Indonesia's Hajj Fund and Lessons from Malaysia's Tabung Haji
In the 1980s, educational ties between Indonesia and Malaysia were intensive and mutually enriching. Malaysia frequently brought in Indonesian teachers and lecturers to build its educational capacity. This history reminds us that institutional learning between neighbouring countries is nothing new or taboo. Today, in hajj fund management, it is Indonesia’s turn again to learn from Malaysia’s experience—not merely copying numbers, but understanding the institutional regime.
Amid Indonesia’s long queue of prospective pilgrims, there is a bitter yet valuable lesson from our neighbour. Malaysia’s Tabung Haji manages nearly twice the funds in US dollar terms compared to BPKH, with 9.7 million active individual accounts. Meanwhile BPKH, despite managing hundreds of trillions of rupiah, still operates hajj finances within a cashier framework paying bulk queues, while hajj operations remain trapped in a procurement regime.
The history of Tabung Haji and BPKH
Tabung Haji grew from an idea by Prof. Ungku Abdul Aziz in 1959. Starting in 1963 with deposits of only RM 46,610 from 1,281 people, the institution gradually became one of the earliest and most mature examples of what we today call a Sovereign Halal Fund—a long-term public fund managed according to sharia principles, with a strong socio-religious mandate, operating on the logic of the economic sovereignty of the community.
It does not merely save for hajj; it builds collective capital accumulation that remains rooted in individual ownership. Over more than six decades, Tabung Haji has successfully integrated three functions at once: personal savings, worship organisation, and productive investment. This distinguishes it from conventional sovereign wealth funds, which usually rest on natural resource surpluses or state foreign exchange reserves.
BPKH was born in a very different context. After years of hajj funds being managed under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and beset by several corruption cases ensnaring ministers and senior officials, Law No. 34 of 2014 finally separated the financial function. Only in 2017 did BPKH officially stand as an independent public legal entity.
It is still young. Its focus is purely on financial management, while hajj operations remain in the hands of the relevant ministry. Whereas Tabung Haji has long functioned as an integrated Sovereign Halal Fund, BPKH is still at the stage of building the foundations of functional separation. This is an early phase as the forerunner of a Sovereign Halal Fund.
From the perspective of institutional theory developed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2024 Nobel laureates in Economics), an institution’s age and maturity do matter. But far more decisive is its institutional character: whether it is inclusive—able to protect individual rights, encourage broad participation, and limit the space for elite intervention and extraction—or extractive, where policy tends towards populism, is vulnerable to rent-seeking, and sacrifices long-term interests for short-term gains.
The scale of the Sovereign Halal Fund
According to data from end-2025 to mid-2026, Tabung Haji as a Sovereign Halal Fund holds deposits of around RM 93.4–95.3 billion (equivalent to US$22–24 billion), with total assets of RM 98.58 billion that have surpassed liabilities of RM 95.63 billion.
In 2025, the institution distributed returns of 3.5 per cent worth RM 3.22 billion directly into individual accounts. Compare this with BPKH, which manages funds of around Rp 181 trillion (roughly US$11 billion), with 2025 benefit value reaching Rp 12.05 trillion, equivalent to almost 7 per cent. However, its account management remains bulk-based: initial deposits from 5.7 million waiting pilgrims.
Tabung Haji manages larger funds with a far broader individual base. BPKH manages bulk funds because the long queue had already formed before the institution was established.
Individual versus bulk accounts
The sharpest difference lies in the individual account pattern. In Malaysia, every Muslim—including children—can open a personal account under the wakalah concept. The funds belong entirely to the depositor. They can be withdrawn within limits, gifted, or used for hajj.
Profits are credited directly to each account every year based on the lowest average balance. Transparency is high through the app. In Indonesia, prospective pilgrims deposit Rp 25 million and US$4,000 for the special hajj, through sharia banks acting as deposit collectors. The funds are managed on a bulk basis.
Each person receives a virtual account that receives benefit value periodically. That balance can reduce the final payment upon departure. However, part of the benefit value is also used to subsidise departing pilgrims, operations, and welfare programmes.
Tabung Haji provides individual and transparent ownership. BPKH still provides benefit value within a bulk framework that is vulnerable. The individual pattern aligns with classical savings theory, such as Franco Modigliani’s, which emphasises personal asset accumulation across the life cycle. Meanwhile, the bulk pattern involves redistribution efforts that can reduce incentives for personal saving if not carefully designed, and could even veer towards Ponzi-like danger.
Tiered subsidies and the istito’ah principle
Malaysia has moved further with a tiered subsidy system. For the 1447 H/2026 CE season, the full Muassasah cost is set at RM 33,300. The B40 group pays only RM 15,000—about 45 per cent—after receiving total assistance of RM 18,300, including RM 1,000 from the government.
M40 pays RM 23,500 with RM 9,800 in assistance. T20 pays in full. The main source is Tabung Haji’s own investment returns, not purely the state budget. Total assistance this year is around RM 210 million. Since 2001, the cumulative total has reached RM 2.72 billion.
Indonesia does not yet have such capability-based segmentation. Benefit value is used to rationalise costs paid by pilgrims, distributions to virtual accounts, and other programmes. The principle of istito’ah—capability—is still applied more firmly in Malaysia.
This capability-based segmentation reflects a more inclusive institution: helping the weak without sacrificing sustainability for all participants.
The procurement trap versus investment risk
Indonesia remains predominantly in a procurement regime. Although the finances have been separated into BPKH, the hajj ecosystem as a whole still relies heavily on the procurement of quotas, catering, accommodation, transport, and services.
This structure opens space for rent-seeking risks, cartels, mafias, illicit levies, and potential corruption at the operational level. Cases related to quotas and organisation over time prove that procurement logic has not been fully sterilised.
BPKH has chosen relatively conservative investments—dominated by government securities and deposits—to keep the principal safe and secure stable, sustainable benefit value, achieving an unqualified audit opinion (WTP) eight times in a row.
Owing to the joint liability clause (fiduciary liability) and the not-yet-opened investment regime in the hajj ecosystem, BPKH has chosen conservative investments—dominated by high-credit-rated securities (sukuk) and sharia deposits—achieving an unqualified audit opinion eight times in a row.
Malaysia long ago entered the investment regime with a diversified portfolio, but this opened up major vulnerabilities: losses of nearly RM 13 billion that forced a bailout through Urusharta Jamaah, alongside the 1MDB corruption case and others.
Tabung Haji has proven that a Sovereign Halal Fund built on a culture of individual saving from an early age and capability-based benefit value can be constructed, even though it once fell into the trap of aggressive investment.
BPKH has proven that the fundamentals of the community’s funds towards a Sovereign Halal Fund—beginning with the independence of functional separation and consecutive unqualified audit opinions—can be achieved, even though the surrounding ecosystem remains fraught with procurement risk.
For Indonesia, the main lesson is clear. We need to foster a more individual savings culture, not merely bulk queue deposits. We need to consider capability-based segmentation so that subsidies are fairer and more sustainable.
And most importantly, we must liberate the hajj ecosystem from a procurement logic prone to abuse. Because in the end, pilgrims’ money does not belong to the institution. It is a trust that will be called to account.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/indonesias-hajj-fund-and-lessons-from-malaysias-tabung-haji-1788767592)
Originally published by Republika (https://analisis.republika.co.id/berita/tkzehn416/dana-haji-indonesia-dan-pelajaran-dari-tabung-haji-malaysia), translated from Indonesian