Geopolitics Enters the Digital Age

Can a country be weakened without war? Twenty years ago, the question might have sounded strange. Today, the answer is increasingly clear: yes. Cyberattacks can cripple public services, disinformation campaigns can erode public trust, and disruptions to communication networks or data centres can hamper economic activity without a single shot being fired. All this demonstrates that national security is no longer determined solely by military strength, but also by a state’s ability to secure its digital space. For centuries, geopolitics was understood as competition for territory, trade routes, and natural resources. Thinkers like Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasised the importance of sea power, while Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland Theory showed how geographical position influences the global balance of power. Their ideas remain relevant today. However, technological development has broadened the arena of competition. Where the struggle for influence once primarily took place on land, at sea, in the air, and in space, the digital domain has now become a crucial part of the geopolitical landscape. The 4–10 July 2026 edition of The Economist covered various topics, from artificial intelligence (AI) and communication applications to internet satellites, submarine cables, and drone warfare. At first glance, these themes might seem unrelated. Yet, when read as a whole, an interesting common thread emerges: competition between nations no longer occurs solely on land, sea, air, and in space, but also in the digital realm. In this context, data, communication networks, and technology have evolved into new sources of strategic power. This shift does not mean classical geopolitics has lost its relevance. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz still affect world energy supplies. The South China Sea remains a strategic area. International trade routes continue to be the lifeblood of the global economy. What has changed is the addition of a new dimension to interstate rivalry. Besides strengthening military and economic capabilities, countries are now also racing to build digital capacity, protect communication infrastructure, develop artificial intelligence, and bolster their cyber resilience. This change in perspective has become increasingly evident in recent years. The United States, for example, has tightened restrictions on the export of high-tech AI chips to certain countries. China is racing to develop its domestic AI capabilities, while the European Union is building a comprehensive AI regulatory framework. Each is taking a different approach, but all are driven by the same understanding: digital technology is no longer seen merely as a business innovation, but as a strategic asset that affects economic competitiveness, national security, and a country’s geopolitical standing. At the same time, digital infrastructure has also become increasingly strategic. Data centres, submarine cables, communication satellites, and digital networks have become the backbone of modern government and economic activity. Disruption to this infrastructure can hamper public services, disrupt payment systems, sever communications, and even paralyse parts of the economy. It is no wonder that protecting digital infrastructure has become an important part of many countries’ national security strategies. It must be stressed that not all problems in the digital space are part of geopolitical competition. Many cyberattacks, digital frauds, and data leaks are criminal acts that must be handled through law enforcement. However, the digital space also opens opportunities for state and non-state actors to conduct espionage, influence operations, and disrupt a country’s critical infrastructure. Consequently, the line between national security and digital security is becoming increasingly thin. What does this mean for Indonesia? First, Indonesia needs to broaden its perspective on national defence. Warships, fighter jets, missiles, and the strength of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) remain the primary foundation of the country’s defence. However, the spectrum of threats has widened. The state must also be able to protect data centres, telecommunication networks, payment systems, submarine cables, and various digital infrastructures that support public life. For an archipelagic nation like Indonesia, whose economic and communication activities are heavily dependent on digital networks, the resilience of this infrastructure is becoming increasingly important. Digital resilience is no longer a supplement, but an integral part of national resilience. Second, budget limitations demand that Indonesia set its priorities carefully. Indonesia does not need to race to possess the most cutting-edge technology. With limited resources, the challenge is not to chase all the latest advancements, but to choose the right priorities. A more realistic approach is to build national digital resilience gradually through strengthening cyber security, improving the quality of human resources, protecting data, conducting research, and establishing good digital governance. In many cases, investing in people and institutions will yield greater benefits than simply purchasing expensive technology. Third, Indonesia’s diplomacy must also continue to adapt. If international issues once largely revolved around trade, territorial boundaries, or traditional security, today the governance of AI, cyber security, data protection, and international digital standards are increasingly on the global diplomatic agenda. As a developing country with a growing digital economy, Indonesia has a vested interest in contributing to the formation of an international digital governance framework that is open, inclusive, and respects sovereignty.