Corruption Among Regional Heads: Is It Really Due to Political Costs?
The Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) latest sting operations, which have ensnared a number of regional heads, have prompted various proposals to curb corrupt practices in the regions. One came from Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian, who linked the high rate of regional head corruption to the enormous political costs that must be spent to win elections, while officials’ formal income is deemed disproportionate. From that assumption emerged the idea of raising regional heads’ welfare, even providing incentives in the form of a percentage of Local Own-Source Revenue (PAD) as a driver of performance improvement and, at the same time, an effort to reduce corruption.
At first glance, this idea sounds reasonable. On closer inspection, however, the logic underpinning it is problematic. Public policy should not be built on vague assumptions about “political costs”, especially if those costs stem from practices outside the legal corridor. Rather than resolving the root of the problem, the proposal risks shifting the focus away from fixing the governance of political financing towards compensating for distortions that should have been eradicated.
Misdirected Political Costs
Fundamentally, the Interior Minister’s statement that becoming a regional head requires substantial expense is acceptable: the process of running for and winning regional elections is indeed not free. This is also explained in research by LP3ES together with KITLV Leiden, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Diponegoro (Berenschot et al., 2026), which shows that the high political costs of regional elections come not merely from official campaign spending, but also from political dowries, vote buying and the financing of informal political networks.
These findings change the location of the problem. If political dowries and vote buying are indeed an inseparable part of regional election costs, raising regional heads’ salaries will not touch the source of the problem, because that increase would still compete with the need to finance dowries and patronage networks that are far larger. What must be dismantled is not the size of regional heads’ income, but the mechanism that makes dowries and money politics a mandatory cost of running for office.
The official Campaign Fund Receipt and Expenditure Reports (LPPDK) issued by regional election commissions in 2024 show that even in provincial elections, whose campaign costs exceed those of regencies and cities, spending reported by candidates amounted to only tens of billions of rupiah. Yet various studies reveal that the true political cost is suspected to far exceed that figure because it includes informal expenditure such as political dowries, vote buying and patronage that never appears in official reports.
This contrast explains why the political-cost argument advanced by the Interior Minister rests on a vague premise. If the cost in question is the official cost reported to the election commission, the figure is not large enough to justify raising officials’ welfare or granting PAD-based incentives. If, however, it refers to the much larger unofficial costs, then the state would effectively be preparing compensation for costs that should never have existed in the first place.
Practice in countries with better-organised political financing systems points in a different direction. Germany restricts the sources and amounts of donations to political parties while requiring transparent public reporting. France imposes strict campaign spending limits and obliges every candidate to report their funds in detail to an independent supervisory commission, with firm sanctions for violators. Not one of these countries chose to raise elected officials’ salaries as an anti-corruption instrument. What they fixed was the point of entry: who may finance, what the limits are, and who supervises.
A PAD-based incentive scheme carries risks even more complicated than a simple salary increase. Most local own-source revenue derives from business permits, mining and land use — sectors that have been the most prone to serving as entry points for regional head corruption. If a percentage of PAD is promised as a personal incentive, regional heads have a direct financial reason to push that revenue up as fast as possible, namely by easing permits while ignoring applicable requirements. Far from reducing corruption, this scheme risks creating a new motive to accelerate it.
This risk is not mere speculation. In mid-2025, the Regent of Pati raised Land and Building Tax by up to 250 per cent on the grounds of catching up on local revenue compared with neighbouring regencies. The policy triggered the largest demonstrations in Pati’s history, ending in riots, before it was eventually revoked. A similar pattern spread to Cirebon and Bone, and the Ministry of Home Affairs itself recorded more than a hundred regencies and cities raising PBB-P2 rates since 2024, twenty of them by more than 100 per cent. This chasing of PAD occurred without any personal incentive for regional heads. If regional heads were one day to receive a direct percentage of the PAD they generate, this drive — already proven to spark social unrest in many regions — would have a new reason to grow stronger.
Treating the Symptoms, Leaving the Disease
A more fundamental question then arises: why has such an expensive structure of political financing been allowed to persist for so long? One answer is that the actors most powerful enough to dismantle it are precisely those who have benefited from it. The political parties that receive dowries from prospective candidates are the same parties that sit in parliament and hold the authority to revise campaign financing laws. Dismantling political dowries means parties lose one of their own sources of funding. Proposals to raise regional heads’ salaries will always feel easier to approve than reforms that directly touch parties’ interests.
Tidy campaign finance reports on paper stand in stark contrast to the reality of political costs on the ground. Marcus Mietzner’s 2015 study on political financing in Indonesia found that the country’s political funding problems are not the result of system failure, but the product of a system design that itself creates incentives for informal financing — what he terms “dysfunction by design”. In other words, political dowries, vote buying and private or business donations are the logical consequence of Indonesia’s political financing design.
The discourse of raising regional heads’ salaries and granting PAD-based incentives will produce another very dangerous effect. Both stem from how the state treats numbers: one is hidden because it was never designed to be seen, the other is forced upward in order to boost revenue. Between those two numbers, regional heads always occupy the same position — bearing the consequences of a flawed system. Meanwhile, the state seeks the easiest way to appear to solve the problem.
Raising salaries or granting PAD incentives does not touch the root of the problem at all. Parties that have long received dowries are left undisturbed, entrenched patronage networks remain intact, and no one is forced to acknowledge that part of the cost of power in this republic was indeed designed never to be accountable. What remains are richer regional heads, a system just as broken, and a public that bears the consequences.
The question is no longer whether regional heads deserve better welfare. The question is whether the state still has the courage to dismantle the political dowries and patronage that form the root of those costs, or chooses to keep financing the symptoms while letting the disease persist. We will never realise this until the next sting operation reminds us of the same old problem.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/corruption-among-regional-heads-is-it-really-due-to-political-costs-1785063105)
Originally published by Republika (https://retizen.republika.co.id/posts/773351/korupsi-kepala-daerah-benarkah-karena-ongkos-politik), translated from Indonesian