In memory of the Battle of Surabaya

In memory of the Battle of Surabaya

By Onghokham

JAKARTA (JP): On Nov. 10 we celebrated Heroes Day. In this
Golden Year of Indonesia, Heroes Day will not celebrate its 50th
anniversary but its 45th anniversary. Another different aspect of
Heroes Day is that its monument is not in Jakarta but in the East
Java city of Surabaya, Indonesia's second fastest growing city.
The Heroes Monument in the city is also the first "national"
monument to the revolution. Jakarta's came later.

After the Round Table Conference (December 1949) when the
Dutch left Indonesia, our first president, Sukarno, visited his
birth-place of Surabaya. On the occasion Sukarno declared Nov. 10
to be Heroes Day and that the monument for Heroes should be in
Surabaya. The site of the Heroes monument in Surabaya was near
the former alun alun (big square), which during colonial times
became the site of Surabaya's High Court and during Japanese
occupation (1943-1945) it became the headquarters of the
Kempeitai (Japanese Secret Police).

Of course Sukarno did not designate Surabaya as the place for
the heroes' monument because it was his place of birth, but
because of the Battle of Surabaya in late October and early
November 1945.

During these late months of 1945, Surabaya's Republican youth
defended the city against the British army which for a large part
were British Indian.

Ruslan Abdulgani, who in November 1945 was a Republican youth
leader and activist, once said "it is very odd, indeed, that
after 300 years of Dutch colonialism (Sic) we have a Heroes
Monument fighting the British".

Another British thing is the height of the Heroes Monument of
Surabaya. Sukarno wanted it to be 45 meters in height. However,
airport authorities protested against it -- the airport of
Surabaya was still in the midst of the city. A 45-meter needle
would endanger civil aviation. Hence, it was decreed that its
height should be 45 yards. An English measurement completing its
character as a monument to commemorate Indonesia's fight against
the British.

How did the British get involved in the war against Surabaya?
Douglas MacArthur, the Allied supreme commander during the
Pacific War, choose to ignore Japanese occupied territories. His
strategy was to go and attack straight at the heart of the
Japanese empire, Japan itself. The only diversion he made was his
liberation of the Philippines which Japan occupied since May 1943
in order to keep his promise of "I shall return".

Churchill too saw the need to liberate first Japanese occupied
Malaya and Singapore. Just as with MacArthur an Allied victory
over the Japanese in their colonies was seen as important to
their lost prestige and for restoration of the British empire in
Southeast Asia. However, it would only be from Myanmar that the
Japanese were driven out by Allied forces. Malaya and Singapore
had to wait until after the war ended.

The Dutch government too understood that if their colonies
were liberated by non-Dutch troops then their position would be
seriously threatened. However, they did nothing to prepare for a
military return to their Indies. Their shipping was tied to the
Allied command in Europe for six months after the end of the war
as was their army. The latter they could have released soon but
not their shipping and so they had no opportunity to ship their
army to the Southeast Asian war.

In August just before the Japanese capitulation of the Allied
on Aug. 15, 1945, there came a decision to split the war command
against Japan. MacArthur was to have the Pacific as his area
while Southeast Asia including Indonesia, were put under the
responsibility of Lord Mountbatten.

Japan's surrender on Aug. 15 took everybody by surprise.
Mountbatten could have occupied Malaya and Singapore immediately
for British invasion plans were already scheduled for September.
However, MacArthur first wanted official Japanese surrender which
happened on board the USS Mississippi in Tokyo Bay. It was not
until Sept. 2 that the British received the Japanese surrender in
Malaya and Singapore which were understandably first British
priorities in Southeast Asia.

As we all know, the Conservatives in Britain unexpectedly lost
the general elections to Labor. The new government was basically
pragmatic in colonial and imperial affairs even in regard to
their own as can be seen in their policies towards India.
Overshadowing this policy was British experience in Greek affairs
in 1944 where they intervened by supporting a minority pro-
monarchist faction versus a left-leaning population.

