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Concern over bank restructuring

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Concern over bank restructuring

By Sidesh Kaul

This is the first of two articles on bank and corporate
restructuring in Indonesia.

JAKARTA (JP): There is a growing sense of disillusionment with
the course charted out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for Indonesia's economic recovery. Indonesia today is at a
crossroads and decision-makers have the onerous task of juggling
economic and political realities. Now is the time for an
objective assessment of the key components of the IMF's strategy
in Indonesia and where this strategy is leading the country.

Of late there has been a cacophony of criticism of IMF
policies. The IMF has been accused of having a "hidden agenda",
of being grossly incapable and incompetent, of having misread the
situation, of gross contradictions and of adopting policies which
effectively "save the rich and kill the poor".

While it may be politically expedient for some sections of the
polity and intellectual community to indulge in IMF bashing,
there is no denying the fact that the IMF succeeded in at least
charting out a course in these turbulent times where none was
forthcoming.

However, the task does not end there and the road to recovery
is a journey that will need ample amounts of stamina, political
will, determination and the solid support of the masses. It also
will need large doses of introspection and assessment.

In order to understand whether there is indeed any method to
the IMF's madness, we have to go back to the beginning. The
Indonesian crisis is a story of structural and systemic
weaknesses. It is a direct reflection of the total disregard the
New Order had for institutionalizing a system of good governance.
The New Order sought legitimacy on the basis of economic growth
while keeping a tight lid on dissent.

The crisis, by attacking the core foundations of this
legitimacy, blew the lid open, exposing vistas for real and true
reform.

The Indonesian crisis was a consequence of the structural
weakness of the economy. As the Asian contagion spread in 1997,
the rupiah's depreciation laid bare the inability of the economy
(especially the banking and real sectors) to adjust to this
shock. The currency crisis soon developed into an economic
crisis, which in time infected the social and political arenas
(where there were structural weaknesses as well).

This minor infection very rapidly developed from an esoteric
economic phenomenon into a full-blown crisis that could be seen
and experienced in everyday life in Indonesia. Unlike some of the
other countries in the region affected by the same contagion,
Indonesia's devastation was total.

The failure of the Indonesian banking system, because of
structural and systemic weaknesses, as a first line of defense
and the large amounts of corporate debt hastened the meltdown. It
was no surprise when the IMF decided to focus on putting the
banking industry back on its feet as the first step toward
recovery.

At the very outset of its involvement in Indonesia's recovery
program, the IMF adopted a five-pronged strategy: Stabilizing
the rupiah, restructuring the banking system, implementing
structural reforms, addressing private debt and restoring trade
financing.

While the process of recovery and the issues connected with it
are extremely complex, it is not difficult to discern that the
first step of the IMF's program was to tighten the country's
monetary policy and rehabilitate the Indonesian banking industry.

The IMF-led tightening of the monetary policy was done in
order to rein in the volatile rupiah. The target of the monetary
program was shifted to the net domestic assets of Bank Indonesia
(BI), with the intention of curbing the expansion of BI credit.
However, the tightening of the monetary policy has had an adverse
effect.

Interest rates have skyrocketed, imports have become
prohibitive and liquidity is nonexistent. There has been a
palpable domino effect on the real sector, with firms cutting
back production. New BI liquidity support has been offered at
extremely high interest rates (and with stiff penalties) to
discourage banks from looking to BI for liquidity help. The net
result is that interest rates continue to remain high, and for
borrowers the debt nightmare is compounded every day. Banks under
the IMF-led monetary policies are operating at negative spread.
Nonperforming loans (NPLs) are now growing at a much faster rate.

The positive impact of high interest rates is that the rupiah
has been kept on a tight leash. However, the myopic believe the
strengthening of the rupiah at any cost does not have any
shortcomings. The IMF quickly needs to disabuse itself of the
notion that with a stronger rupiah, the government, corporations
and banks would be in a better position to pay back loans.

What the IMF chooses to ignore is the behavior of firms and
individuals during the crisis. With no liquidity, most firms and
individuals have gone into "survival mode"; i.e. firms and
individuals are trying to maximize their internal sources of
liquidity as the first measure of survival. The direct impact of
this is that creditors will be kept at bay, inflating Indonesian
banks' NPLs.

The IMF has a history of harsh macroeconomic formulas
(remember the IMF-led reforms in Korea and Russia) which have
failed to have the desired impact. Instead of adopting a "one
medicine cures all" macroeconomic strategy, the IMF would do well
to tailor an approach for Indonesia which is more of a middle
path (between a tight monetary policy and selective growth) that
would not stifle corporations and productive sectors.

The writer is a Jakarta-based observer of Indonesian economic
and political affairs.

More from 7 May 1999 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/concern-over-bank-restructuring-1447893297-1439872)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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