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Frenemy Threats: Strengthening Counter-intelligence and National Security Resilience

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Politics
Frenemy Threats: Strengthening Counter-intelligence and National Security Resilience
Image: CNBC Indonesia

In a nation’s history, threats to the state do not always take the form of open military attacks or pressure from beyond its borders. They can also originate close to the centre of power, or even within an institution itself, for example through people who have gained trust, access to strategic information, or direct involvement in decision-making.

This phenomenon is popularly described as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”, “an enemy within” or a frenemy: a party that outwardly appears to be cooperating, but whose actions may harm an organisation and the national interest.

From the perspective of strategic intelligence, and drawing on my experience and expertise, this phenomenon should be understood as a potential insider threat that may intersect with espionage. The vulnerability lies not only in who has access, but also in how that access is used, what information is targeted, who receives or uses it, and for what purpose it is collected. Leaks of strategic information can reveal decision-making patterns, policy priorities, system vulnerabilities, and Indonesia’s diplomatic or defence bargaining position.

Public concern has intensified following reports of alleged illegal surveillance of President Prabowo Subianto and several national figures. According to reports available up to 12 November 2026, four senior National Police officers had been named as suspects, including former National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo. The case was reported to involve the alleged use of a Lawful Interception Management System (LIMS) without proper procedures, unauthorised access, and the alleged deletion of electronic data.

National Police Chief General Suyudi Ario Seto also said the police were separately investigating an alleged conspiracy to commit treason. Investigators have nevertheless stressed that the elements of treason still need to be examined and proved independently. Being named a suspect is not a finding of guilt. Nor is an allegation of illegal surveillance alone sufficient to conclude that espionage or treason has taken place.

Several officials and national figures have said the case goes beyond privacy concerns. State Secretary Prasetyo Hadi highlighted the possibility of a threat to the safety of national leaders. Coordinating Minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections Yusril Ihza Mahendra stressed the seriousness of the case because its motive remains unknown, as well as the need to review oversight. Presidential Advisory Council member Bambang Soesatyo warned of the potential impact on the confidentiality of strategic agendas and decision-making.

The National Police Chief said the investigation should trace the chain of command and the purpose of the surveillance, while House of Representatives Commission III chairman Habiburokhman called for a comprehensive inquiry. Some analysts and academics, meanwhile, have emphasised the importance of transparency and the need to distinguish illegal surveillance from espionage and treason. These views are warnings about risks, not substitutes for legal proof.

Frenemies, Insider Threats and Espionage

In political or institutional relationships, “frenemy” describes a relationship involving both cooperation and competition. Criticism of the government, disagreement and constitutionally lawful opposition do not in themselves amount to betrayal. Security risks arise when access to confidential information is abused, information is transferred without authorisation, or public authority is used for purposes contrary to law.

An insider threat is a risk originating from someone with authorised access to personnel, facilities, systems or information who uses that access improperly. Possible motives include personal gain, pressure or blackmail, conflicts of interest, or the interests of another party. Such threats are difficult to address because insiders understand procedures, chains of authority, communication habits and potential gaps in oversight.

Espionage involves covert efforts to obtain protected information for the benefit of a particular party. The information targeted may concern politics and policy, defence, diplomacy, the economy, technology, critical infrastructure or data on officials that could be used for mapping, pressure or recruitment.

Illegal surveillance therefore cannot automatically be classified as espionage. Any assessment must examine motive, targets, methods, recipients of the information, operational patterns and possible links to the interests of other parties, including foreign actors where supporting evidence exists.

Espionage operations may use human intelligence, the exploitation of devices and networks (cyber intelligence), professional or social relationships, and the combination of public and confidential information. Collected information may be used to map decision-making networks, anticipate policy direction, gain an advantage in negotiations, put pressure on particular parties or support influence operations. Analysis should therefore be based on verifiable patterns and indicators, not prejudice about a person’s identity or affiliations.

