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Iran's revolution, 20 years after

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Iran's revolution, 20 years after

This is the second of two articles on the Iranian revolution
by Sidhesh Kaul, a commentator on regional economic and political
issues based in Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): Ayatollah Khomeini laid out his views clearly in
his 1971 book The Islamic Government in which he propounds that
the "mullahs" would be the nucleus of the revolutionary vanguard
under the leadership of the "ayatollahs", with Khomeini himself
as the virtuous "faqih" (expert in law) at the head.

Most scholars in that period dismissed this book as the
frustrated ranting of an obsessed lunatic; but had they paid
closer attention they could not have missed how closely the
Ayatollah mirrored the characteristics of Iranian Islam and
political philosophy.

Further, according to Shiite teachings a state that is not
ruled by the descendants of Ali cannot be legitimate.

The Shiites developed positions of accommodation with ruling
governments on the grounds of preventing anarchy or as a
necessary evil to be tolerated in the face of foreign aggression.

In the Shiite mythological framework this was merely seen as a
temporary measure until conditions were right for the return of
the "Mahdi".

In contrast Sunni fundamentalists have found it difficult to
establish a religious basis for popular political revolt.

The rise of the "mullahs" began during the 15th century reign
of the Safavids, which turned Shiite beliefs into the official,
Iranian state ideology.

With the help of a forged genealogy, Isma'il I claimed descent
from the Seventh Imam, asserted his right to rule on behalf of
the "Hidden Imam" and empowered Shiite "mullahs" to promote
religious conformity. In due course ideological uniformity
cemented territorial unity and the Iranian nation was born.

With the decline of the Safavids in the 18th century the
Iranian "mullahs" began to draw upon the anti-statist
connotations of Shiite political philosophy to assert an
independent authority.

With the demise of the last Safavid in 1722, and in the
absence of the "Hidden Imam", the "mullahs" asserted their claim
to rule on behalf of the "Hidden Imam".

By the time the Shah came into power it had become firmly
established in the collective Iranian consciousness that the only
legitimate rule was that of the "Hidden Imam" or his virtuous
representatives i.e. the clergy and that "non-virtuous" (read as
"non-clergy") governments were to be tolerated until such time
the "Hidden Imam" returns.

In retrospect the Shah was left with few options. Like Isma'il
I of the Safavids he could have forged his genealogy and claimed
descent from one of the Imams, waged war against foreign
aggressors and won temporary reprieve from traditional Shiite
theologists, stamp out the "mullahs" for good and crush the
catalysts of the struggle or impose his will on the softest of
targets -- the people.

The Shah chose the last option and paid for it dearly.

Almost two decades after the revolution the initial exultation
of relief from the oppressor has long died down and the people
have returned to their humdrum existence.

There is no Shah and Iran is being ruled by the virtuous --
yet the country is not still.

It appears that the country's leaders have run out of what
Islamic messages to rely on in endeavors to build a modern
Iranian society.

In the absence of the overwhelming and commanding charisma of
Ayatollah Khomeini, the clergy is divided -- there are some who
want to adhere to the traditional, albeit restrictive tenets,
whilst others are more accommodating and reform minded and would
like to interpret Islam within a modern framework.

One of the defining traits of Shiism is the emphasis on
argument and today, in the face of the challenges that
modernization poses to traditional tenets, there are debates
raging on the interpretation of Islam.

The implication of a divided clergy could have wide ranging
repercussions especially on leadership issues and on Iran's
future.

Iran has become a country with an open-ended political game.
Reformers challenge the hard-line clerics and the rules of the
game are being questioned -- despite this ferment, transparency
and accountability remain mirages.

The domestic atmosphere does not encourage innovation and
initiative. The conflict between what is "Islamic" and what is
not governs the day-to-day existence of every day life.

In retrospect the Revolution seems more and more as a reaction
to an oppressive monarchy than as a vote for theocracy, and that
the emergence of the theologians as the vanguard of government
was engineered in part by the momentous circumstances and in part
because of the lack of viable alternatives.

Pro-theocracy proponents are quick to point out that shortly
after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini conducted a referendum
to determine the populace's support for an Islamic Republic.

This referendum is being questioned today since the
alternatives that this referendum put to ordinary Iranians was
whether they should replace the monarchy with an Islamic Republic
-- the results were obviously a foregone conclusion.

The constitution of Iran embodies the contradictions and
confusions that a modern theocracy has to face in a shrinking
global order. The conflict between western style democratic
ideals, Islamic tenets and Iranian culture is reflected in the
constitution.

The government has all the recognizable elements -- a
President, a Prime Minister (this position was done away from the
constitution at a later stage) an elected parliament and a
judiciary -- all squeezed within a theocratic framework.

Ultimate authority rests with a man of God (the "virtuous
faqih") who holds the keys to the state's enforcement machinery.
"Islamic" tenets are recognized as the principles of governance.

Economically, the constitution could be classified as
isolationist in nature -- a step back for economic progress.
Interpretation of these principles is left to the Guardian
Council, comprised of six clerics and six legal experts).

The constitution creates the position of a Supreme Leader who
in turn is elected by an assembly of experts. This position, long
after Khomeini's death, has come under fire.

Khomeini used to wear the crown of the Supreme Leader like a
virtual, unchallenged dictator -- now it appears that ideological
Islam can no longer defend the existence of this position.

While Khomeini succeeded in realizing his dream of an Islamic
Republic he failed in creating an institution independent of a
charismatic leadership. Too much was left to interpretation and
the net result was utter confusion.

Interpretation echoes vested interests, foments
dissatisfaction and breeds ad hoc policies conveniently tuned and
changed depending on the whim that holds sway.

It also bestows authority on organs outside the state and
administrative machinery and which cannot be easily reigned in by
civilized engagement.

The problem is that everybody and nobody owns religion and the
freedom to interpret bestows authority on segments of society who
may not necessarily have the state's good at heart.

From time to time even the government machinery does not
hesitate to snuff out inconvenient or embarrassing
interpretations.

This battle continues to rage on in Iran and it appears that
the government, given the inherent polemical nature of Shiism,
would perpetually be a prisoner of interpretation.

There is also the argument of class tyranny. The priests are
the new elite. Democracy can never be nurtured in an atmosphere
where one class dominates.

Had Iran been a nation of mullahs then perhaps such a
possibility could have been easy to visualize -- but it is not.
Iranians' aspirations are being squeezed into a restrictive
mold.

A theocracy is all pervasive, curtailing basic freedoms, the
press or the arts. Iran used to be the philosophical center of
the world at one time -- poets, scientists, philosophers and
artists thrived in its environs.

Today Iranians, who are as proud of their cultural heritage as
they are of their Shiite beliefs, feel claustrophobic. The
frustrations are a powder keg.

The debate rages on in Iran today about how to let go off a
controlled system without descending into chaos. Fault lines
along ideological and generational maps are beginning to show.

Indeed, mixing God's work with Caesar's is not easy -- it is
time the ayatollahs slowly recede into the background -- perhaps
take on the role of conscience keepers and let democracy take its
course.

More from 13 February 2001 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/irans-revolution-20-years-after-1447893297-1090262)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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