Government Cannot Rely Solely on 'Beauty'
Every year, the Miss Universe pageant reminds the public that a winner’s crown never falls solely due to a beautiful face. The judging panel considers three elements simultaneously: beauty, brain, and behaviour. Contestants with stunning appearances who become nervous during Q&A sessions or lack mastery of key issues rarely bring home the title.
This analogy is relevant when analysing a nation’s position in today’s global power competition. A nation cannot rely solely on its ‘beautiful face’ in the form of projected growth, demographic bonuses, natural resource wealth, or a large domestic market.
Without the ‘brain’ reflected in institutional capacity, and without the ‘behaviour’ tested through bureaucratic agility in facing crises, that beauty is merely stage capital that fades quickly once the spotlight shifts to the next issue.
Indonesia has long been marketed through a narrative of structural beauty: a population of over 280 million, the world’s second-longest coastline, the largest nickel reserves, and a steadily expanding digital market. However, this beautiful face has not automatically translated into real power.
The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index 2024 places Indonesia ninth out of 27 Asian countries in terms of comprehensive strength, trailing one level behind Singapore, which has a population of less than six million and a land area of only about 700 square kilometres, even though Indonesia’s economy is four times larger than Singapore’s.
Analyst Michael Beckley explains this paradox through a simple formula: comprehensive national power is calculated by multiplying GDP by GDP per capita. Consequently, a large population that is not balanced by productivity becomes a resource burden rather than a pillar of strength, a paradox also observed in India.
Indonesia’s competitive score in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking reinforces this picture. After rising to 27th place in 2024, Indonesia’s position plummeted to 40th out of 69 countries in 2025, and then fell further to 48th in 2026, trailing behind Malaysia, which jumped eleven places.
IMD World Competitiveness Center Director Arturo Bris emphasised that economic competitiveness is no longer determined by budget size or economies of scale, but by the credibility of a country’s institutions. This data serves as evidence that a beautiful face consisting of market potential and resources, without the support of credible governance, does not automatically reach the podium.
The concept of ‘smart power’ popularised by Joseph Nye serves as an important reference here. Smart power is not merely the sum of hard power and soft power, but the capacity to intelligently weave both together according as the context and momentum require. A government with ‘brains’ will be able to read changes in the geopolitical landscape, formulate data-driven policies, and avoid being trapped in the mere romanticism of potential.
IMD notes that Indonesia excels in price competitiveness indicators, ranking tenth in the world, and tax competitiveness, ranking twelfth in the world; however, it lags far behind in government efficiency and business efficiency, with most indicators falling below the 50th global rank. This means that fiscal beauty capital is not accompanied by an equal level of governance intelligence.
Compare this with South Korea, which occupies seventh place in the 2024 Asia Power Index with a comprehensive strength score of 31.5, supported not only by economic capacity but also by cultural exports ranging from K-pop to film, which strengthen both its soft power and diplomatic position. Japan, despite its score occasionally falling below the threshold of a major power, consistently maintains a strong middle class thanks to mature research institutions and a technocratic bureaucracy.
Australia ranks sixth with a score of approximately 31.8, supported by an alliance network and think tanks that actively produce foreign policy knowledge, even though the same report notes that Canberra is experiencing a decline in resource resilience due to a worsening energy trade balance. This shows that even developed nations must continuously nurture their ‘brains’ and must not become complacent with the beauty of alliances alone.
The third element, ‘behaviour’, is the one most often overlooked, despite being the most decisive factor in shaping a government’s image in the eyes of both domestic publics and global audiences. Behaviour encompasses the agility of the bureaucracy in responding to crises, the resilience of institutions in facing shocks, and the ability to communicate policies clearly.
The 2025 IMD report asserts that government efficiency is now the primary differentiator in reducing socio-economic polarisation, as efficiency encompasses agility, inclusivity, and a future-oriented policy framework.
The Philippines serves as an interesting example. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has recorded more bilateral diplomatic dialogues than his predecessor, and his firmer approach to territorial disputes is highly regarded by experts, reflected in invitations to speak at the Australian parliament and a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
This is an example of agile diplomatic behaviour building a narrative, even though the Philippines’ comprehensive strength is considered middle-tier. Vietnam also recorded an increase in its comprehensive strength score in the same year, partly due to the consistency of its diplomatic behaviour known as ‘bamboo diplomacy’—flexible yet firmly rooted in national interests, which involves integrating Vietnam’s national industry into global industrial supply chains.
Conversely, without mature behaviour, government policy communication is easily perceived by the public as reactive and inconsistent, especially in the post-truth era when both domestic and international audiences judge a government by the speed and clarity of its response, rather than through official documents alone.
Furthermore, Indonesian policies are often reversed and released without proper planning.