India shut out of ASEAN Regional Forum

Tue, 31 Jan 1995

By Ganganath Jha

NEW DELHI (JP): The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) came into existence in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' post- ministerial conference on July 25, 1993.

Its existence is meant to promote common understanding, mutual confidence and goodwill in order to minimize the scope of confrontation among the partners and to establish durable peace.

From the outset, ARF supported the drive to nurture habits of consultation and cooperation pertaining to regional security.

While speaking about this forum, Jusuf Wanandi, head of the supervisory board of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, observed that a multilateral forum for dealing with regional security problems was needed to build mutual confidence and prevent conflict and misunderstanding.

The evolution of ARF was meant to contain potential security threats to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The ARF, seeking a non-military path to security, has an 18-member Regional Consultative body, which includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, Vietnam and the European Community. Only four APEC members -- Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico and Taiwan -- are left out. Again four non-APEC members -- EC, Laos, Russia and Vietnam -- are admitted members.

Its large membership shows that India is an important omission. Being an immediate neighbor and sharing a common maritime frontier with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar, stretching into thousands of miles, India is a natural ally of the ASEAN states.

Any developments with significant bearings on the security environment in Southeast Asia are bound to have implications for India. Today India is at the crucial phase of nation building and modernization. It has opened up to economic liberalization and market economy and it needs to have the understanding and support of the ASEAN.

A catastrophic development, such as the result of a Pakistani campaign against India, would have profound regional implications. Pakistan has admitted that it has a nuclear bomb, and the present premier, Benazir Bhutto, is threatening "a third war" against India to resolve the Kashmir issue.

These developments have polluted the regional security picture and therefore the scope for conflict escalation is very high. India would like to have an understanding with Pakistan and membership into such forums as ARF may help it in creating an appropriate environment. India would also like to participate in the ARF to prove that it can be a dependable ally and sincere partner in abiding by regional consensus.

India has never believed in territorial expansion, but tries to procure sophisticated weapons such as IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) and related nuclear technology important for maintaining stability and national morale.

The development of science and technology is for positive and constructive purposes, barring any substantial nuclear threat from its adversaries. India is interested in forging friendly relations with Pakistan, but there is a lack of reciprocity. The nation's elite and the information media have failed to project that both countries are two parts of the same coin, that they are brothers, and there is a need to project brotherly feelings. It is also important to note that the development of the two nations is not possible without forgetting the strained past and hostile present.

It is a fact that hostilities in Indo-Pakistani relations get in the way of regional integration in South Asia and this factor has been a major deterrent in relation to their omission from ARF as well. However, the pertinent point to be considered is whether the unfriendly nature of India's relations with Pakistan is not sufficient for destabilizing the politics of the entire region.

Is this situation not giving signals of a nuclear war? If that is so, then is it not a compelling factor to trap these two in the security related discussions at a regional level? The question, then, is whether the ASEAN states, which share a common maritime border with India, extending from Myanmar to Indonesia, should close their eyes towards happenings in the subcontinent?

We do find that India and Southeast Asia have been expressing a common threat perception in the post Cold War era. Their opinions do converge on issues of ethnic import, transnational support of terrorism, secessionism, fundamentalism and the protection of human rights. The ASEAN and Indian diplomats have been expressing similar viewpoints at the international fora and they have a consensus on the following:

(a) the emerging vacuum in Southeast Asia after the American withdrawal;

(b) the forceful assertion of Chinese territorial claims over South China Sea;

(d) the naval build up at Hanggyi and Coco Islands in Myanmar;

(e) the threat of nuclear holocaust in the Korean peninsula and Indian subcontinent,

(f) and the continuing civil war in Cambodia.

These were the motivating factors that influenced ASEAN to offer sectoral dialog partnership status to India. ASEAN and India have accelerated trade, investment, tourism, science and technology ties since 1992 and strings of eternal friendship are constantly probed. Despite such positive developments, India is the single significant nation from the region to have been left out of the ARF. It is difficult to comprehend reasons behind India's omission. Suffice it to say that the unhappy legacies of the Cold War era, the history of a profound communication gap, the unfriendly attitudes of its immediate neighbors and the slow pace of economic development, etc. are getting in the way of improved cooperation.

At present, India's convergence of interests with the ASEAN countries, both in the security and economic realm, motivates it to extend cooperation to the ARF for constructive interaction and regional peace. A new environment of friendship and cooperation have emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the impending removal of trade barriers. Other factors which helped in the evolution of convergence of interests are:

(a) the diminishing role of ideology;

(b) the collective concern for regional security threats, i.e., Cambodia, Spratlys, East Timor and Kashmir;

(d) growing interaction with the ASEAN states in defense matters and regular joint naval exercises with Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia and the United States.

Thus India is ready to offer cooperation to ARF to participate in discussions to resolve conflicts and promote better understanding.

Another interesting feature of the ARF is that it gives emphasis to consensus in decision making and is bound to prove deterrence for the aggressor. What is more striking is that one can present their security perception in a friendly atmosphere in such forums and there would be a better understanding of each other's concerns.

This forum, whose basic aim is to resolve misunderstanding and suggest constructive measures, would prove useful to diffuse the tense atmosphere. Again, India, which is projected as a hegemony by some of its neighbors and was viewed as such by the ASEAN in the past, may be projected more objectively with the association of such forums.

The countries of this region have to make their own history and overtake the developments of the most developed nations on other side of the globe. They must explore avenues for accommodating the interests of nations on the periphery, either spontaneously or as an affirmative action. There is no point in ignoring a willing partner. Instead willing partners should be embraced in order to consolidate regional power for regional security and uninterrupted prosperity.

Dr. Ganganath Jha is Associate Professor in the Division of Southeast Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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