Wed, 05 Jan 2005

Indonesia, ASEAN and Australia trapped by sense of superiority

S.P. Seth, Sydney

Indonesia is understandably upset over Australia's recent announcement of its plan to establish a 1,000-mile maritime identification zone to fight terrorism and other international crimes. (Under the plan, Canberra will be able to intercept foreign vessels once they pass within 1,000 nautical miles of Australia's coastline.) According to Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, the plan is unacceptable because "it breaches our maritime jurisdiction." He added, "We view this concept as having the potential for violating international maritime law."

Australia's Defense Minister, Senator Robert Hill who was in Jakarta recently, disagrees but failed to convince Jakarta in the matter, even after arguing that it would also help Indonesia protect its offshore oil platforms. It probably didn't occur to Senator Hill that by that logic Indonesia might as well hand over its maritime defense to Australia.

According to one Australian maritime law expert, Rosemary Rayfuse at the University of New South Wales (as reported in the Australian press), there was no legal basis "whatsoever" for the inspection or interception of vessels suspected to be carrying illegal cargo outside of a 12-nautical mile zone from the country's coastline. She said, "That is extraordinary (1000-mile zone) and there is certainly no legal basis for a maritime interdiction zone of that magnitude."

Indeed, it isn't. Indonesia aside, Malaysia isn't amused either even though they are not affected directly. According to its Deputy Defense Minister, Zainal Abidin Zin, "They cannot say, for the sake of security, they have the power to intercept ships. We are not happy with the statement showing their supremacy."

He added forcefully, "They cannot bulldoze a plan that does not honor the sovereignty of another country." And branded Australian Prime Minister John Howard's statement to this effect "volatile" and warned it could lead to misunderstanding between Australia and its neighbors. In other words, if Australia's persists with its new plan this has the potential of becoming a seriously contentious issue with other ASEAN countries.

The question: Why is Canberra doing it? An explanation of sorts is implied in a recent article by Miranda Darling, a research associate with the Centre for Independent Studies, a right-wing think tank. She writes in the Sydney Morning Herald: "South-East Asia has three vulnerable 'choke points'--- the Straits of Malacca, Sunda (between Java and Sumatra) and Lombok (east of Bali -- which are used by half the world's shipping. As financial and security controls on land grip harder, terrorists are using the sea to smuggle drugs and counterfeit goods to fund their operations."

In a veiled justification of Australia's plan, she adds, "Most attacks (on shipping) take place in waters where the piracy laws of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea are powerless. Policies that apply a 'nation-based' approach are founded on a false premise because the nature of both merchant shipping and terrorism is international", but not bound by international law-a convoluted logic.

Canberra's extended maritime interdiction plan looks like an extension of the Australian and United States' doctrine of pre- emption, this time to traverse maritime boundaries.

It is worth noting that Australia is already engaged in the task of pacifying and securing island states of South Pacific. Under threat of withholding aid, almost all of them have been coerced into accepting Australian direction, if not control, of their affairs.

We have in the South Pacific this spectacle of colonialism by stealth. These former Australian colonial enclaves are being reclaimed because they are not considered capable of governing themselves. It is a familiar refrain of the colonial era which, it seemed, had been consigned to the dustbin of history. The amazing thing is that the Australian establishment, including the media, have accepted uncritically Canberra's new role in the South Pacific.

Indonesia is, of course, too big. With a population of over 200 million people and a politically charged middle class, it won't be easy. Canberra hopes to develop more cooperative security ties with Indonesia under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Jakarta is not averse to it.

Indeed, in his address to the APEC conference in Chile, Susilo emphasized the need for "a new global security culture", highlighting Indonesia and Australia as a model of sorts. Therefore, the political climate exists. But even Susilo's new administration will find it hard to ignore Canberra's new maritime doctrine of securing Australia in someone else's backyard.

As for a new security pact or understanding between Australia and Indonesia, Jakarta wants it to be a comprehensive package of defense and economic assistance. According to Indonesia's Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, "I would like him (the then visiting Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill) to consider the fact that assistance in security entails assistance in terms of economic recovery for the poor and deprived."

He added, "(By) providing sustenance for the poor and deprived and increasing their betterment in terms of economic life there will be less inclination for these young people to turn to international terrorism."

In a sense, Sudarsono was making an important point not only about Indonesia but the ASEAN region as a whole. Which is that Canberra needs to engage comprehensively with ASEAN countries, and not just to pick and chose. For instance, Canberra wants to be part of an ASEAN free trade regime, and be represented in its deliberations. But, at the same time, it wouldn't sign a non- aggression pact (Treaty of Amity and Co-operation) with ASEAN.

Canberra argues that it would curb its ability to criticize human rights violations and undermine the US alliance. But this doesn't stand up because some of the ASEAN countries are US allies and their non-aggression commitment doesn't affect their alliance.

Basically, Canberra wants to keep its options open in dealing with the region. And that creates doubts. Which tend to be reinforced with plans like the 1000-nautical mile maritime zone to intercept foreign vessels, if Canberra so decided.

According to Marty Natalegawa, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, "There can be no more efficient and effective way for Australia to dispel misperceptions some quarters may have of its intentions in South-East Asia than to simply accede to the (ASEAN non-aggression pact)."

The author is Freelance Writer and can be reached at SushilPSeth@aol.com