Europe’s Warning Bells
Something is changing in the way European countries view the future. A region that for decades symbolised prosperity, technological progress, democracy and security stability is now warning its people to prepare for the possibility of a major crisis.
Governments in several countries are advising residents to keep supplies of food, drinking water, medicines and emergency equipment. Guidance on preparing for war, once associated with Europe’s darkest historical periods, is also being reintroduced for civilians.
This development presents an irony: even as economic and military power grows, people’s sense of security is facing uncertainty. These concerns are not merely political rhetoric.
On 22 October 2026, the UK Government, through the Cabinet Office, launched its national Be Ready campaign, encouraging every household to prepare basic supplies for at least 72 hours. Germany’s Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), in guidance updated in October 2025, recommends preparedness for up to ten days.
Sweden has strengthened its In Case of Crisis or War guidance since 2024, while Poland stepped up public preparedness for air-raid threats again in September 2026.
These policies are not all concerned with the possibility of war; they also address natural disasters, energy disruptions, cyberattacks and the paralysis of public services. But as several developed countries strengthen civilian preparedness at the same time, a fundamental question arises about the changing security threats they face.
The situation is particularly notable amid rising geopolitical tensions, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and a race to reinforce defence capabilities in many countries. A report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2026 said global military spending reached US$2.887 trillion in 2025, the highest level in the institute’s records.
European military expenditure rose by 14 per cent from the previous year. The scale of this defence investment shows that concern about security threats has been translated into strategic policy and budget decisions.
Yet behind the growth in military capability lies a paradox worth considering: why do countries that are becoming stronger militarily feel the need to prepare their populations for the worst?
For Indonesia, these developments should not be seen as remote from national interests. In an increasingly interconnected world, security tensions in Europe can spread through international trade, energy prices, food supply chains, financial stability and industrial activity.
Geographical distance no longer guarantees protection from the effects of global crises. The warning bells now ringing in Europe are therefore a reminder for Indonesia to reconsider the meaning of national resilience.
Security should not be understood solely as the ability to defend territory and strengthen armaments, but also as the state’s capacity to ensure that people’s lives can continue when crisis strikes.
The question is not simply whether a major war will break out, but how prepared Indonesia is to protect its people, maintain economic stability and keep public services functioning as the global security order becomes increasingly unpredictable.
As European Security Comes into Question
The shift in Europe’s security outlook cannot be separated from the Russia-Ukraine war, which began on 24 February 2022. The conflict has not only changed the military balance; it has also shaken the belief that large-scale war on the European continent belonged to the past.
For several decades after the Cold War, economic integration, expanded regional cooperation and NATO’s presence fostered optimism that stability could be maintained through economic interdependence and collective defence. The war in Ukraine has shown, however, that close economic ties do not always prevent armed conflict.
From the perspective of political geography, the threat has a strong spatial dimension. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, together with Poland and Finland, face different security sensitivities from those of Western European countries. Their proximity to Russia makes border areas, energy infrastructure, communications networks and transport routes strategic interests that must be protected.
The seriousness of the situation is reflected in the Preparedness Union Strategy, launched by the European Commission on 26 March 2025. The strategy sets out 30 key measures to strengthen preparedness across the region, covering early-warning systems, protection of critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, civil-military coordination, preparedness education and strategic reserves.
The European Union is also encouraging people to be able to manage independently for at least 72 hours during a crisis.
This change shows that security is no longer merely a matter of guarding national borders. It also concerns a government’s ability to keep society functioning when systems long taken for granted are suddenly disrupted.
Geopolitical concerns were further highlighted at a meeting of the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK in Paris on 26 October 2026. Through the E5 group, the five countries said Russia was the most serious long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.
They linked that assessment to the war in Ukraine, alleged acts of sabotage, violations of allied airspace and growing hybrid threats.
The joint statement showed that European countries are strengthening their own defence responsibilities while maintaining strategic ties with the United States through NATO.
Even so, the situation needs to be assessed proportionately. On 30 September 2026, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said there was no immediate threat of a Russian attack on NATO territory.
That statement puts the issue in perspective: a heightened assessment of long-term threats is not the same as certainty that a major war will break out soon.
What is happening, then, is not simply panic about the possibility of war, but a shift in security strategy in response to increasingly complex uncertainty.
Military Spending Is Rising, but the Sense of Security May Not Be
The changing global security situation can also be seen in the rise in military spending. SIPRI’s 2026 report said global military expenditure reached US$2.887 trillion in 2025, a real-terms increase of 2.9 per cent on 2024.
That was the highest level of military spending ever recorded by SIPRI and marked an increase for the eleventh consecutive year.
Europe was one of the regions with the most pronounced growth. The region’s military spending reached US$864 billion in 2025, up 14 per cent from the previous year. Over the period from 2016 to 2025, European military expenditure rose by about 102 per cent.
Russia is estimated to have spent US$190 billion on its military in 2025, equivalent to about 7.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Ukraine spent around US$84.1 billion, or roughly 40 per cent of GDP. These figures show the scale of economic resources being absorbed to sustain the capacity to wage war.
The increase is also reflected in NATO policy. At the Hague Summit in June 2025, member states agreed to a commitment to invest 5 per cent of GDP in defence and security by 2035.
