Integrating State Policy and Customary Institutions in Indonesian Marine Management

In economic science, the sea is considered a common resource. Simply put, this means anyone can utilise it, but no one truly owns it. From an ecological perspective, Garrett James Hardin (196 ent) viewed this as a problem because individuals act rationally to maximise personal gain. When the sea is utilised through open access, individuals or groups increase fishing efforts, which can lead to declining fish stocks and eventually result in a biological tragedy of the commons.

Theoretically, institutional economics offers two approaches to address this issue: state regulation through restrictions, and collective management by customary institutions. In the context of Indonesia as an archipelagic nation, both must work in tandem. The state possesses broad authority and reach, while customary institutions hold social legitimacy and local wisdom tested across generations. Thus, integrating state policy and customary institutions is vital for Indonesian marine management.

Conditions and Challenges of Indonesian Marine Management

Indonesia’s marine management is implemented based on the division of sea areas into eleven Indonesian Fisheries Management Areas (WPPNRI). Each region possesses different ecological characteristics, commodity types, and socio-economic dynamics. Through coastal and small island zoning plans, the state allocates sea space for various purposes, ranging from capture fisheries zones and conservation areas to shipping lanes and general utilisation areas.

However, this management framework has not yet fully addressed the core problem of common resources. Challenges remain regarding the difficulty of limiting access and enforcing rules on the ground. The vast and open nature of the maritime territory makes surveillance costly, often failing to cover all activities. Consequently, exploitation pressure continues, leading to overexploitation. According to the Decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Number 19 of 2022, most national fishery resources are estimated to be overexploited, particularly high-value commodities such as lobster and reef fish.

State Intervention in Facing the Commons Resources Problem

The government, through the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, has established various policies to intervene in this issue. These include the moratorium on former foreign vessels (Permen-KP 56/2014), the prohibition of certain fishing gear like ‘cantrang’ (Permen-KP 2/2015), and the Measured Fishing policy (PP 11/2023).

From an institutional economics perspective, these policies represent the arrangement of property rights and rules to overcome the failure of common resource management. Through the vessel moratorium, the state asserts collective rights over its waters and closes de facto open access to external actors. By prohibiting certain gear, the state sets technological standards to reduce ecosystem externalities. Furthermore, through quotas in Measured Fishing, the state provides quasi-property rights that incentivise businesses to maintain stock sustainability, echoing Coase’s (1960) argument regarding efficiency through certainty of rights. Thus, marine management is essentially an effort by the state to organise usage rights over resources that were previously freely accessible.

However, the limitations of these policies lie in the complex costs of monitoring and coordination. Additionally, the implementation of the ‘cantrang’ ban faces significant resistance from fishermen, particularly in the northern coast of Java. This resistance arises because the policy is perceived to eliminate livelihoods without providing adequate alternatives, such as gear substitution or socio-economic compensation. The Measured Fishing policy also carries the potential for rent-seeking behaviour and resistance from fishermen and businesses who view it as a restriction on their economic movement.

Customary Community Collective Action as an Alternative

While the state intervenes through national policy, coastal communities have long developed customary institutions to manage fishery resources collectively. They have, for generations, regulated fishing times, gear types, utilisation zones, and social sanctions for violators. Examples include Sasi Laut in Maluku, Panglima Laot in Aceh, Lilifuk in East Nusa Tenggara, Awig-awig in Bali and Lombok, and Mane’e in Sangihe—all representing a wealth of customary institutions grown from empirical experience.

According to Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom (2009), such institutions can serve as effective solutions to the tragedy of the commons without relying solely on state intervention. However, this approach often faces challenges from external actors, such as large-scale industrial vessels. This is because customary institutions generally only cover coastal waters and do not extend to the high seas where industrial vessels operate.

The Importance of Harmonising National Policy and Customary Institutions

Collaborative approaches between national policy and customary institutions have begun to emerge within the national marine management system, through community involvement in surveillance (Community Oversight Groups) and the recognition of community-managed areas…