Elections to be make-or-break for PAN and chairman Amien Rais

Elections to be make-or-break for PAN and chairman Amien Rais

Frans Surdiasis, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post,
Jakarta

The late Elvis Presley's song It's now or never, perfectly
depicts the situation faced by Amien Rais and his National
Mandate Party (PAN) in confronting this year's general election.
Many people say that this year is plausibly the last chance for
Amien Rais to achieve his ambition of becoming the country's
president.

Amien, who was born in Solo, Central Java, on April 26, 1944,
was one of four civilians who championed the fall of Soeharto in
May 1998.

If the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) speaker fails to
be elected president in July's elections, it would be very hard
for him to contest the 2009 general election.

Co-founded by Amien in 1998, this year's elections will also
determine the future direction of the Muslim-based PAN. The party
expects to double the number of votes it gained in the 1999
elections to about 15 percent in this April's legislative
election.

Of the four reformist figures, practically only Amien has not
had the chance to lead the country. Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid
became the country's fourth president in October 1999. The then
vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced Gus Dur in July
2001. The third person, Yogyakarta Governor Sultan Hamengkubuwono
X, is a respected figure, but regarded more as a respected
national figure.

"Amien Rais Yes, PAN No." This slogan reflects the attitude of
the members of Muhammadiyah -- the country's second-largest
Muslim organization after the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) -- in the 1999
elections. This may also be their attitude in the upcoming
elections. Amien was formerly chairman of Muhammadiyah and the
organization was PAN's backbone.

The 15-percent target is too optimistic for this party.

The party has tried to maintain its platform as an open party
with a strong commitment to Islam but this only resulted in less
support from Muhammadiyah.

When PAN was declared a party on August 23, 1998, it claimed
to be an open party that tried to accommodate Indonesians of all
groups and backgrounds.

Initially, PAN was perceived as an alternative party, bringing
new hope to a political system strongly bound to its roots.

Though supported at the grass roots, mainly by Muhammadiyah
members and other Muslim modernists, PAN at a national level is a
non-religious party with a nationalist and populist agenda. Its
leadership includes many prominent Christians and secular
activists and intellectuals.

The party won 7.3 percent of the votes in 1999. But with Amien
Rais as the party's central figure, many people questioned these
results. With Muhammadiyah's membership standing at about 30
million, PAN was expected to secure at least 12 percent of the
votes.

What's wrong with PAN's performance? Hypotheses abound as to
why PAN performed as it did. Some speculate that Amien's
background in Islamic organizations and his sometimes-strident
pro-Muslim views in the past, alienated non-Muslims, the
attraction of which would have been the key to PAN's assertion of
itself as a new political party. Analysis of poll data suggests
that this is correct.

For some voters, the party was too Islamic, and for others not
Islamic enough.

PAN's performance in the 1999 elections posed a serious
challenge for the party in determining its future. It was crucial
to decide whether to be a totally open party or to rely on
Muhammadiyah's support. In its first congress of 2000, the debate
divided the party's top executives.

One camp, represented by top party official A.M. Fatwa,
wanted the party's platform to be more explicitly in favor of
Islamic values. Another camp, led by its former secretary-general
Faisal Basri, insisted that the party should remain inclusive and
open. But Faisal resigned from the party.

Taking the last poll results into consideration, we can
theorize that Muhammadiyah's voters have stronger emotional ties
to Amien rather than to PAN.

First, contrary to the National Awakening Party (PKB), which
was formally declared the country's biggest Muslim organization
by the Central Board of Nahdlatul Ulama, PAN was quite
independent from the beginning.

Second, PAN does not explicitly favor Islamic values. This
makes PAN unattractive to those who tend to link themselves with
parties explicitly bearing Islamic symbols.

Third, the political aspirations of Muhammadiyah's members
have been channeled among many parties.

West Sumatra, one of Muhammadiyah's strongholds, may be an
interesting case to look at. In the 1999 elections people here
preferred Golkar to PAN.

Taking PAN back to Muhammadiyah's corridor is a pragmatic way
to increase the party's supporters, but this is not without risk.

How to achieve the target? Increasing support from
Muhammadiyah might be a core strategy for PAN. But making the
party more Islamic could also cost the party non-Muslim voters.

An alternative step would be to reach out to non-Muslim
voters. The party's stance on anti-discrimination, in terms of
both religion and ethnicity, could also draw non-Muslim voters.

Five years of Amien's PAN have passed and its performance has
improved. PAN has extended its network and is more consolidated
now than before. But the question remains as to whether PAN
should be an "open" party or once again rely on Muhammadiyah's
support.