Hormuz, Oman, and the Struggle for a Permanent Middle East Order
On 27 May 2026, President Donald Trump issued an unusual statement, even by his own standards: “Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we’ll have to blow them up.” This statement emerged as Iran and Oman explore the possibility of a joint management framework for the Strait of Hormuz without Washington’s involvement. For Trump, this is not merely a diplomatic development requiring a response; it is a signal that a space previously considered under US control is beginning to shift and is becoming highly risky for him.
Trump faces two consistent structural constraints: sensitivity to financial markets and the electoral calendar. Instability in Hormuz implies rising oil prices and persistent inflation, which limits the Federal Reserve’s manoeuvrability—a combination he has previously experienced as having a direct impact on public perception of the economy. With the November 202lar midterm elections serving as a political deadline, Trump has little incentive to allow Hormuz to remain an uncontrolled variable for too long. The threat against Oman, in this logic, is a method of pressuring a process he does not want proceeding without US involvement.
There are three layers of conflict within this single strait. The first is energy: approximately one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this strait. Any disruption now directly impacts the perception of global energy system risks and the prices monitored daily by Trump, energy markets, and financial institutions. The second layer is transactional diplomacy; in the 2026 dynamics, Hormuz is emerging as a variable in US-Iran negotiation calculations. The idea that maritime access could be part of a bargaining package represents a significant shift, where something once considered a common right is now treated as a bargaining chip. The third and most decisive layer is long-term architecture. If Iran and Oman are discussing a joint management framework, they are testing not just technical mechanisms, but who has the right to design the permanent structure once the conflict phase subsides.
Oman has traditionally maintained a non-intrusive, neutral position, serving as an indirect communication channel between Washington and Tehran. However, this position changes when Oman moves from being a mere intermediary to a stakeholder in the new management design of Hormuz. The dilemma for Oman is that maintaining relevance requires participating in the new architecture, while maintaining neutrality may mean gradually losing the strategic influence that has been the foundation of its power.
Moving forward, the issue is no longer just about who controls the strait, but who has the right to define how it is effectively regulated. If a regional mechanism emerges that grants Iran a formal role in managing Hormuz, it would set a significant precedent: that strategic pressure can be converted into a new regional geopolitical map. Conversely, if Washington succeeds in maintaining the status quo, the old pattern will persist, albeit at the cost of recurring and increasing tensions.
In the context of ending the Iran war, indicators of which scenario will manifest can be observed through three concrete variables in the coming weeks: whether Pakistani mediation continues or stalls before the end of June; whether vessel movements in Hormuz show signs of normalisation or remain in IRGC tactical patterns; and whether oil markets begin to price in a higher risk premium in response to diplomatic deadlock. As both the US (through the expansion of the Abraham Accords) and Iran (through new management of the Strait of Hormuz) fight for a permanent post-war order, the possibility of a transition to more severe energy crisis scenarios increases if no concrete progress is made by late June.