Editorial
Editorial
Bad banks, debtors audited
The special examination by Bank Indonesia of banks facing large
amounts of non-performing loans and of companies having extensive
amounts of bad debts should be welcomed as part of the package of
measures being launched by the central bank to cope with problem banks.
The special auditing of banks obviously is essential in ascertaining
the exact size of non-performing assets in the banking industry and to
get a more accurate breakdown of how many of them are really bad and how
many are doubtful loans. Thus far, the estimates on problem loans vary
widely. Some put their amount at state banks alone at more than 21
percent of total loans or about US$9 billion. Others came up with much
larger sums.
On the other hand, the examination of corporate bad debtors is a more
effective way of determining the internal and external factors that
forced them to fall behind in their debt servicing or repayments.
Much more important, however, is digging deeper into the bank's
records and processes of transactions so that the central bank will be
able to find discrepancies, if any, between the monthly or quarterly
financial reports it has so far received and the actual condition of the
audited banks.
Take asset valuation for example. The examination will ascertain as
to whether the banks have fully met the asset valuation and interest
accrual standards and whether they have properly classified their loans.
Experience shows that the most serious problems of a bank are not in the
loans classified as overdue. The worst losses are often hidden in the
portfolio that is classified as the current or good portfolio.
Findings from such thorough auditing will greatly help the central
bank to establish whether the problem of bad loans has been caused by a
bad management culture (bad bankers) or by technically incompetent
credit officers.
Obviously, bad management culture is very difficult to change, almost
always requiring a completely new management, while technical
incompetence could gradually be resolved through education and training,
or the hiring of more experienced bankers.
The findings may require the central bank to improve its set of
standards of measurement, independent verification of results of bank
operations and disclosure requirements. The conclusions of the
examination may also point out the weak points of the central bank's
supervisory mechanism or uncover to what extent high officials or
political leaders have actually been influential in getting credit
applications approved.
The special auditing of the corporate bad debtors has similarly
important objectives of seeking to distinguish honest borrowers, who are
in trouble because of factors beyond their control, from borrowers in
bad faith, who colluded with bank executives in the first place.
Hence, viewed from the sets of measures currently taken by the
central bank we may find a bit of consolation in the fact that the loan
scandal of around $460 million at the State Development Bank of
Indonesia (Bapindo), besides incurring a sizable amount of losses, has
also led to the momentum needed for improving banking prudential rules
and the mechanisms of the central bank's supervision and credit
allocation.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/editorial-1447899208-1023054)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post