DBH Plus: Seeking Fiscal Justice for Indonesia's Mining Sector
Discussion regarding the Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Fund (DBH SDA) for mining has resurfaced in various producing regions. The most frequently raised issue remains the same: regions feel the share they receive is not yet commensurate with their economic contribution or the various social and environmental consequences they must bear.
East Kalimantan Governor Rudy Mas’ud, for example, has stated that East Kalimantan contributes around Rp110 billion in fixed fees and Rp34.55 trillion in royalties, while the amounts returned to the regions are approximately Rp21 billion and Rp8.56 trillion respectively. In Central Sulawesi, Governor Anwar Hafid has also repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the DBH portion when linked to the social and environmental impacts felt by the community.
Recently, the government also announced that hundreds of regional governments are experiencing difficulty paying employee expenditure due to adjustments to the Regional Transfer Fund (TKD). Some of these are mineral-producing regions.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the most frequently heard demand is: DBH must be increased. In my view, this demand is entirely understandable. However, the more I examine this debate, the more I feel the problem may not stop at how much DBH the regions receive.
If the regional proportion is to be increased, whose share must be reduced? By how much? And will the party whose share is reduced simply accept it?
On the other hand, the central government also has criticisms regarding the quality of regional spending, which is considered not always productive, effective, and long-term oriented.
Perhaps for this reason, the debate on DBH fairness needs to look at this issue a little further.
Conceptually, Indonesia already has a foundation that is quite favourable to the regions. Mining DBH SDA is sourced from Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP), primarily royalties and fixed fees. Eighty per cent is allocated to the regions and 20 per cent to the central government.
Of the regional portion, 16 per cent is allocated to the province, 32 per cent to the producing regency/municipality, and 32 per cent to other regencies/municipalities within the province as part of the fiscal equalisation mechanism. So why does criticism continue to emerge? In my view, there are at least two important issues to discuss.
First, the nominal limitation. Because DBH is only sourced from royalties and fixed fees, the revenue distributed does have a ceiling. Indonesia has indeed implemented progressive royalties that increase with commodity prices or quality. However, for many producing regions, this mechanism is still considered not to fully reflect the economic value and profits generated from mining activities.
Second, the block grant design. Flexibility in the use of funds is an important part of fiscal decentralisation. However, in the context of mining-producing regions, this flexibility also has consequences.
DBH enters as general regional revenue and then competes with various other expenditure needs. The relationship between revenue from extractive activities and investment in environmental restoration, infrastructure development, human resource quality improvement, and post-mining economic transformation is ultimately not always clearly visible.
For this reason, perhaps it is time to shift the DBH discussion slightly. Not merely whether DBH needs to be increased, but how to increase DBH while strengthening its function as a development instrument for producing regions.
One interesting reference is the Canon Minero in Peru. Unlike Indonesia’s DBH SDA, which is sourced from PNBP, the Canon Minero comes from 50 per cent of mining corporate income tax revenue, which is then redistributed to producing regions through a tiered mechanism.
This is not a new tax, but rather a rearrangement of the distribution of existing tax revenue so that the economic benefits of mining are felt more by producing regions. What is interesting is not only the source of funds, but also how the funds are used.
The Canon Minero applies an earmarking mechanism: its revenue is directed towards public investment, infrastructure development, regional capacity building, and long-term development projects. The funds are not used for routine expenditure or government operational spending.
Thus, the rent from the mining sector is consciously converted into public assets that provide cross-generational benefits. Peru’s experience certainly does not have to be duplicated as is. However, perhaps it is time for Indonesia to begin thinking about the next phase of mining fiscal policy. Not by replacing the existing DBH scheme, but by complementing it with additional instruments.
I imagine a DBH Plus scheme. DBH sourced from royalties and fixed fees would be maintained as a block grant to preserve regional fiscal flexibility. At the same time, the government could consider an additional mechanism sourced from a portion of mining corporate income tax, with earmarked use for future-oriented investments.
This approach addresses two problems at once. The funds received by regions increase, but their use also becomes more targeted. Mining rent does not stop as additional regional income, but is converted into infrastructure, environmental restoration, education, human resource strengthening, local economy, and preparation towards a post-mining economy.
In a broader perspective, this idea is not merely about fiscal transfers. It is about how natural resource rent is transformed into regional development capability.
At the same time, the division of roles between the state and companies becomes clearer. Public infrastructure and basic services are the responsibility of the state through its fiscal instruments. Meanwhile, companies can focus on their primary responsibilities: efficient operations, economic and fiscal contributions, occupational safety, environmental rehabilitation, and healthy socio-economic relations with communities around their operational areas.
Just as downstreaming has opened a new chapter in Indonesia’s mineral industrialisation, perhaps it is time to begin imagining the next chapter of mining fiscal policy. The measure of success in natural resource management must evolve beyond merely the size of revenue collected and distributed, towards the extent to which that rent is able to leave behind capabilities, infrastructure, and development opportunities that continue to provide benefits, even long after the mineral reserves themselves are exhausted.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/dbh-plus-seeking-fiscal-justice-for-indonesias-mining-sector-1786337487)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20260810105349-14-757877/dbh-plus-mencari-keadilan-fiskal-pertambangan-indonesia), translated from Indonesian