Golkar and ABRI: An historical alliance

Golkar and ABRI: An historical alliance

A recent statement by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Hartono that every soldier of the Armed Forces is a Golkar cadre has sparked a wide debate on the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Political scientist Cornelis LAY disentangles the historical myths from current reality.

JAKARTA (JP): For everyone who has followed the birth and development of Golkar, Gen. Hartono's statement is easily understandable. It is a reflection of the reality of the relationship between Golkar and the Armed Forces (ABRI). In other words, the army chief correlated actual politics and perceived politics.

Fostered by the army, Golkar has, since its inception, been blessed with the wealth of ABRI's open political support. It has been allowed to grow into a political giant which dominates the national political scene at all levels. Observers attribute Golkar's successive election victories to the unreserved support of the military and the use of the government bureaucracy.

Nevertheless it is hard to understand the political reality solely from this historical view of Golkar or accept the organization's relationship with ABRI without ever questioning it.

It is ABRI's widely-known claim to be a force which has grown out of the people and for the people that distinguishes it ideologically from the military in other countries. This claim has allowed ABRI to always see itself as an instrument or tool of the people. If this is true, the statement of the army chief amounts to a "reduction" of ABRI's position into an instrument of only a group of the people.

As a political force Golkar can never claim to be the word of the people no matter how great its support. Due to its political nature, Golkar cannot be read as the manifestation of the people. It only represents a section of the population. Outside Golkar, there are numerous groups of people -- no matter how small in number -- who are part of other political forces.

Hence, it is very difficult to reconcile the army chief's statement with ABRI's ideological position as the instrument of the whole population.

If one agrees that the basis for justifying the existence of ABRI's sociopolitical function is its claim to have struggled with the people, it can be seen that its partiality toward one group of people is hard to justify. In terms of the political function, it is "the people" which features prominently, not the political force.

The third reason to question the current relationship between ABRI and Golkar is that ABRI's highest commitment, as it always stresses and as is always expected by the people, is to the state. And Golkar, whatever its size, is not and cannot be a substitute for the state. Golkar is only a part of it. Therefore, when ABRI "reduces" itself to become an instrument of Golkar for only historical reasons, it soon becomes apparent that many people soon become marginalized.

Fourthly, supposedly one accepts the historical link between Golkar and ABRI without question, there will still be a problem when it is juxtaposed with the oft-repeated rhetoric on the success of 25 years of political development.

Successful political development usually means more democratic political behavior, more mature political practices or self- reliance and increased political autonomy. However, when one returns to Gen. Hartono's statement, the impressions emerges that our politics have become stuck in the 1970s.

The political situation and challenges at the community level today are reminiscent of those of the initial period of the New Order.

This view was reinforced when ABRI's chief of social and political affairs said that Gen. Hartono's statement must be understood from the perspective of ABRI's sociopolitical role and read in the context of ABRI's tactical policy to defend the continuity of the New Order.

Because this tactical standpoint has been the standard one from the start of the New Order, it is logical that one has simply drawn the conclusion that political stagnation is the only result of the political development process in the years to date. I think that everyone would agree that it refutes the reality of tremendous change, development and progress in our political community.

This applies also to Golkar. Indonesia's political development so far seems to have not affected the process of Golkar's political institutionalization, political maturity, self-reliance and autonomy. It still needs "total protection" from its "mother".

Apart from the above problems, my other main concern about the army chief's statement is the possibility of its implications in the future, especially during the 1997 general election.

The statement might be misinterpreted on a practical level with disastrous consequences, possibly resulting in a return to the electoral practices of 1971. It is almost universally acknowledged that the 1971 general election was not a demonstration of the electoral practices to which we all aspire.

The writer is a lecturer of political science at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.

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