'Insecurity dilemma' haunts Cambodia

'Insecurity dilemma' haunts Cambodia

In the politics of survival, morality is used by the
contending parties only for political advantage.

By Sorpong Peou

SINGAPORE: In recent weeks, the concepts of justice and
legality have often been invoked by Cambodian leaders and people.
But justice for whom and in whose interest? In a political world
where state structures are extremely fragile, the politics of
survival prevail upon moral considerations.

Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, who effectively staged a
violent coup against First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh (King
Sihanouk's son), accused the latter of being a "traitor" and a
"criminal".

According to Hun Sen, his co-premier had committed many
illegal acts: the Prince imported weapons from outside the
country; he negotiated with the murderous Khmer Rouge movement
now led by Khieu Samphan. On these legal grounds, the Prince
should stand trial for his crimes against the state.

Prince Ranariddh and his supporters, however, were quick to
condemn Hun Sen as "fascist" for staging a coup d'etat against
the Prince, a legitimate leader.

Ranariddh explained why his co-premier illegally grabbed
power: Hun Sen feared that he would lose in the next elections;
he was worried about the FBI findings that held his bodyguards
accountable for the March 30, 1997, bloody grenade attack on the
Khmer Nation Party (KNP) demonstration led by its leader, former
Finance Minister Sam Rainsy (a former prominent member of
Ranariddh's royalist party known as FUNCINPEC; now an ally of the
Prince in the National United Front or NUF); Hun Sen was also
worried about the US Drug Enforcement Agency's discovery of about
600 tons of marijuana which had been exported from Cambodia; and
he opposed any trial of Pol Pot by an international tribunal

From a political point of view, Hun Sen had reasons to be
concerned about his personal and factional security. His paranoia
about assassination plots against him is not groundless in the
context of domestic anarchy where perceptions of realities are
shaped by history, experience, and current events.

He is after all a former Khmer Rouge regimental commander
(under Pol Pot), who later became foreign minister and prime
minister in a regime installed by Vietnam after the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia in late 1978.

Throughout the 1980s, the Hun Sen government fought with three
major resistance groups, two of which were Ranariddh's Funcinpec
and the Khmer Rouge.

Hun Sen's accusation that Ranariddh had tried to provoke him
by bringing Khmer Rouge soldiers into his own bodyguard unit is
also understandable. The Prince's personal army build-up,
although defensive in nature, could have been seen by Hun Sen as
a direct military challenge to his authority.

Matters got worse when the issue of Pol Pot's trial came to
the fore. As a former Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen may not have liked the
idea, despite the fact that his regime had sentenced both Pol Pot
and Ieng Sary in absentia to death in 1979.

When Ranariddh negotiated for peace with Khieu Samphan and
urged the latter to hand over Pol Pot to the government, the
Prince kept saying that others were afraid that they would be
"implicated".

Each leader manipulated the concept of justice to his
political advantage. When Hun Sen negotiated with Ieng Sary, it
was legal; he may also have negotiated with former Khmer Rouge
defense minister Son Sen (reportedly shot dead because of his
alleged negotiations with Hun Sen).

It was ironic that he considered illegal Ranariddh's
negotiations with Khieu Samphan for the hand-over of Pol Pot.

Ranariddh's analysis of the coup may not be totally
groundless. However, he may have planned to politicize the Pol
Pot drama to delegitimize Hun Sen before the next elections
scheduled for May 1998.

As the military underdog, the Prince needed to strengthen his
power base by "legal" means. The royalists had not said much
about elections because they feared that Hun Sen, being the top
dog, would intimidate them.

This fear has basis: after all, during the UN-organized
elections, Hun Sen's party used violence to intimidate his
political opponents and frighten voters away from voting for
other parties.

In the politics of survival in a condition of anarchy where
political actors always feel vulnerable to outside challenges,
violence can easily break out and may escalate uncontrollably:
the top dog is always interested in preempting the rising
challengers, and the challengers perceive the need for more
military strength.

The way out of the "insecurity dilemma" in Cambodia is for
political leaders to practice the politics of accommodation. At
the same time, however, the ongoing killings should not be
rewarded by the international community.

Dr. Sorpong Peou is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore.