IBRA's asset sales
IBRA's asset sales
As the exchange rate of the rupiah against the American dollar
is still almost 70 percent lower than it was at the beginning of
the economic crisis in late 1997 and most big and medium-scale
businesses are in financial distress with huge sums of bad debts,
Indonesia is supposed to be an asset acquisition paradise for
foreign investors.
Consequently, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA),
which holds and manages an estimated Rp 600 trillion (US$70.5
billion) worth of assets taken over from closed and nationalized
banks, is supposed to act as a one-stop service for these
investors.
As South Korea and Thailand have been enjoying strong recovery
due to a massive return of foreign direct investment mainly
through asset acquisition, which has markedly strengthened their
currencies, Indonesia should theoretically be a much better place
for asset-acquisition deals.
But instead of becoming a deal paradise, IBRA has often been
seen as a labyrinth that confuses investors combing through the
rumble of assets in its holding. The agency is even putting the
2000 state budget in jeopardy as it has so far raised only about
Rp 8 trillion of the Rp 19 trillion it was tasked to collect
between April and December. It seems rather impossible for IBRA
to raise the remaining Rp 11 trillion within the next four
months.
IBRA's botched handling of Standard Chartered Bank's
acquisition of Bank Bali last year severely damaged its
credibility. But President Abdurrahman Wahid's appointment of his
trusted aide, Cacuk Sudarjianto, eight months ago to lead the
agency, had been expected to increase its deal-making ability and
expedite its decision-making process.
However recent developments indicate that IBRA, whose role is
so vital in the fueling of the economic recovery, seems still
mired in bureaucratic inertia. It sometimes faces partisan
political meddling by those striving for their respective self-
interests, and is often sidetracked by the consequences of its
previous mistakes made during the Soeharto and B.J. Habibie
administrations.
The latest instance is the imperative to review the Master of
Settlement and Acquisition Agreements on the assets of four
conglomerates as repayment of their debts to the government
(central bank). The ensuing negotiations for this revision,
though sorely needed to prevent huge state losses, will
certainly slow down the process of disposing those assets.
But it is not fair to put all the blame on IBRA. Investors'
interests in the assets offered by the agency are not determined
solely by its ability to offer assets in a most attractive
package. Indonesia's macroeconomic outlook, which is strongly
influenced by both political and economic risks, greatly
influences investors' interests in the assets and their
perception of the relative value of the assets. And
unfortunately, foreign investors still place a high political and
economic risk premium on Indonesia.
However business is afterall transaction with calculated risk.
Given the right price discount to offset the risk premium, there
should always be investors willing to make the plunge. Therefore,
even though IBRA's main task remains maximizing the value of the
assets under its management, the agency should be given a
stronger mandate to dispose of assets at generous discounts
commensurate with the risky environment. This should, however,
not be seen as a suggestion for a fire sale, but the rationale of
opportunity cost. One dollar in this time of crisis is much more
valuable than $100 five years from now.
The dilemma is that the longer the assets are under IBRA's
management, the slower will be the economic recovery and the
bigger the damages incurred on the assets, notably corporate
entities. The government should realize that the thousands of
corporations currently under IBRA are the locomotive of the
economy, and until they are rehabilitated and restructured by new
investors there will never be a sustainable recovery.
The government also should be fully aware that as the
manufacturing sector still suffers from an excessive capacity due
to the economic slump, asset acquisition is, at least within the
next one to two years, the most attractive and viable gateway for
direct foreign investment inflow.
It is most important, though, that IBRA installs a good-
governance system to maintain high standards of disclosure and
accountability for its operations, given the complexity,
political sensitivity and vulnerability of asset disposal to
corruption.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/ibras-asset-sales-1447893297-1305894)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post