional security. The longstanding failure to solicit views from the region on the U.S.-Japan security cooperation and planning continue to raise suspicions that insufficient efforts have been made to safeguard regional security.

Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan confrontation regarding the rape case in Okinawa will only weaken their mutual security relations in the long run. Faced with this inevitable trend, Japan covets a better rapport with the region, which has been slow in coming.

China has argued for years that Japan has been using Beijing as a bogeyman to urge Southeast Asia to be vigilant against its military build-up. Beijing has said its defense program has been moderate and focused on self-defense. Japan's latest defense white paper was rather obvious in its detailed analysis of the China's intentions regarding Taiwan. Be forewarned, Southeast Asia!

While Japan and Southeast Asia both feature China as the power to be reckoned with in their defense strategies, the absence of a shared perceived threat has allowed China to establish footholds in the Southeast Asian scheme at the expense of Japan's security posture.

As such, Southeast Asia is left to deal with the United States to counter China's growing influence. This approach has underlying weaknesses as the region's perception of the United States has become more varied. For instance, there is no consensus within the region on the U.S. controversial missile defense plan.

As long as the region views Japan's perception of China as an extension of the U.S.' broader containment policy, it will be hard for Japan to bridge the gap with Southeast Asia, in which it has far bigger economic stake than China.

-- The Nation/Asia News Network