Illegal Wiretapping: Depoliticising Intelligence for a Stronger Rule of Law
The misuse of state instruments to satisfy the lust for power is a betrayal of the mandate of reform and constitutional values.
Jakarta (ANTARA) — When state surveillance tools are used to spy on the country’s highest leaders, the law bows to the personal or factional political interests of those in power.
The illegal wiretapping scandal involving national leaders and strategic figures has exposed the fragility of national security governance. Instruments designed to detect threats have instead become political weapons. This crime not only violates privacy but also undermines the foundations of democracy and legal certainty.
Under Indonesia’s legal system, wiretapping is a restriction on human rights and is subject to strict rules. It must have a lawful basis. The Constitution guarantees every citizen protection of their privacy against hacking and arbitrary interception of communications.
Law No. 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions prohibits the interception of another person’s electronic system. The only exception is for law-enforcement purposes as provided for by law. Wiretapping outside official procedures may be classified as a cybercrime.
For intelligence agencies, Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence limits the National Intelligence Agency’s (BIN) wiretapping powers. Interception may only be conducted to address threats to national security and state sovereignty. If there is sufficient preliminary evidence against a target, a permit must be obtained from the head of the district court.
Within the police, National Police Chief Regulation No. 5 of 2010 strictly governs the procedures for wiretapping. Interception at the National Police Monitoring Centre must be supported by a police report, authorisation from the head of the Criminal Investigation Agency and court approval. Adding a target without official documentation constitutes an abuse of authority.
When an official secretly enters a state official’s telephone number into a surveillance system, the rule of law collapses. The deletion of digital audit logs further indicates criminal intent (mens rea) to conceal the offence. This practice demonstrates the vulnerability of the state’s security facilities.
In light of this phenomenon, the author examines it through four frameworks of intelligence and security analysis. The first is the politicisation of intelligence. Mark M. Lowenthal argues that politicisation occurs when intelligence functions are drawn into serving partisan political agendas and those in power (Lowenthal, 2019).
In cases of illegal wiretapping, security intelligence tools are repurposed to map power relations and exert political leverage. Officials no longer provide objective analysis in the public interest. Instead, confidential information is used to create an information asymmetry that benefits certain groups and helps them retain political influence (Betts, 2007).
The second framework is democratic oversight of the security sector. Hans Born and Marina Caparini argue that security institutions with access to wiretapping tools are prone to defy authority when external oversight mechanisms are weak (Born and Caparini, 2007). Gaps in oversight allow officials to act without fear of consequences.
Without independent technical audits of lawful surveillance systems, oversight by the judiciary and parliament becomes ineffective (Bruneau and Matei, 2013). Officials with access to the technology can carry out illegal interceptions. Lax oversight fuels a crisis of horizontal accountability within law-enforcement institutions.
The third framework concerns internal threats and counter-intelligence. Roy Godson explains that the most dangerous threats to the integrity of national security often emerge from within institutions themselves (Godson, 2001). Infiltration by senior officials represents a serious failure of domestic counter-intelligence.
When officials manipulate intelligence infrastructure and erase audit logs, the national security system has been breached from within. Erasing digital traces is a premeditated crime. Counter-intelligence failures allow state tools to be controlled by officials’ personal agendas.
The fourth framework is securitisation theory from the Copenhagen School. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver explain that security issues are often used as a pretext to justify extra-legal actions outside normal legal procedures (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). False securitisation can be used to disguise official misconduct.
In the name of national stability, judicial procedures are bypassed and privacy rights violated. Security narratives used to justify illegal wiretapping blur the line between legitimate intelligence operations and criminal offences. Such practices destroy the principle of the rule of law in a democratic state.
International experience includes political wiretapping scandals that have damaged democracy. The Watergate scandal in the United States in the 1970s demonstrated the dangers of those in power abusing security tools to spy on political opponents (Lowenthal, 2019). It triggered one of the greatest political crises in modern US history.
Watergate prompted the US Congress to overhaul the intelligence oversight system. The government established permanent oversight committees in the House of Representatives and Senate and passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Born and Caparini, 2007). The law requires approval from a special court before surveillance can be conducted.
A similar case occurred in Greece with the Predatorgate scandal in 2022. Greece’s National Intelligence Service was found to have used sophisticated spyware to surveil opposition leaders and investigative journalists (Bruneau and Matei, 2013). The scandal sparked public anger and led to the resignation of the head of Greek intelligence.
The Greek government responded to the crisis by tightening wiretapping rules. The legislation was amended to require the approval of two independent prosecutors for every surveillance application made in the name of national security (Bruneau and Matei, 2013). Greece also granted victims the right to be notified after a surveillance operation had ended.
Lessons from international scandals show that surveillance without strict controls erodes democracy. Developed countries recognise that technical accountability and law enforcement prevent officials from acting arbitrarily. Indonesia should learn from these experiences to avoid the same pitfalls.
Addressing this crisis requires firm, impartial law enforcement. Criminal investigations into cybercrime by those who carried out illegal surveillance and those who ordered it must be completed transparently. Open trials are essential to restoring public confidence in law-enforcement and security institutions.
Reform of security-sector governance is also non-negotiable. The government and the House of Representatives need to strengthen external oversight of lawful surveillance facilities. Every surveillance activity must be audited regularly by an independent body free from political interference by the executive.
Judicial oversight must be mandatory for every surveillance operation. No institution or official should have absolute authority to intercept communications without a judge’s approval. The principle of checks and balances must be upheld to maintain a balance between national security and human rights.
Digital audit systems on state surveillance servers must be improved. Deleting data logs should be classified as a serious crime carrying criminal penalties. Security infrastructure must not operate without transparent digital records that cannot be manipulated.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/illegal-wiretapping-depoliticising-intelligence-for-a-stronger-rule-of-law-1793962369)
Originally published by Antara (Indonesian) (https://www.antaranews.com/berita/5836791/penyadapan-ilegal-depolitisasi-intelijen-demi-negara-hukum-yang-kuat), translated from Indonesian