Evidence Mounts That China Is the Real Winner Behind the US-Iran War

Since the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to end, or at least begin the process of ending, nearly four months of war, public attention has largely focused on whether the agreement grants greater concessions to Tehran compared to the initial demands of US President Donald Trump, who once called for the Islamic Republic’s ‘unconditional surrender’.

Yet behind that debate, analysts see another party emerging as the strategic winner of the conflict, despite never firing a single shot: China.

From the start of the war, Beijing took a stance opposing the conflict. The Chinese government condemned the war, denounced the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several other senior officials in the initial wave of US-Israeli strikes, and consistently pushed for a negotiated resolution.

Now, as Washington and Tehran attempt to build a still-fragile peace, a number of observers believe China has successfully reaped various important strategic advantages from the conflict.

For years, China has sought to present itself as a responsible great power, respecting the sovereignty of other nations, prioritising dialogue, and avoiding military adventures abroad. The Iran war became a momentum allowing Beijing to reinforce that narrative on the international stage.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi repeatedly communicated with Iranian diplomats throughout the conflict. At the same time, Beijing openly supported Pakistan’s efforts to mediate peace talks. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi was also known to have held discussions with senior Chinese diplomats in the final days before the ceasefire framework began to take shape.

After the MoU was signed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly expressed appreciation to China for its role in advancing the negotiation process. Chinese officials subsequently compared their diplomatic approach to the US-Israeli military campaign, which they said had shaken global energy markets and pushed the Middle East region to the brink of a wider war.

‘The US attacks on Iran together with Israel truly set an unprecedented bad example and dismantled 80 years of world order,’ Henry Wang, President of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, told Newsweek. That narrative was especially aimed at developing countries in the Global South, many of which viewed the conflict with scepticism and have been the primary target of China’s diplomatic influence expansion.

The war also highlighted cracks in Washington’s relationships with several of its allies in Europe and the Gulf region. Support for the US military campaign during the conflict was not entirely solid. European governments, already at odds with Washington over trade and tariffs, were reluctant to become further involved in the conflict. Some allies even openly questioned the legitimacy of the war and its economic impact.

‘Open differences between Washington and its partners over the legitimacy of the war, its execution, and its impact have revealed fissures that risk spreading to other issues over time,’ wrote Ryan Hass, Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution, in an analysis published last June. ‘For China, these fissures provide comfort.’

The conflict also provided new ammunition for China’s long-running campaign directed at Asian nations, namely that the US is an unreliable and increasingly unpredictable partner. ‘We are seeing the consequences of the damage inflicted by Trump’s statements and policies through reduced support from countries that are justifiably angry because of America’s choice to impose costs and risks on them,’ said Kori Schake, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. ‘We appear just as hardline but less predictable or strategically competent than China.’

Ryan Hass also assessed that Beijing will exploit the fact that America struggled to achieve its strategic objectives in Iran. ‘China will also enjoy the visible reminder of America’s difficulty in achieving its strategic goals in Iran,’ Hass wrote. For Chinese officials, the war became new argument material. If the US struggles to obtain a decisive outcome against a regional power like Iran despite possessing overwhelming military superiority, then questions arise as to whether Washington is willing or even able to sustain a much larger conflict near China’s own territory.

This view is considered highly relevant in the context of Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims as part of its territory. In recent years, China has not only increased military pressure on Taiwan but also run a propaganda campaign aimed at weakening the morale of Taiwanese society and convincing them that unification with the mainland is the only option. The Iran war strengthens Beijing’s argument that US military intervention often leaves instability and burdens its allies, who have little role in the decision-making process.

Beyond diplomatic and political gains, the conflict also served as a major test for China’s energy sector. The country obtains around 40 per cent of its crude oil imports and a third of its liquefied natural gas needs from the Middle East. When the Strait of Hormuz was practically closed and traffic disrupted, China’s energy resilience was put to the test.