Islamic Financial Institutions Must Move Up a Gear: More Than Just Selling Halal Products
Building an Islamic financial institution (LKS) is like launching a magnificent ship to sail the ocean of the community’s economy. Its hull is sturdy, its sails—adorned with calligraphy—are fully unfurled, and it flies the flag of compliance with fatwas. Everyone applauds and praises the ship’s design—which, in finance, takes the form of a range of halal products.
But when the ship begins to cross the rough waters of the business world, a bitter reality emerges. Its helm is not equipped with digital navigation instruments, its storm-monitoring radar does not work, and its captain has no standardised early-warning system. The ship often veers off course. It is not unstable because its blueprint is flawed, but because it lacks adequate operational infrastructure to keep it on the right track.
This ship represents the state of our Islamic finance industry. LKS are often urged to “move up a gear”, but the phrase is interpreted solely in terms of numbers: asset growth, digital sophistication or a leap in profits. These are all important, of course. Yet one crucial dimension is often left behind: moving up a gear in Sharia compliance itself.
What does that mean? Let us unpack it.
The most basic requirement for an LKS is to ensure it offers halal products. Like a restaurant, its menu must be free of prohibited elements. LKS staff are expected to understand the relevant legal principles and standard procedures—for example, for murabahah financing (a sale-and-purchase contract). Being able to explain a murabahah contract to a customer is a worthwhile achievement, but it does not yet mean the institution has truly moved up a gear.
The real challenge is not simply having halal products available, but ensuring their implementation on the ground is consistently Sharia-compliant. In practice, we often encounter what some practitioners sarcastically call “contract abuse”. For the sake of convenience and meeting performance targets, almost every customer need is forced into the same mould: murabahah.
Murabahah is indeed the most practical contract for both customers and LKS. For example, if a customer applies for financing of Rp100 million, their debt consists of the Rp100 million principal plus a margin of, say, Rp10 million. With a 10-month term, the instalment is easy to calculate at Rp1.1 million a month (Rp11 million in total). For the LKS, the accounting is also straightforward because the instalment amount is fixed.
This is very different from a profit-sharing contract (ABH), where instalments fluctuate in line with the customer’s actual income. This is often considered burdensome for both the LKS and the customer. But using “it is too much trouble” as a reason to force every transaction into murabahah points to stalled governance. That LKS has not moved up a gear.
Even in the implementation of murabahah, the institution’s mainstay, there are still ample opportunities for breaches. Most murabahah transactions begin with a wakalah (agency) contract. This means the LKS authorises the customer to purchase the goods. The customer receives cash from the LKS and then acts as its agent to buy the goods from a vendor.
On paper, this arrangement is valid. In practice, however, the risk of side-streaming—the use of funds for purposes other than the intended purchase of goods—is considerable. Sharia principles must not exist merely as a label on a brochure; they must be embedded in the institution’s everyday operating systems.
Customer education alone, therefore, will not be enough to prevent side-streaming. An LKS that has moved up a gear is one that builds systems to oversee implementation. It may need to create a digitally integrated network of vendors. The process could be made precise: when customers apply for financing, they select goods from a digital catalogue of the LKS’s partner vendors. Once the order is confirmed, the LKS transfers payment directly to the vendor, which then delivers the goods to the customer. This would close off opportunities for side-streaming.
Another sign that the industry still needs to move up a gear is the position of profit-sharing contracts (ABH). We should not be too quick to applaud claims that musyarakah is beginning to dominate Islamic banks’ portfolios. According to Financial Services Authority (OJK) data for June 2025, musyarakah accounted for 51.13 per cent of contracts at Islamic Commercial Banks (BUS), Islamic Business Units (UUS) and Islamic Rural Banks (BPRS). Murabahah accounted for 40.36 per cent, while mudarabah made up just 1.73 per cent.
On closer inspection, however, much of this still consists of hybrid contracts such as Musyarakah Mutanaqisah (MMQ) combined with ijarah (leasing), which ultimately continue to provide a fixed return. The signature instrument of Islamic finance—profit-sharing contracts—has yet to take command.
Why is this happening? In a series of focus group discussions (FGDs) held by the National Committee for Islamic Economy and Finance (KNEKS), practitioners confirmed a familiar dilemma: asymmetric information between banks and customers, particularly among micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).
This information gap makes LKS wary. When customers report that their businesses have made a loss, banks often struggle to verify whether this is true. The situation may encourage moral hazard, especially since most MSMEs do not yet have transparent bookkeeping standards. As a result, LKS are reluctant to take the risk of implementing profit-sharing contracts.
This is where systemic intervention is needed. KNEKS is developing and promoting an initiative called “Beyond Murabahah” (BM). Its design offers a practical solution to the information asymmetry impasse. Through BM, LKS are provided with new procedures and frameworks to implement profit-sharing contracts in ways that prevent fraud and minimise moral hazard, while ultimately delivering more competitive returns for both parties. This is what genuinely moving up a gear looks like: Sharia values put into practice through business operations that are rational, secure and profitable.
Ultimately, improving LKS performance in Sharia terms requires a holistic approach to governance. Consistent compliance is not solely the responsibility of the Sharia Supervisory Board (DPS). All standard operating procedures (SOPs)—including those that may not appear directly related to products, such as human resources procedures—must be aligned with it.
Institutions must not allow incentive systems, including key performance indicators (KPIs), to push staff to focus only on financing volume and neglect Sharia compliance procedures. Instead, incentives should encourage staff to be more alert and precise in upholding Sharia principles. As the earlier example shows, ensuring murabahah is compliant requires more than Sharia-compliance SOPs; it also needs the support of technology and vendor partnerships.
Returning to the opening metaphor: however magnificent a ship may be, if its navigation and operational infrastructure is fragile, it can easily lose its way, founder and sink in a storm. The same applies to LKS. A display of Sharia-compliant products is not enough; institutions need operational infrastructure to ensure those products are implemented consistently and do not veer off course.
For policymakers, practitioners and stakeholders, the time has come to go further. Let us build a holistic nervous system. We should ask ourselves and our institutions this essential question: “Have all our operating systems been designed so that Sharia compliance remains intact when a product is put into practice—every day, at every level?”
If the answer is yes, only then can we justifiably claim that our Islamic financial institutions have truly moved up a gear.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/islamic-financial-institutions-must-move-up-a-gear-more-than-just-selling-halal-products-1792565570)
Originally published by Republika (https://opini.republika.co.id/berita/tn8sup393/naik-kelasnya-lembaga-keuangan-syariah-bukan-sekadar-penjual-produk-halal), translated from Indonesian