It was the first Allied experience of a quagmire of criticism
at home and abroad costing a lot of money to poor war-ravaged
Britain and no quick-military results. Where there were no direct
British interests involved, British intervention would be avoided
as much as possible. As far as continental European countries
were involved it was the traditional "perfidious Albion's"
policy. One forgot that at the same time Britain was promising
India and Myanmar their independence.

The second British priority was the liberation of the Allied
prisoners of war, people in concentration camps and returning the
Japanese army to Japan after disarming them. All these objectives
for many reasons came only to be realized very late within the
former Netherlands Indies empire. It was this delay of "Allied"
(British) arrival that many Dutch scholars blame for the end of
the Dutch empire in the East. However, as Dutch historians of
this period have pointed out, there was also as much Dutch delay
as British. Especially the Dutch government in the Hague
disregarded Indonesian realities in the post-Pacific war
situation and perhaps never understood them until the present
day.

The Netherlands' post war policies towards its colonies were
rooted in a "1930"s view of the Indies of peace and order. It was
about a century behind the facts. Moreover, in 1945 the Dutch
were too much involved in their own reconstruction problems. They
had no time to think of the future of the colonies while their
war time isolation prevented understanding of any new dynamism
elsewhere. They were very ill prepared to meet Asian nationalism
of the post-war world. The colonies as far as the Dutch were
concerned had to be retained at all cost. There was a colonial
ideology as some called it, that colonies were a must for
Holland's prosperity and for it to be a European power. However,
now there was a proclamation of independence which did not
penetrate Dutch government consciousness until a month later.
Dutch reaction was to understandably dismiss it. They were angry
as a mother receiving a slap from her child.

At the end of September 1949 the English landed in Jakarta
with a small contingent (800 men) and some 200 Dutch soldiers.
Almost a month after it Mallaby landed in Surabaya on Oct. 25
with 4000 men, many of them British-Indian battalions. In Jakarta
it never came to a full scale war between the Republicans and the
Allied forces since the stakes were on both sides too high to let
things out of control. However, tensions and incidents were daily
occurrences almost taking the dimensions of a racial war between
Indonesians and Dutch.

It was in Surabaya that the Allies and Republicans came to a
full scale war. Revolutionary nationalism exploded in Surabaya
and achieved a fanatic fever if not almost hysterical as one
novelist, Idrus, put it in his novel Soerabaya. At first the
people in Surabaya received the Allied forces in a friendly way
and authorities were cooperative. However, suspicions towards the
British rose daily with stories of incidents in Jakarta where the
Dutch and British succeeded in slowly consolidating their
positions. Surabaya youths' slogan became "we will not be treated
like Jakarta". Any small incident could ignite the spark. This
came in the form of pamphlets thrown over Surabaya by British
airplanes and signed by the British Java commander, Gen. D.C.
Hawthorn without consulting Mallaby demanding the surrender of
arms by Surabaya's armed youth.

On the afternoon of Oct. 28, "a fanatical armed mob of 120 to
150,000 men..." turned against the scattered British position all
over the city. Sukarno was flown to Surabaya to achieve a cease-
fire. However, in trying to enforce it Mallaby was killed. This
event had deep consequences for Surabaya for it made inevitable a
British revenge action launching the second part of the battle in
Surabaya on Nov. 10 which until today is commemorated as Heroes
Day but which is for many Surabaya people who experienced it a
battle for Surabaya.

Again a frenzied armed mob, as the British saw them, battled a
modern army. Street by street and from door to door. Armed youth
stormed a Sherman tank. How many Republicans died, nobody will
ever know exactly though estimates run into tens of thousands.

On the British side there were 300 dead and it took them three
weeks to occupy the city. However, it was this battle which
convinced the Dutch, especially those in Jakarta, that
negotiations with the Republican leadership was the only way to
solve the conflict. Once both sides, under heavy British
pressure, set down for negotiations, the independence of
Indonesia was the only possible outcome.

The writer is a historian based in Jakarta.