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Indonesia’s Strategic Autonomy Amid the Hegemonic Trap

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Finance
Indonesia’s Strategic Autonomy Amid the Hegemonic Trap
Image: CNBC Indonesia

The results of the US midterm elections on 3 November 2026 were more than a change of power on Capitol Hill. Democratic control of Congress will leave President Donald Trump’s administration facing a legislative opposition from January 2027.

Yet the issue extends beyond the contest between Republicans and Democrats. When one country’s political decisions can move bond, currency and commodity markets, as well as global capital flows, how long should global financial stability depend on developments in Washington?

For eight decades, the international financial system has rested on the dollar, the depth of US financial markets and the Bretton Woods institutions. This architecture has provided liquidity, but has also created structural dependence.

US-China rivalry and the politicisation of payments expose a paradox: globalisation is technologically connected but geopolitically fragmented. Indonesia must build strategic autonomy so it is not held hostage to shifts in global power.

The paradox of financial hegemony

Through hegemonic stability theory, Charles Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin explain the role of a dominant state in supporting international economic stability. But stability that depends on a single hegemon carries the risk of concentrating power.

Giovanni Arrighi highlights shifts in the centres of global capital accumulation. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman introduced the concept of “weaponised interdependence”: control of strategic nodes in global networks can allow interdependence to be used as an instrument of geopolitical pressure.

These three perspectives help explain changes in the contemporary financial architecture. Dollar dominance is not only a matter of currency; it also involves control over payment networks, debt markets, foreign-exchange reserves and access to international liquidity.

IMF data show the dollar’s share of global foreign-exchange reserves fell from 57.18 per cent in the first quarter to 56.70 per cent in the second quarter of 2026. This decline does not signal the dollar’s collapse, but reflects gradual diversification.

This is where the paradox of hegemony emerges. Countries are being encouraged to reduce their dependence on the dollar, but no alternative yet offers comparable depth, liquidity and trust. The world is not abandoning the dollar all at once; instead, it is moving towards a financial multipolarity that has yet to fully take shape.

When Washington shakes markets

The Democrats’ victory increases the likelihood of legislative deadlock between the White House and Congress. Debates over the budget, government debt, trade tariffs and industrial policy could heighten uncertainty.

However, polarisation does not automatically weaken the dollar or push up US bond yields. On 4 November 2026, the yield on 10-year US Treasuries actually fell by around six basis points to 4.89 per cent, as fiscal expectations shifted and oil prices declined. Markets assess the interaction of fiscal policy, inflation, geopolitics and the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate outlook, rather than simply the victory of a particular party.

For Indonesia, risk is transmitted through capital flows, the exchange rate, financing costs and international trade. Bank Indonesia recorded the rupiah at Rp18,145 to the US dollar on 2 November 2026. Foreign portfolio investment saw a net outflow of US$0.08 billion in the third quarter, before improving at the start of the fourth quarter.

Foreign-exchange reserves stood at US$146.8 billion at the end of October, equivalent to 5.3 months of imports. This shows that the external buffer remains adequate, even as global pressure persists.

The problem is that short-term stability is not the same as structural independence. Foreign-exchange reserves can cushion volatility, but do not automatically remove dependence on financing, technology and export markets.

Multipolarity and the trap of new dependencies

The expansion of BRICS and trade transactions conducted in local currencies reflect Global South countries’ aspirations to build a more balanced economic order. However, dependency theory, as developed by Raúl Prebisch and André Gunder Frank, warns that changing economic partners does not necessarily change the structure of dependence.

Reducing dollar dominance only to replace it with sole dependence on Chinese financing, technology or markets is not economic sovereignty. It is merely a shift in the centre of hegemony.

Indonesia must avoid two traps at once: subordination to established powers and new dependence on alternative powers. The relevant approach is therefore not ideological de-dollarisation, but strategic hedging: diversifying economic relationships to expand national policy space.

ASEAN’s experience shows that openness to a range of partners can be a source of bargaining power. But success depends on strong institutions, industrial capacity and the ability to uphold national interests. Multipolarity should be an opportunity to widen the range of choices, not simply to replace one patron with another.

Five pillars of strategic autonomy

Indonesia needs an architecture for strategic autonomy that links monetary resilience, deeper financial markets, industrial sovereignty, digital security and economic diplomacy.

First, it should accelerate the diversification of currency transactions. Bank Indonesia recorded Local Currency Transaction (LCT) activity of US$42.07 billion in the first half of 2026, a year-on-year increase of 259 per cent and exceeding the US$25.74 billion recorded throughout 2025.

This achievement shows that dependence on the dollar for transactions can be reduced pragmatically. However, expanding LCT must be supported by liquidity, hedging instruments and efficient transaction settlement.

Second, domestic financial markets should be deepened. Strengthening pension funds, insurers, institutional investors, corporate bonds, sukuk and sustainable finance is needed to increase long-term funding sources.

Financial resilience cannot be built simply by retaining foreign capital; it also requires improving the ability to mobilise and allocate domestic savings productively.

Third, downstream processing should be transformed into technological sovereignty. Processing nickel, copper and strategic minerals must lead to technological mastery, downstream industries, higher productivity and greater national value added. Without technology transfer and participation by domestic industry, downstream processing risks creating new dependencies in global supply chains.

Fourth, sovereignty over digital financial infrastructure should be strengthened. Cross-border payment systems, cyber security, data governance and technological interoperability are increasingly vital to the resilience of the financial system. Financial sovereignty in the 21st century is not only the ability to maintain foreign-exchange reserves, but also to secure transaction networks and national economic information.

Fifth, Indonesia should pursue multi-vector economic diplomacy. Its membership of the G20, BRICS and ASEAN should be used complementarily to expand markets, investment, technology transfer and influence in reforming global financial governance. The aim is not rigid geopolitical alignment, but commitment to the national interest.

Sovereignty amid shifting hegemony

Washington’s polarisation is not proof that US dominance is ending. But it is a reminder that excessive dependence on a single centre of power can become a source of systemic vulnerability.

Indonesia needs more integrated coordination of fiscal, monetary, macroprudential, microprudential, industrial and trade policies. Stability should be the foundation for transformation, not the ultimate goal of development.

Strategic autonomy does not mean shutting the country off from globalisation. On the contrary, Indonesia must be able to work with all powers without losing control over its economic priorities.

Ultimately, sovereignty is not measured by how far Indonesia distances itself from Washington or Beijing, but by its capacity to determine its development choices without pressure from structural dependence.

Indonesia does not need to win the global struggle for hegemony. It must ensure that, whoever wins that struggle, the nation’s economic future remains in its own hands.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/indonesias-strategic-autonomy-amid-the-hegemonic-trap-1794707446)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261115075718-14-785315/otonomi-strategis-indonesia-di-tengah-perangkap-hegemoni), translated from Indonesian
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