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Democracy and the Price of a Threshold

| Source: detikcom Translated from Indonesian | Politics
Democracy and the Price of a Threshold
Image: detikcom

Debate over the parliamentary threshold has resurfaced in discussions on the Draft Law on General Elections. Five per cent is one of the benchmarks under consideration, while a proposal for 6 per cent has also emerged. The difference raises a fundamental question: would raising the threshold really simplify the number of political parties in parliament?

A common argument in favour of a higher parliamentary threshold is the need for a more effective parliament. The fewer parties holding seats, the easier it is to consolidate political support. But this assumption needs to be tested. Having fewer parties does not automatically guarantee better legislation, oversight or accountability.

The results of the 2024 election can be used to test part of this argument—not to predict the outcome of the next election, but to assess whether changing the threshold alters the number of parties winning seats.

When the Figure Changes, the Result Stays the Same

According to General Elections Commission (KPU) Decree No. 1204 of 2024, the total number of valid votes nationwide in the 2024 House of Representatives (DPR) election was 151,793,293. A 4 per cent threshold therefore equates to about 6.07 million votes. At 5 per cent, the threshold would be about 7.59 million votes, while at 6 per cent it would reach about 9.11 million.

A simulation using the 2024 vote distribution produces an interesting result. The eight parties that passed the 4 per cent threshold would remain the same eight parties to qualify if the threshold were raised to 5 or 6 per cent. No party received a vote share between 4 and 6 per cent. The United Development Party (PPP), the highest-polling party below the threshold, received 5,878,708 votes, or about 3.87 per cent.

This means that, in the simulation, raising the threshold from 4 per cent to 5 or 6 per cent would change neither the number nor the list of parties eligible to win seats in the DPR.

This finding does not prove that a higher threshold could never reduce the number of parties. The distribution of votes may change in the next election. But the simulation shows that increasing the percentage does not, by itself, guarantee a simpler party system. Its impact depends on how voters’ choices are distributed.

The consequences for representation must also be considered. In the 2024 election, about 17.3 million votes went to parties that failed to meet the 4 per cent threshold. In the simulations at 5 and 6 per cent, that number remains unchanged because the same parties still qualify.

These are not invalid votes, but they do not count towards the allocation of DPR seats under the threshold mechanism. This illustrates that the design of the threshold determines not only which parties win seats, but also how many voters’ ballots contribute to the formation of parliament.

This is where policy discussions should begin. If raising the threshold is intended to simplify the party system, lawmakers need to show what change is expected and provide calculations to support their choice of figure. Political agreement may be part of the legislative process, but it does not, in itself, demonstrate that a policy is effective.

Parliamentary Effectiveness Cannot Be Measured by the Number of Parties Alone

Simplifying the party system may be one of the aims of election regulation. But the number of parties is only one variable in the political system. Parliamentary effectiveness also depends on the quality of lawmaking, oversight capacity, transparency and accountability.

A parliament with fewer parties can still produce poor policies if deliberation is weak. Conversely, a large number of parties does not automatically make decision-making ineffective. The question is not only how many parties hold seats, but how they perform their representative and oversight functions.

Lawmakers should therefore distinguish between two things: reducing the number of parties and improving parliamentary effectiveness. The two may be related, but they are not the same. If effectiveness is the main reason for raising the threshold, the link between the chosen figure and the promised outcome must be explained, rather than simply assumed.

Testing Policy, Not Merely Choosing a Figure

Constitutional Court Decision No. 116/PUU-XXI/2023 provides an important basis for this debate. The Court ruled that the 4 per cent threshold would remain in force for the 2024 DPR election, while its application to the 2029 election and subsequent elections would be conditionally constitutional. Changes to the provision and the threshold level must follow the requirements set out in the ruling.

The Court did not stipulate that the threshold must be raised to 5 or 6 per cent. Lawmakers retain room to make policy, but their choice must be supported by an adequate methodology and reasoning, taking into account party-system simplification, proportionality and voter representation.

Any proposal to raise the threshold should therefore be accompanied by simulations showing at least three things: changes in the number of parties winning seats, changes in the distribution of seats, and the proportion of valid votes that do not contribute to the allocation of DPR seats. The results should then be linked to the policy objectives being pursued.

Simulations cannot guarantee the quality of future legislation or the effectiveness of future oversight. They can, however, test the direct consequences of policy choices and make the basis for decision-making more open to public scrutiny.

Ultimately, the debate over the parliamentary threshold is not simply about choosing a higher figure. What must be demonstrated is whether an increase would deliver the promised improvement and whether its benefits would outweigh the consequences for voter representation.

If the number of parties remains unchanged in a simulation, lawmakers need to explain why they still consider a higher threshold the right instrument. In a democracy, a figure agreed through political negotiation is not necessarily the most effective one. Election policy should be judged not only by its stated aims, but also by demonstrable results and the consequences borne by voters’ ballots.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/democracy-and-the-price-of-a-threshold-1791949873)
Originally published by detikcom (https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-8706063/demokrasi-dan-harga-sebuah-ambang-batas), translated from Indonesian
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