Incentive Cuts and the Immortality of Rent-Seeking
Allegations of corruption involving cuts to tax-collection incentives in Bogor Regency have opened the public’s eyes. A crime once dismissed as rumour has become real. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) seized Rp1.5 billion suspected of having been accumulated through the deductions. A similar case occurred earlier in Sidoarjo, where the KPK found that civil servants’ incentives had been cut by Rp2.7 billion, in a case involving the local leader and several officials.
If anyone calls corruption the oil of development, it would be more accurate to call it a fiscal cancer. Even as regional transfers are being cut and spending efficiencies imposed across the board, corruption continues, targeting activities at the heart of local public finances. Regional tax and levy collection is being undermined by rent-seeking behind the scenes of government.
Immortality
In principle, tax-collection incentives were introduced as a progressive effort to reduce corrupt behaviour. During the era of collection fees, which ran from 1976 to 2009, transparency and accountability were serious problems. At the time, collectors were paid directly as a percentage of the revenue collected.
Government Regulation No. 69/2010 was subsequently issued, transforming the term “collection fee” into “collection incentive”. The change went beyond terminology: the reward mechanism was also revised. Incentives were introduced as a reward for the collecting agency’s performance in meeting its targets. This encouraged officials to work towards those targets; if they were not met, no incentive was paid.
The Bogor allegations point to an anomaly. It is like playing whack-a-mole: hit one hole and a mole appears in another. The incentive policy becomes counterproductive when its implementation departs from its original purpose. The mole was hit in the collection-fee hole, yet it has reappeared under the incentive scheme.
Using incentives to deter corruption has made the crime increasingly immortal. Corruption persists, merely changing its methods. Moreover, our officials are known for their creativity in finding ways to exploit corruption loopholes, like Lionel Messi’s dribbling and Toni Kroos’s manoeuvres.
The short-term consequence of this supposed immortality is demotivation. Employees collect taxes half-heartedly because part of their incentives is taken by certain officials. The result is that regional own-source revenue (PAD) falls short of its potential. Incentives intended to boost PAD instead become instruments for extracting rents.
In the long term, this practice holds back regional development. With PAD below its potential, regions remain dependent on central government transfers, and local problems go unresolved. Bogor, for example, remains grappling with connectivity between its sub-districts, an issue that requires adequate funding to address. The persistence of corruption also damages public trust and the stability of the local investment climate.
Deep-rooted
Who received the proceeds from the incentive deductions in Bogor? That is for the KPK to investigate, and the answer will emerge in due course. But the investigation should not simply pursue the recipient. The KPK needs to examine and expose the institutional design and chain of command that allowed the practice to take place.
Efforts to prevent corruption in the regions often struggle to keep pace with new forms of corrupt behaviour. Rent-seeking, too, is immortal, like Gatotkaca in Javanese mythology. The practice of paying tribute, depicted in Multatuli’s Max Havelaar, teaches us that corruption’s survival can also be enabled by the centre’s tacit approval.
The central government’s proposal to revise Government Regulation No. 69/2010 must not be driven solely by demands to raise regional leaders’ salaries. The process should be based on empirical evidence that higher incomes have not been accompanied by more effective corruption prevention. Gregory Mankiw may have said that people respond to incentives, but in Indonesia this scheme requires intensive monitoring and evaluation.
We should abandon the idea that officials’ incentives are a sole solution. Instead, reverse the approach: the state should offer attractive incentives to compliant taxpayers. Policies such as tax holidays or easier access to public administration could be more appealing to the public.
South Korea offers an example through its Exemplary Taxpayer system, under which model taxpayers receive exemptions from tax audits for a specified period, as well as financial and social benefits. Japan’s Aoi Shinkoku system even provides compensation for business losses as an incentive for tax compliance.
Offering incentives to frontline tax collectors is an outdated approach. This conservative policy is counterproductive to efforts to improve investment competitiveness. It makes little sense for government employees to receive incentives for something that is already a public obligation. The risk of corruption can be minimised through transparent and accountable incentive mechanisms.
Breaking the hold of regional corruption must begin with radical and systemic change. Radical change means tackling the root causes. For example, electoral arrangements could be changed to close off political dowry payments and reduce campaign and campaign-team costs. Within the bureaucracy, transparent job auctions could shut down opportunities for tribute payments.
Systemically, digitalisation must extend to transactions. Limiting the circulation of physical cash in bureaucratic settings should be considered, as tribute deductions often take the form of cash and are therefore difficult to trace. This may sound utopian given disparities in digital infrastructure between regions, but digitalisation would make systemic oversight possible.
Ultimately, preventing regional rent-seeking cannot rely on prophetic calls and piecemeal action. Incentive deductions are evidence of entrenched power relations and gaps in Indonesia’s anti-corruption laws. Sting operations may deter wrongdoing, but without radical and systemic change, rent-seeking will become even more immortal.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/incentive-cuts-and-the-immortality-of-rent-seeking-1791510678)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261009064330-14-774577/pemotongan-insentif-dan-imortalitas-perburuan-rente), translated from Indonesian