Combating Hoaxes Before They Become Convictions
Hoaxes do not always gain strength because their content is convincing. They often become powerful because they arrive first, are repeated numerous times, and touch upon public emotions before facts have the opportunity to speak.
When government clarifications only emerge after false information has spread widely, the battle of communication becomes much harder. The government is no longer merely conveying the truth, but must instead attempt to change beliefs that have already formed.
The Ministry of Communication and Digital has performed important work through the monitoring and clarification of false information. Throughout 2024, the government identified and clarified 1,923 pieces of hoax content. The list of clarifications continues to be updated, including those regarding recruitment scams, health hoaxes, fake social assistance, and data-stealing links.
This work is commendable. However, the scale and speed of disinformation necessitate that clarification strategies be supplemented with a more preventive approach. The government must begin fighting hoaxes before they emerge and become established beliefs.
Communication science recognises an approach known as ‘prebunking’ or early preparation. While debunking refutes false information that has already circulated, prebulting prepares the public to recognise patterns of manipulation before they encounter them.
This approach is similar to vaccination. The public is introduced to safe doses of the characteristics of manipulation so that they possess immunity when encountering the real version. They are taught to recognise clickbait titles that incite anger, anonymous sources, out-of-context video clips, fake accounts, urgent calls to share, and links that request personal data.
This strategy is relevant because hoaxes constantly evolve, yet their manipulative techniques are relatively repetitive. Ahead of aid registrations, fake links will appear. When the government opens recruitment, imitation announcements will circulate. During outbreaks or health issues, baseless medicinal claims will emerge. By 2026, Komdigi even intends to strengthen the upstream approach by involving digital platforms in handling health hoaxes.
Every ministry could essentially create a disinformation risk map. The Ministry of Health could map hoaxes regarding medicines, vaccines, and outbreaks. The Ministry of Social Affairs could anticipate social assistance fraud. The Ministry of Finance could prepare explanations regarding taxes and budgets. The National Civil Service Agency could anticipate fake recruitment.
Such maps would serve as the basis for a preventive communication calendar. Two weeks before a programme is launched, the government should already have explained the official channels, the format of documents, registration procedures, costs, and the types of personal information that are never requested.
The government also needs to build a disinformation warning system, similar to weather alerts. When certain patterns of hoaxes increase, the public could receive brief notifications through official channels, media, telecommunications operators, and local government networks.
Clarifications must be produced in easily shareable formats. A single long explanation on a government website is not always able to catch up with a short video that has been viewed millions of times. Facts need to be presented in the form of visual cards, vertical videos, voice messages, and short texts that can be forwarded through family groups.
Speed must be accompanied by accuracy. Every ministry should ideally have a rapid response team involving subject matter experts, communications specialists, legal experts, and digital monitors. These teams should be given time targets to verify high-risk issues and issue initial responses.
Collaboration with platforms also needs to be strengthened. Platforms can assist by labelling content, reducing the reach of harmful content, preserving digital evidence, and directing users to official sources. However, such cooperation must be conducted transparently so that hoax mitigation does not transform into the restriction of legitimate opinion.
The government must clearly distinguish between three things: information proven to be false, harsh opinion, and criticism of policy. Hoaxes must be fought with evidence. Criticism must be answered with arguments and improvements. Disagreement should not automatically be categorised as disinformation.
Digital literacy must also move from seminars towards practical skills. The public needs to practise checking website addresses, tracing photo sources, recognising fake accounts, reading dates, and distinguishing between journalistic content and disguised advertisements.
Local figures play a significant role. Teachers, healthcare workers, religious leaders, community heads, business owners, and youth communities are often more trusted than official accounts that feel distant. The government can form a network of community verifiers with constantly updated materials.
The success of this strategy should not merely be measured by the number of contents taken down. A more important measure is how quickly hoaxes are detected, how widely clarifications reach exposed groups, and whether the public becomes increasingly capable of verifying information independently.
The war against hoaxes cannot be won if the government always arrives last. Clarification is still necessary, but prevention is far more powerful. The government must be present before scams claim victims, before lies turn into anger, and before manipulation turns into conviction.
In the era of algorithms, truth does not automatically win. Truth must be delivered earlier, in clear language, through trusted messengers, and in forms that are easily accepted by the public.