Information Vulnerabilities and Decision-making

The “Asal Bapak Senang” (ABS) culture—roughly, telling the boss what they want to hear—becomes a point of vulnerability when reports are written to please leaders rather than present the facts. Manipulated data, incomplete reports and concealed failures can weaken early warning and lead to poor decisions.

Distortions in the intelligence cycle can occur from the formulation of information requirements through data collection and processing, analysis and the delivery of findings. To reduce them, facts must be distinguished from assumptions, sources validated, and analysis must explain both its confidence level and any remaining information gaps.

The exposure of strategic information can reveal leaders’ agendas, communication patterns, policy priorities, defence vulnerabilities and diplomatic leverage. Such information may also be used for blackmail, the creation of misleading perceptions, disinformation or influence operations.

The threat therefore extends beyond the theft of documents and can reach into the decision-making process. However, allegations of policy sabotage must be supported by evidence of a pattern of conduct, intent, causation and admissible evidence. Disagreement or the failure of a programme alone is not sufficient grounds for an accusation.

Strengthening Counter-intelligence and Information Governance

First, strategic information must be protected through clear classification, the need-to-know principle, access restrictions based on duties, multi-factor authentication, encryption, activity logs and regular audits. The use of interception technology for law enforcement must have a legal basis and proper authorisation, a limited purpose, an audit trail and adequate oversight. State resources must not be used beyond their lawful authority.

Second, counter-intelligence capabilities should be developed through vulnerability mapping, insider-risk assessments, information-security training and incident-reporting procedures. Signs such as unusual access, unauthorised data transfers or the deletion of digital traces should be followed up professionally. Early detection must be evidence-based and must not become arbitrary surveillance.

Third, the division of responsibilities among law-enforcement agencies, intelligence bodies, and cyber-security and cryptography authorities must be clearly defined. Information sharing must have a lawful purpose, access controls, source protection and accountability mechanisms.

Fourth, analytical quality can be strengthened through cross-validation, testing alternative hypotheses, red-teaming, and separating confirmed information from indications that still require verification.

Fifth, organisations should protect good-faith whistle-blowers and foster a culture that values factual reporting, including reports that may be unwelcome to leaders.

The handling of the surveillance case must combine firmness with accountability. Legal proceedings should examine the evidence, chain of command, purpose of the surveillance, recipients of the information and any possible use of its results. Allegations of treason must be assessed and proved according to their own legal elements. Public information should be communicated in a measured way so as not to obstruct the investigation or disclose sensitive operational details.

Safeguarding Sovereignty in Decision-making

Success in addressing frenemies is not measured by the number of people suspected. It is measured by institutions’ ability to identify vulnerabilities, protect strategic information, expose the abuse of access and address violations in accordance with the law. Allegations of surveillance against the President serve as a reminder that secure communications for national leaders and the integrity of access management are important aspects of protecting the national interest.

The state must strengthen counter-intelligence without fostering a culture of mutual suspicion, protect confidentiality without sacrificing accountability, and ensure that technology and authority are used only for lawful purposes. Surveillance does not automatically amount to espionage, just as criticism does not automatically constitute a threat. Assessments must be based on purpose, methods, targets, beneficiaries and evidence that can be tested. Ultimately, strategic intelligence vigilance is intended to protect sovereignty in decision-making, the safety of national leaders and Indonesia’s interests.

Ultimately, the President, as the holder of the highest executive authority under Article 4(1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, must be protected from every threat, including the abuse of authority by state institutions that should serve the President. No state institution may abuse its mandate and powers for purposes outside the law.

Going forward, stronger counter-intelligence must go hand in hand with oversight reform, accountability, and national resilience and security. Protecting the President does not mean protecting power for its own sake; it means safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and the interests of the nation.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/frenemy-threats-strengthening-counter-intelligence-and-national-security-resilience-1794757852)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261115215417-14-785406/ancaman-frenemy-perkuat-kontraintelijen-ketahanan-keamanan-nasional), translated from Indonesian
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