Further enlargement of ASEAN not a dream

Further enlargement of ASEAN not a dream

Bilson Kurus looks at a future with an ASEAN of 10 members.

On July 28, Vietnam was formally welcomed into the ASEAN fold
as its seventh member. A regional rival of staunchly anti-
communist ASEAN up to the late 1980s, Vietnam's entry paves the
way for a further enlargement of ASEAN. It is very likely that
the rest of Indochina -- Cambodia and Laos -- as well as Myanmar
will soon follow in Vietnam's footsteps. In all probability,
ASEAN will become an association of all 10 Southeast Asian states
by the turn of the century.

The prospect of an enlarged ASEAN is both a cause for hope and
a pause for thought.

An association encompassing all the current 10 countries would
be in a stronger position to speak for the destiny of the region,
which has long been an arena of great power competition. It will
provide a stronger avenue for Southeast Asians to be heard in
international fora. It will be a potential vehicle for the
peoples of the region, if not to lead, then, at least to be
legitimate co-partners in shaping the future social, economic and
political landscapes of Southeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the
world.

But a bigger ASEAN will mean new challenges, bigger
responsibilities and even potentially more internal squabbles. It
will also mean some necessary adjustments on both sides. Is ASEAN
capable or, perhaps more important, willing to confront the
consequences of a larger entity?

An immediate challenge for a bigger ASEAN is getting a diverse
group of members to agree with each other. With six members,
ASEAN had already found it difficult to achieve consensus.
Without consensus, ASEAN had frequently resorted to the
expedience of "agreeing to disagree". It is unlikely that ASEAN's
consensual modus operandi will be replaced by a majority
decision-making process anytime soon.

This means ASEAN's reliance on pragmatism laced with a
generous spirit of compromise and goodwill on the part of its
leaders will be both correspondingly greater and critical to its
organizational cohesion and unity. Minus this ingredient, ASEAN
may find itself backpedaling rather than forging ahead towards
the frontier of regionalism in Southeast Asia.

The entrance of members who are further behind in the economic
realm will unquestionably test the ASEAN spirit of compromise and
goodwill to the limits. Will new members be seen as threats and
competitors for extra-ASEAN investments? Conversely, will
investments from the more advanced members be perceived as
exploitation by the new members?

If issues such as these are shelved rather than dealt with in
a pragmatic and meaningful manner, ASEAN might unwittingly become
a de facto "disparate and unequal" entity. As it is, the
economic, not to mention political, gap between Vietnam and the
other candidates for ASEAN membership could potentially result in
a multi-tiered organization. That would undoubtedly defeat the
purpose of widening the ASEAN circle.

While the entry of Vietnam into the ranks of ASEAN is a final
affirmation of Asean's closure of its longstanding Cold War-
induced conflict with Vietnam over Cambodia, it would be a
quantum leap of faith to assume that the historical tension
between Thailand and Vietnam will now be a thing of the past.

As the Flor Contemplacion saga between the Philippines and
Singapore illustrated, spats could still arise even among
friends. The assertion by a Thai Prime Minister in the early
1990s to turn Indochina into an "economic battlefield" suggests
that competition for influence in what each sees as its
legitimate backyard remains. Vietnam's entry into ASEAN may have
only redirected the competition to a more benign arena.

Yet the admission of Vietnam into ASEAN and the keen interest
indicated by Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar to follow in Vietnam's
footsteps is also a positive affirmation that the benefits and
advantages (tangible and otherwise) of ASEAN membership outweigh
any potential drawbacks. In this respect, Vietnam's entry has
expanded the potential Asean market to about 420 million people.
And when Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar join the ranks of ASEAN, the
ASEAN Free Trade Area will indeed become a de facto South-east
Asian free trade area. This can only further boost the region's
attractiveness for trade and investment as well as put ASEAN in
an even stronger position to deal with extra-ASEAN trade
partners.

On the political and diplomatic fronts, the inclusion of
Vietnam and the other Indochinese states as well as Myanmar would
further bolster the ability of ASEAN to deal with extra-regional
actors over troublesome issues such as the conflicting claims
over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam's entry
into ASEAN has in essence ASEAN-ized the dispute over the
Spratlys given that Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei are also
claimants to parts of the Spratlys, which is claimed in its
entirety by China. If ASEAN chooses to deal with China as a bloc
over the Spratlys, the addition of Vietnam cannot but be seen as
a "structural empowerment" of ASEAN. Such a move is certainly not
unprecedented as ASEAN has taken a similar approach in dealing
with Japan and Australia over trade-related issues in the past.

Arguably, the expansion of ASEAN is perhaps the impetus that
the organization needs in order to maintain its raison d'etre.
And what could be more fitting than to start with Vietnam, its
erstwhile regional antagonist for the better part of the
organization's existence.

In the short term, it allows the original members to act in a
bigger arena and may partially deflect the desire by some members
to look beyond Asean towards broader regional arrangements. In
the long term, an enlarged ASEAN might serve as a viable home
base from which members can either venture into, or retreat from,
the international arena depending on the evolving global
scenario. Either way, widening the ASEAN circle is a challenge
worthy of an organization which, in the eyes of its detractors,
would flounder in the post-Cambodia era.

Dr. Bilson Kurus is a Visiting Research Associate with the
Institute for Development Studies, Sabah, Malaysia.