Heartland versus Rimland: Re-reading Global Geopolitics
The world continues to change. For several decades, many believed that globalisation and the digital revolution would render geographical location increasingly meaningless. Yet the opposite has occurred. Amidst the rivalry between the United States and China, the war in Ukraine, and the scramble for semiconductors, critical minerals, and global supply chains, geography has once again become a determining factor in the direction of world politics. It is unsurprising that a number of classical geopolitical theories once considered obsolete are now regaining attention. Ideas put forward more than a century ago still help us understand the dynamics of great power competition in the 21st century.
In the late 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahan, a United States Navy officer and maritime strategy thinker, argued that the nation controlling the seas would wield global influence. Several decades later, Halford Mackinder, a British geographer and geopolitician, proposed the Heartland theory, placing the Eurasian landmass as the centre of global geopolitical gravity. Nicholas Spykman, a Dutch-born American political scientist and one of the pioneers of modern geopolitics, later developed the Rimland theory, referring to the Eurasian coastal regions that serve as the meeting point of land and sea powers. These three thinkers do not negate one another; rather, they explain how changes in technology, economics, and the distribution of power shaped geopolitics in their respective eras.
More than a century later, a number of analysts are once again using these frameworks to interpret the changing global geopolitical landscape. Among them are Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, writing in Foreign Affairs (July 2026). In their view, the world today exhibits the re-emergence of a classical rivalry between land power (Heartland) and maritime power (Rimland), albeit in a form vastly different from the past. In their reading, China and Russia form the increasingly integrated core of the Heartland power. Iran and North Korea are seen as part of a network of revisionist states that, with their respective capacities, reinforce pressure on the Western-dominated international order. Unlike the continental powers of the Napoleonic era, Imperial Germany, or the Soviet Union, today’s Heartland is not a single empire but a loose coalition united by a shared interest in reducing the dominance of the United States and its allies.
The nature of the rivalry has also changed. Where territorial conquest was once the primary instrument, competition now increasingly takes place through economics, technology, industry, and global networks. Cyberattacks, disinformation, control of semiconductors, critical minerals, undersea data cables, and strategic supply chains are all part of geopolitical competition. Globalisation itself is no longer solely a driver of international cooperation but can also be exploited as an instrument of political influence and pressure.
On the other side, the United States remains the main anchor of the Rimland, supported by a network of allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, including NATO countries, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. According to Beckley and Brands, the primary advantage of this coalition lies not merely in its military strength but in the combination of economic size, technological leadership, industrial capacity, and the breadth of its alliance network. However, they also caution that this advantage cannot be maintained without consistent US leadership. Under the administration of President Donald Trump, coordination and cohesion among Rimland nations are considered to face challenges due to rising unilateralist tendencies and diminished trust among some allies regarding Washington’s commitment. Therefore, the main issue for the Rimland is not a lack of resources but how to coordinate all these advantages into an effective joint strategy.
Meanwhile, the Heartland nations continue their efforts to reduce dependence on Western-dominated economic and technological systems. They are expanding alternative trade networks, strengthening industrial cooperation, developing domestic technologies, and building resilience against various forms of economic and technological restrictions. The competition between the two blocs is thus increasingly shifting from direct military confrontation towards a long-term contest in the fields of economics, industry, technology, and security.
One of the most interesting parts of Beckley and Brands’ analysis, however, concerns the position of the Global South. They argue that the Rimland need not obsess over winning over every developing nation. As during the Cold War, many countries will continue to choose a pragmatic approach according to their respective national interests. Some are attracted to investment and financing from China, but simultaneously worry about industrial overcapacity, dumping practices, and excessive economic dependence. Consequently, the world is unlikely to return to a rigid division into two opposing blocs. What is more likely to emerge are nations that continue to pursue hedging strategies, cooperating with various parties depending on the issue and their interests.
For ASEAN, these developments present both challenges and opportunities. The region sits at the crossroads of two oceans and is one of the world’s economic growth centres. This position makes ASEAN increasingly important, but also increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of great power rivalry. Maintaining regional unity and ASEAN centrality therefore remains a strategic interest. For Indonesia, the most important lesson is not determining whether the Heartland or the Rimland will ultimately prevail. What is far more critical is ensuring that the country does not become a mere arena for the projection of other nations’ power.