Convoluted Communication System Leads to Fatal Train Collision at Bekasi Station
The National Transport Safety Committee (KNKT) reported its preliminary investigation into the collision between the Argo Bromo Anggrek train and a Commuter Line train at Bekasi Timur Station on 27 April 2026, which claimed 16 lives, citing a convoluted communication system as a contributing factor. The incident involved two Commuter Line trains: KA 5568A on the Kampung Bandan-Cikarang route and KA 5181 on the Cikarang-Angke route. Also involved were the Argo Bromo Anggrek train (KA 4B) and a GreenSM green taxi.
KNKT Chairman Soerjanto Tjahjono highlighted miscommunication between train controllers and the Control Centre (PK), noting the communication system was overly convoluted. ‘The communication system of the Train Operations Control Centre (PK) is too convoluted. KA 5568A used a Sepura radio and was within S.27 communication zone (PK South), while KA 4B Argo Bromo Anggrek used a locomotive radio and was in S.1 zone (PK East). This caused excessive delays as PK South had to inform the Chief Controller, who then relayed the information to PK East. This needs improvement,’ he stated during a hearing with the House of Representatives’ Commission V on Thursday (21/5/2026), republished on Monday (25/5/2026).
He noted that the Control Centre was unaware of the actual conditions at Bekasi Station, as communication was conducted solely via radio. ‘We received a report from the Argo Bromo Anggrek driver that he initiated braking from 1.3km away after being informed of a level crossing collision ahead. The driver attempted to brake, but the Control Centre was unaware of the actual situation around Bekasi Timur Station due to voice-only radio communication in the cabin. Thus, they only knew there was a collision and that the driver was braking,’ he explained.
Additionally, there was miscommunication between Bekasi Station’s PK and the Argo Bromo Anggrek driver, who was only instructed to apply gradual braking rather than full emergency braking, leading to the collision. ‘According to PK East, the Argo Bromo Anggrek train was instructed to apply gradual braking and sound the horn 35 times, while information on upstream and downstream track clearance status (prepal) had not been received from the relevant crossing,’ he said.
Meanwhile, the KNKT’s preliminary investigation revealed that voice recordings between the driver and Manggarai PK showed that information about KA 5568A Commuter Line being stationary on Track 1 at Bekasi Timur Station due to a crowd was not relayed to PK South. This was because PK South was simultaneously managing the KA 5181 incident involving a GreenSM taxi collision and KA 6075 Commuter Line behind KA 5181.
Additionally, discrepancies in master time references were found across various communication systems at Manggarai PK, locomotive loggers, signalling system loggers, station operations service rooms, train CCTV, and station CCTV.
Regarding the communication timeline, the KNKT’s preliminary report stated that the KA 5181 driver communicated with PK South about the train’s status after colliding with a green taxi. The PK South operator then reported the KA 5181 situation to the Operations Control Centre (Pusdalopka) at Manggarai Station. Upon learning of the incident, PK South attempted to secure KA 5181 and KA 6075.
Subsequently, PK East received information about a collision near Bekasi Timur Station involving KA 5181 and communicated this to the KA 4B driver. Meanwhile, the KA 5568A driver attempted to contact PK South, which was unable to depart due to a crowd at the crossing where the green taxi collided with KA 5181. However, due to PK South’s focus on managing the KA 5181 incident, the information was not fully conveyed.
PK East instructed the KA 4B driver to apply gradual braking. However, as the Control Centre was unaware of the exact situation, the driver was not ordered to apply full emergency braking. Tragically, the collision was unavoidable. Subsequently, the KA 4B driver reported the collision between KA 4B and KA 5568A at Bekasi Timur Station.
KNKT is still conducting its investigation into the collision between KA 4B Argo Bromo Anggrek and KA 5568A Commuter Line on Track 1 at Bekasi Timur Station. ‘KNKT has received information on actions taken by relevant parties to enhance safety following the incident,’ Soerjanto said.