Deputy Regional Heads Based on Need

Disharmony between regional heads and deputy regional heads is not merely news about strained relations between two officials. When conflict enters the government sphere, the impact is immediately felt: the bureaucracy becomes divided, job transfers are contested, coordination weakens, and regional programmes stall. Citizens awaiting services ultimately bear the cost of elite disputes they did not create. Usually the seeds of the problem emerge from the candidacy stage. Deputy figures are chosen to cover the shortcomings of the regional head candidate, such as representation of region, social group, religion, generation, party, or particular political networks. Such considerations are reasonable for attracting sympathy and winning votes.

The problem is that candidate pairs formed to win elections are not prepared to govern together after the election. Once elected, the regional head holds control over policy and programmes, the budget, and the bureaucracy. The deputy feels they also fought to obtain the people’s mandate because their name appears jointly on the ballot. In this way, regional elections create two holders of legitimacy, while the Regional Government Law predominantly regulates a single centre of control in the hands of the regional head.

TWO LEGITIMACIES, ONE CONTROL

Cracks in the leadership elite quickly spread to regional apparatus. Bureaucratic officials begin to be labelled as ‘the regional head’s people’ or ‘the deputy’s people’. Transfers and promotions become prone to being used as distribution of influence. Budget planning, procurement of goods and services, management of regional-owned enterprises, and strategic projects can become arenas of competing interests.

Indeed, not all relations between regional heads and deputies end badly. Some regional heads and deputies are able to share roles, complete their term of office, and even run again together and obtain a mandate from the people. However, such harmony largely rests on personal agreement, shared political interests, and communication skills. Yet a sound institutional design should not make government effectiveness dependent on whether two people get along.

The core problem lies in the imbalance between legitimacy and authority. Deputy regional heads are directly elected together with the regional head, but they do not possess independent governmental authority. Article 66 of the Regional Government Law places them to assist, coordinate, monitor, and provide advice. In carrying out these tasks, the deputy is responsible to the regional head. Their position appears equal when elected, but becomes subordinate once government is running.

NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT

Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution only regulates governors, regents, and mayors as heads of regional government who are democratically elected. The Constitution does not mention deputy governors, regents, or mayors. This construction differs from the president and vice president, who both receive direct constitutional basis.

The absence of deputy regional heads in the 1945 Constitution does not make the position unconstitutional. Lawmakers may still create positions to assist regional heads. However, the position also cannot be treated as a constitutional necessity. Its form, method of filling, duties, and even its position are legal policy choices that can be rearranged.

The history of its regulation has also changed. Deputy regional heads were known in Law No. 5 of 1974 through an appointment mechanism. Law No. 22 of 1999 placed the regional head and deputy as a pair elected by the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). Since Law No. 32 of 2004, both have been directly elected as one pair. Thus, what is relatively new is not the deputy position, but the electoral pair model.

Here the tension between two laws is visible. The Regional Government Law places the deputy as an assistant responsible to the regional head. The Regional Election Law requires both to run and be elected as one pair. The result is a deputy regional head who is strong electorally but weak functionally.

DO NOT LEAVE IT TO CANDIDATES

The solution is not to abolish the position of deputy regional head throughout Indonesia. The needs of each region are not the same. An archipelagic province with a wide span of control cannot be equated with a city whose territory is limited. A border regency with a scattered population faces a different coordination burden from a regency whose service centres are easily accessible.

Revision of the Regional Government Law and the Regional Election Law needs to introduce a needs-based deputy regional head model. Its existence is determined through objective parameters, such as population size, area and regional character, number of government units coordinated, fiscal capacity, basic service burden, and special regional status.

This model is more accurately called differential, not merely optional. The choice must not be left to the taste of candidates, coalition agreements, or the will of the elected regional head. Regional classification must be determined before the election stages and cannot be changed during the term of office. In this way, the regional leadership structure does not become part of electoral transactions.

NEW DESIGN

First, regional heads are elected independently, no longer as one package with a deputy. This step ends two electoral legitimacies within one chain of command and is more in line with the formulation of Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution.

Second, in regions that according to classification require a deputy, the elected regional head proposes a candidate to obtain DPRD approval through an open process. The DPRD examines the competence, integrity, and potential conflicts of interest of the candidate. The law must set deadlines, re-submission mechanisms, and solutions in the event of deadlock. The appointment of a deputy must not become the personal affair of the regional head, but also must not turn into a new transaction.