Elections to be make-or-break for PAN and chairman Amien Rais

Frans Surdiasis, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The late Elvis Presley's song It's now or never, perfectly depicts the situation faced by Amien Rais and his National Mandate Party (PAN) in confronting this year's general election. Many people say that this year is plausibly the last chance for Amien Rais to achieve his ambition of becoming the country's president.

Amien, who was born in Solo, Central Java, on April 26, 1944, was one of four civilians who championed the fall of Soeharto in May 1998.

If the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) speaker fails to be elected president in July's elections, it would be very hard for him to contest the 2009 general election.

Co-founded by Amien in 1998, this year's elections will also determine the future direction of the Muslim-based PAN. The party expects to double the number of votes it gained in the 1999 elections to about 15 percent in this April's legislative election.

Of the four reformist figures, practically only Amien has not had the chance to lead the country. Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid became the country's fourth president in October 1999. The then vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced Gus Dur in July 2001. The third person, Yogyakarta Governor Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, is a respected figure, but regarded more as a respected national figure.

"Amien Rais Yes, PAN No." This slogan reflects the attitude of the members of Muhammadiyah -- the country's second-largest Muslim organization after the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) -- in the 1999 elections. This may also be their attitude in the upcoming elections. Amien was formerly chairman of Muhammadiyah and the organization was PAN's backbone.

The 15-percent target is too optimistic for this party.

The party has tried to maintain its platform as an open party with a strong commitment to Islam but this only resulted in less support from Muhammadiyah.

When PAN was declared a party on August 23, 1998, it claimed to be an open party that tried to accommodate Indonesians of all groups and backgrounds.

Initially, PAN was perceived as an alternative party, bringing new hope to a political system strongly bound to its roots.

Though supported at the grass roots, mainly by Muhammadiyah members and other Muslim modernists, PAN at a national level is a non-religious party with a nationalist and populist agenda. Its leadership includes many prominent Christians and secular activists and intellectuals.

The party won 7.3 percent of the votes in 1999. But with Amien Rais as the party's central figure, many people questioned these results. With Muhammadiyah's membership standing at about 30 million, PAN was expected to secure at least 12 percent of the votes.

What's wrong with PAN's performance? Hypotheses abound as to why PAN performed as it did. Some speculate that Amien's background in Islamic organizations and his sometimes-strident pro-Muslim views in the past, alienated non-Muslims, the attraction of which would have been the key to PAN's assertion of itself as a new political party. Analysis of poll data suggests that this is correct.

For some voters, the party was too Islamic, and for others not Islamic enough.

PAN's performance in the 1999 elections posed a serious challenge for the party in determining its future. It was crucial to decide whether to be a totally open party or to rely on Muhammadiyah's support. In its first congress of 2000, the debate divided the party's top executives.

One camp, represented by top party official A.M. Fatwa, wanted the party's platform to be more explicitly in favor of Islamic values. Another camp, led by its former secretary-general Faisal Basri, insisted that the party should remain inclusive and open. But Faisal resigned from the party.

Taking the last poll results into consideration, we can theorize that Muhammadiyah's voters have stronger emotional ties to Amien rather than to PAN.

First, contrary to the National Awakening Party (PKB), which was formally declared the country's biggest Muslim organization by the Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama, PAN was quite independent from the beginning.

Second, PAN does not explicitly favor Islamic values. This makes PAN unattractive to those who tend to link themselves with parties explicitly bearing Islamic symbols.

Third, the political aspirations of Muhammadiyah's members have been channeled among many parties.

West Sumatra, one of Muhammadiyah's strongholds, may be an interesting case to look at. In the 1999 elections people here preferred Golkar to PAN.

Taking PAN back to Muhammadiyah's corridor is a pragmatic way to increase the party's supporters, but this is not without risk.

How to achieve the target? Increasing support from Muhammadiyah might be a core strategy for PAN. But making the party more Islamic could also cost the party non-Muslim voters.

An alternative step would be to reach out to non-Muslim voters. The party's stance on anti-discrimination, in terms of both religion and ethnicity, could also draw non-Muslim voters.

Five years of Amien's PAN have passed and its performance has improved. PAN has extended its network and is more consolidated now than before. But the question remains as to whether PAN should be an "open" party or once again rely on Muhammadiyah's support.