Of this total, at least 3.5 per cent is intended for core defence requirements and up to 1.5 per cent for defence- and security-related needs, including infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and civil resilience.
NATO’s 2025 Annual Report, published on 26 March 2026, also recorded a real-terms increase of about 20 per cent in defence spending by European member states and Canada compared with 2024.
These figures show that perceptions of threat have been translated into political decisions, budgets and the development of defence capabilities. Yet rising military spending also contains a paradox.
On the one hand, stronger defence capabilities are necessary to protect sovereignty and build deterrence. On the other, an arms race without stronger diplomacy risks heightening tensions and placing pressure on public budgets.
The fundamental question is whether growing military strength always corresponds to a greater sense of security among the public. In contemporary security studies, a state’s strength cannot be measured solely by its combat capabilities and the quantity of its weaponry.
Security also depends on the ability to maintain economic stability, ensure food and energy supplies, protect critical infrastructure and preserve public access to basic services.
A country with a large defence budget may still lack adequate resilience if its health system is fragile, its energy supplies are easily disrupted or its people are unprepared for emergencies.
Defence capability-building should therefore be placed within a broader national security framework, rather than treated simply as a race to expand military strength.
Modern Warfare and the Fragility of Human Security
The war in Ukraine offers a stark illustration of how armed conflict can devastate people’s lives far beyond the battlefield.
A report published on 15 October 2026 by the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine recorded at least 328 civilian deaths and 2,105 injuries in September 2026. The total number of casualties was about 85 per cent higher than in September 2025.
From January to September 2026, the UN recorded at least 2,570 civilian deaths and 15,211 injuries. Civilian casualties over those nine months were about 59 per cent higher than in the same period in 2025.
These figures show that prolonged warfare is not merely a matter of territorial conquest and military power. It also causes continuous human suffering, including among people who are not taking part in the fighting.
The threat becomes more complex when attacks target energy, transport and communications infrastructure, as well as public facilities. Damage to a power plant can cripple hospital services, stop clean-water distribution and disrupt economic activity.
Cyberattacks can hamper banking systems and government services without any open fighting.
In this context, the concept of human security is increasingly relevant. Security is not only about a state’s ability to defend its territory, but also its duty to protect people’s safety, livelihoods and dignity.
This dimension becomes even more important when security threats turn into economic problems. Before the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia supplied about 45 per cent of the EU’s gas imports in 2021.
According to European Commission data published in 2026, that share had fallen to about 12 per cent in 2025. Russian gas imports declined from around 152 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 36 billion cubic metres in 2025.
The change reflects Europe’s efforts to reduce its reliance on Russian energy. But diversifying energy sources also brings new challenges, including dependence on international markets, logistics costs and price fluctuations.
This demonstrates that in an interconnected world, security threats can cross national borders through trade, energy, technology and financial systems. A military conflict in one region can put economic pressure on people thousands of kilometres from the fighting.
People’s sense of security can therefore no longer be separated from a state’s ability to manage economic dependencies and vulnerabilities in strategic infrastructure.
Indonesia Must Not Ignore Europe’s Warning
For Indonesia, the growing vigilance of European countries is a development that merits strategic attention. Being far from the centre of the conflict does not mean Indonesia is entirely free from the consequences of global geopolitical tensions.
Indonesia’s economic links with Europe are significant. European Commission trade data for 2025 show that trade in goods between Indonesia and the European Union was worth €28.9 billion.
Of this total, EU imports from Indonesia amounted to €18.7 billion, while EU exports to Indonesia stood at €10.2 billion. The EU is also Indonesia’s fourth-largest trading partner, accounting for about 6 per cent of the country’s overall trade.
Economic ties became more strategically significant after Indonesia and the EU concluded negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) on 23 September 2025.
The agreement, which still requires further legal steps, offers scope to strengthen trade, investment and supply-chain integration. But the broader international economic relationships become, the greater the need to understand the risks that accompany them.
If security tensions in Europe disrupt industrial activity, trade or energy distribution, Indonesia could feel the effects through commodity-price pressures, logistics costs, shifts in export demand and financial-market volatility.
The scale of the impact would depend on the crisis’s severity and duration, the structure of trade and the government’s ability to mitigate the effects. National resilience should therefore be built on measurable risk assessments, rather than reactions to international political developments alone.
As an archipelagic country, Indonesia faces complex geographical vulnerabilities. The distribution of food, energy, medicines and industrial supplies depends heavily on the continuity of inter-island connectivity.
Disruptions at strategic ports, in electricity systems, communications networks or transport could affect public services and economic activity across many regions.
Europe’s experience offers a lesson: national preparedness must be built in an integrated way. The government needs to strengthen food and energy reserves, digital infrastructure security, supply-chain resilience and the capacity of health services to respond to emergencies.
More broadly, coordination among ministries, security agencies, local governments, businesses and the public must be directed towards the practical ability to manage crises.
Preparedness cannot be demonstrated merely through planning documents, task forces or repeated coordination meetings. It must be measurable in the continuity of services and the speed of recovery when disruption occurs.
Strengthening public capability is also an important part of national resilience. Preparedness education, risk literacy, early-warning systems and networks of social solidarity should be developed to reflect the geographical characteristics and socio-economic conditions of each region.
However, responsibility for preparedness must not be transferred entirely to