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Indonesian diplomacy after Netanyahu closes the door on Palestine

| Source: ANTARA_ID Translated from Indonesian | Politics
Indonesian diplomacy after Netanyahu closes the door on Palestine
Image: ANTARA_ID

Indonesia can actually say to Washington: We support the goal of stabilising Gaza, but stabilisation must have a political exit.

Jakarta (ANTARA) - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state, as he recently conveyed, places Indonesian diplomacy before a challenge unlike any before.

If until now Indonesia has mainly voiced support for Palestinian independence from outside the negotiation process, now Indonesia must determine its role from within the Board of Peace (BoP) when one of the most decisive parties actually rejects the political direction towards the realisation of a Palestinian state.

So, when Israel closes the political door to a Palestinian state, what should Indonesia do?

Changing political position

In diplomacy, a loud voice is not necessarily an influential voice. What matters more is whether a country is able to transform its political position into a coalition, building agendas, incentives, and ultimately decisions.

The current situation is indeed not simple. The BoP roadmap of 30 July 2026 explicitly links the cessation of conflict, the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, Palestinian governance, reconstruction, security, and a credible path towards self-determination and a Palestinian state. The process is designed to be phased and verification-based.

So, by design, the reconstruction of Gaza is not intended to stand alone. There is a connection between today’s stabilisation and the political settlement of the future.

The problem is that Israel rejects the roadmap. One of the main issues is the sequencing between the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

For Israel, Hamas must be completely disarmed before the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

In the roadmap, both processes are placed in interconnected and verified stages. This difference in sequencing appears technical, but it actually concerns a big question: who should take the risk first?

Indonesia needs to read this issue with a cool head. It is unrealistic to expect Israel to ignore its security concerns. Since the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, for Israeli society, the security issue is not merely political jargon, but has become a collective experience that shapes public perception and the direction of state policy.

Likewise, it is unrealistic to ask Palestine to accept a process that only talks about order in Gaza but continually postpones the question of its sovereignty. Good diplomacy must be able to see both things at once.

Therefore, Indonesia does not need to choose between Israeli security and Palestinian political rights. A more constructive position is to push for a formula that makes the two mutually reinforcing.

A Palestinian state needs security institutions that can be trusted. Israel needs assurance that the territory next to it does not become a base for attacks, while Gaza needs a functioning civil government. And all of that requires credible international oversight.

Roadmap BOP

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