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From Product Certification to Halal Talent Mobility

| Source: CNBC Translated from Indonesian | Economy
From Product Certification to Halal Talent Mobility
Image: CNBC

The global halal economy is entering a new phase. On one hand, the connectivity of cross-border certification continues to grow. At the 5th Summit of Halal 20, 15 Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) were recorded, connecting certification bodies from 48 countries. The global Islamic economic value is also projected to rise from US$2.60 trillion in 2024 to US$3.56 trillion by 2029.

These figures provide reason for optimism. However, there is a much more fundamental question: when halal certificates are recognised across borders, do the workers who ensure the halal process receive the same recognition?

The answer, so far, is no. Products already have standards, audit procedures, and recognition pathways. Meanwhile, halal process assistants, supervisors, auditors, slaughterers, and laboratory analysts do not yet have equivalent global professional standards. As a result, halal mobility is growing as the mobility of goods, rather than the mobility of people.

This issue is critical because the halal economy rests upon millions of workers. Approximately 58% of the global workforce remains in the informal sector. In Indonesia, this proportion reaches 59.42%, or more than 87 million people. For them, halal certification does not automatically translate into formal employment, access to finance, or increased income.

Herein lies the paradox. Indonesia possesses a large Muslim population and a demographic bonus. However, population size does not automatically become a halal economic advantage. Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia hold stronger positions in the Global Islamic Economy Indicator because they have built institutions, standards, financing, and supporting ecosystems. Large nations with young workforces can still lag behind if their labour markets are unable to formally absorb skills.

This gap is already visible in the classroom. In many Muslim countries, halal education remains strong in aspects of jurisprudence (fiqh), but is not always connected to food science, laboratories, quality control, and industrial processes. Conversely, several exporting nations possess scientific and manufacturing capacities but lack adequate understanding of the application of halal jurisprudence. Industry requires professionals who master both. Without the intersection of technical competence and halal understanding, the business world only receives half of its required workforce.

Our definition of ‘halal talent’ is also too narrow. To date, halal talent has been represented by five professions: assistants, supervisors, auditors, slaughterers, and laboratory analysts. All five are important, but they all exist at the upstream stage—ensuring the halality of the process. In reality, a growing and competitive halal ecosystem also requires halal supply chain specialists, halal assurance system managers, halal data analysts, halal fintech specialists, halal marketing and branding specialists, halal export specialists, and halal regulation and compliance specialists.

These are the professions that transform a certificate into added value in the market. Without them, certification remains merely a stamp rather than an engine of growth. A halal profession map containing only five roles will produce a workforce for the industry we imagined ten years ago, not the industry being formed today.

Indonesia’s certification targets clarify this urgency. The ambition to reach 14 million certified businesses by 2029 should be accompanied by targets for workforce requirements. However, this business target has not progressed alongside a map of how many assistants, supervisors, auditors, technicians, quality personnel, and supply chain and export specialists are needed.

At the same time, unemployment among vocational school (SMK) graduates stands at 7.74%, the highest compared to other education levels. Without a clear absorption strategy, increased training risks merely shifting unemployment from schools to job waiting rooms.

The ‘link and match’ debate also needs to be reversed. Universities and vocational schools should not always be blamed when graduates struggle to find employment. The problem often begins with micro-enterprises that have not yet formalised. Businesses without legal identity find it difficult to recruit officially, project labour needs, or build a business track record. When signals of labour demand do not appear, educational institutions are forced to guess which competencies should be taught.

Therefore, the narrative surrounding ‘halal’ needs to shift. So far, halal is read solely as compliance: a requirement to be met so that a product may circulate. In fact, the H20 forum discusses not just certification, but the growth of the halal economy.

The formula needs to be expanded: halal is not just compliance, but compliance plus productivity, market access, and competitiveness. A halal assurance system implemented correctly actually forces businesses to document processes, control raw materials, and trace supply chains. All of this constitutes quality management discipline that increases productivity. Certificates recognised across borders open market access. The combination of both generates competitiveness. When halal is interpreted this way, investment in halal talent ceases to be a compliance burden and becomes a productivity investment.

Within this framework, halal certification must not stop at being a compliance document. It must serve as an entry point to economic formalisation. The path is clear: business identity through NIB, halal certification, financing, and then market access through procurement and digital trade. These four stages must function as a single ladder. If business owners are asked to climb one by one with high costs and risks, they will choose to remain in the informal sector.

Incentives need to be improved. Micro-enterprises will be willing to formalise when the cost of being formal is lower than the cost of remaining informal. The government can link licensing and certification to access…

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