Golkar and ABRI: An historical alliance

Golkar and ABRI: An historical alliance

A recent statement by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Hartono that
every soldier of the Armed Forces is a Golkar cadre has sparked a
wide debate on the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Political
scientist Cornelis LAY disentangles the historical myths from
current reality.

JAKARTA (JP): For everyone who has followed the birth and
development of Golkar, Gen. Hartono's statement is easily
understandable. It is a reflection of the reality of the
relationship between Golkar and the Armed Forces (ABRI). In other
words, the army chief correlated actual politics and perceived
politics.

Fostered by the army, Golkar has, since its inception, been
blessed with the wealth of ABRI's open political support. It has
been allowed to grow into a political giant which dominates the
national political scene at all levels. Observers attribute
Golkar's successive election victories to the unreserved support
of the military and the use of the government bureaucracy.

Nevertheless it is hard to understand the political reality
solely from this historical view of Golkar or accept the
organization's relationship with ABRI without ever questioning
it.

It is ABRI's widely-known claim to be a force which has grown
out of the people and for the people that distinguishes it
ideologically from the military in other countries. This claim
has allowed ABRI to always see itself as an instrument or tool of
the people. If this is true, the statement of the army chief
amounts to a "reduction" of ABRI's position into an instrument of
only a group of the people.

As a political force Golkar can never claim to be the word of
the people no matter how great its support. Due to its political
nature, Golkar cannot be read as the manifestation of the people.
It only represents a section of the population. Outside Golkar,
there are numerous groups of people -- no matter how small in
number -- who are part of other political forces.

Hence, it is very difficult to reconcile the army chief's
statement with ABRI's ideological position as the instrument of
the whole population.

If one agrees that the basis for justifying the existence of
ABRI's sociopolitical function is its claim to have struggled
with the people, it can be seen that its partiality toward one
group of people is hard to justify. In terms of the political
function, it is "the people" which features prominently, not the
political force.

The third reason to question the current relationship between
ABRI and Golkar is that ABRI's highest commitment, as it always
stresses and as is always expected by the people, is to the
state. And Golkar, whatever its size, is not and cannot be a
substitute for the state. Golkar is only a part of it. Therefore,
when ABRI "reduces" itself to become an instrument of Golkar for
only historical reasons, it soon becomes apparent that many
people soon become marginalized.

Fourthly, supposedly one accepts the historical link between
Golkar and ABRI without question, there will still be a problem
when it is juxtaposed with the oft-repeated rhetoric on the
success of 25 years of political development.

Successful political development usually means more democratic
political behavior, more mature political practices or self-
reliance and increased political autonomy. However, when one
returns to Gen. Hartono's statement, the impressions emerges that
our politics have become stuck in the 1970s.

The political situation and challenges at the community level
today are reminiscent of those of the initial period of the New
Order.

This view was reinforced when ABRI's chief of social and
political affairs said that Gen. Hartono's statement must be
understood from the perspective of ABRI's sociopolitical role and
read in the context of ABRI's tactical policy to defend the
continuity of the New Order.

Because this tactical standpoint has been the standard one
from the start of the New Order, it is logical that one has
simply drawn the conclusion that political stagnation is the only
result of the political development process in the years to date.
I think that everyone would agree that it refutes the reality of
tremendous change, development and progress in our political
community.

This applies also to Golkar. Indonesia's political development
so far seems to have not affected the process of Golkar's
political institutionalization, political maturity, self-reliance
and autonomy. It still needs "total protection" from its
"mother".

Apart from the above problems, my other main concern about the
army chief's statement is the possibility of its implications in
the future, especially during the 1997 general election.

The statement might be misinterpreted on a practical level
with disastrous consequences, possibly resulting in a return to
the electoral practices of 1971. It is almost universally
acknowledged that the 1971 general election was not a
demonstration of the electoral practices to which we all aspire.

The writer is a lecturer of political science at Gadjah Mada
University, Yogyakarta.

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