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Howard faces dilemma on E. Timor

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Howard faces dilemma on E. Timor

By Hilman Adil

This is the first of two articles on Australia's policy on
East Timor.

JAKARTA (JP): Australia, the first country in the world to
formally recognize East Timor's integration into Indonesia in
1978, announced a major policy shift last January, indicating
that it would support giving the territory the long-term option
of becoming independent. At the same time, however, the
Australian government indicated that it would prefer East Timor
to remain under Indonesian control.

This policy of ambivalence exposed a dilemma in which the
Howard government found itself. On the one hand, there was
considerable sympathy for the struggle for independence of the
East Timorese people, especially by the general public. On the
other hand, the possibility of an immediate Indonesian withdrawal
from the territory would create a power vacuum which could result
in armed conflict between prointegration and proindependence
factions. That would pose substantial security challenges for
Australia.

Put into a historical perspective, we could raise the question
whether this policy of ambivalence influenced by considerations
of "real politik" could be traced back to the years when a
Liberal government under prime minister Robert Menzies was in
power in the early 1960s, and when the East Timor question was
discussed in Cabinet. According to the 1962 Cabinet Papers, the
Menzies government believed that there was "no practical
alternative to eventual Indonesian sovereignty over Portuguese
Timor." At the same time, he took the view that it would not be
acceptable for Indonesia "to proceed against Portuguese Timor
with arms".

More revealing was Sir Garfield Barwick's statement in
February 1963. Before the Cabinet, the then minister for external
affairs argued that East Timor was "not capable of political
independence". He went on to say that "if Indonesia seeks to
incorporate Portuguese Timor by genuinely peaceful means and
providing that this was in accordance with the freely expressed
wishes of the Timorese, Australia would have little alternative
but to acquiesce.

"Indeed, such an arrangement might have an advantage over
other possibilities." That, in essence, was to remain the formal
Australia position until the Indonesian invasion in 1974. After
the invasion, from confidential records just recently released,
it would appear that the then Labor prime minister Gough Whitlam,
in exchanges with former president Soeharto, made clear his
preference for the territory to be incorporated into Indonesia.
At the same time, however, he stated with less emphasis his
party's "strong commitment to the principle of self-determination
for the people in East Timor".

To highlight the underlying continuity between Menzies
approach in the early 1960s and Whitlam's approach in 1974-1975,
one could see a consistency in Australia's foreign policy since
the Liberal government under prime minister Menzies 12 years
earlier. Foreign policy under Menzies revealed almost identical
in every respect the policy pursued by Gough Whitlam. Both saw
merit in the idea of self-determination by the East Timorese
people.

Both also saw merit in the idea of East Timor joining
Indonesia. The only distinction between them in the case of East
Timor joining Indonesia was the way it was implemented. As the
records show, Whitlam turned a blind eye to events surrounding
the armed invasion of the territory in defiance of every canon of
international law. Most probably, based on geostrategic
considerations, the exigencies of real politik made it imperative
for Whitlam to adjust to the new situation by a policy of
accommodation toward Indonesia.

This was justified in terms of maintaining an effective and
harmonious relationship with Indonesia and, therefore, no one
should underestimate the enormous importance of that
relationship. It is in this context, given the situation at that
time, one should not only blame the Labor government under prime
minister Whitlam for Australia's foreign policy in the early
1970s. One of the determining factors shaping Australia's foreign
policy on East Timor since the early 1960s was support for the
principle of self-determination. On the other hand, both the
Liberal and Labor parties have supported the integration of the
territory in Indonesia ever since 1974-1975.

In 1978, the Liberal-National Party government of Whitlam's
successor, Malcolm Fraser, became the first in the world to
formally recognize Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. The
Labor government under Bob Hawke came to power in 1983 with a
platform proclaiming "the inalienable right of the East Timorese
to self-determination and independence" but also reaffirmed
Fraser's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty.

In 1994, the Liberal Party's minister for external affairs,
Andrew Peacock, told Parliament that the Coalition government
regarded the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia as
irreversible. Similarly, the Keating government thought no
different. A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs
summed up the government's position in 1995: "... our recognition
of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor overshadows our
concern about the (absence of an) act of self-determination
and ... there is little likelihood that an internationally
supervised act of self-determination would be allowed. Therefore,
it would be unwise to encourage the proindependence East Timorese
and their supporters to hope for a referendum on the province's
future."

Prime minister Keating was more blunt when he dismissed
criticism by stating: "We are not going to hock the entire
Indonesian relationship on Timor. That's what the East Timor
lobby's got to understand -- it is not going to happen."

Most revealing was what Richard Woolcott had to say. In a
recent article in the Australian Financial Review, the former
ambassador to Indonesia and former secretary of the department of
foreign affairs and trade, stated that the principle of self-
determination "is not a sacred cow". In fact, Western governments
have used lofty appeals to this principle to suit their
commercial and strategic interest.

The writer is a senior researcher in international affairs at
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta.

More from 8 March 1999 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/howard-faces-dilemma-on-e-timor-1447893297-1428940)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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