China's hegemony
China's hegemony
On March 14, 1992, two weeks after China enacted its notorious Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, I wrote in The Jakarta Post expressing my amazement and disbelief in the law and its explicit territorial claim over the South China Sea.
I pointed out that the lack of substantive historical grounds, and the remote location of the territories from the mainland of China, would surely make the claim both untenable and unprecedented in modern history. Furthermore, the Chinese law not only ignored the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (which, however, only came into effect in November 1994) but actually contravened the Convention's provision on the 200-mile wide exclusive economic zone.
What is perhaps most galling about this whole controversy is the equivocal and even confusing approach by China. At least five facts may be cited to support this view. First, China has never officially or formally shown to anybody a map showing the exact extent of its claim.
Second, China is prevaricating on the Law of the Sea Convention, having signed it at first but not having it ratified, so far. This law, of course, would help to substantiate the sovereignty claims of the South East Asian countries, since the law gives the exclusive rights to exploit the economic resources within their respective 200-mile wide zones.
Third, China shows its inconsistency by denying South East Asian countries the use of the continental shelf concept to support their claims, while China itself applies the same principle in its long standing claim on the Japanese-held Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
Fourth, the Chinese government has recently stated, after being persistently asked to disclose the exact limit of its claim, that China does not claim the whole of the South China Sea but only part of it, refusing, however, to specify which part. It is not certain whether this is a sign that China is beginning to backtrack on its claim, or merely a part of it ambiguous tactic to hide its true ambitions.
Fifth, China has frequently maintained that bilateral talks should be held between China and each of the other claimants to discuss the possibility of joint exploitation of the economic resources of the area. But how could such bilateral talks produce anything if one is not even sure if the area to be discussed is located inside or outside the area claimed by China?
The best solution, naturally, is for all the claimants to come together for a multilateral discussion about their overlapping claims, using the Law of the Sea Convention, as well as any substantive historical reason and the concept of continental shelf and geographical proximity, as the guiding principle.
If China should continue to refuse to take part in such talks, then it is time for South East Asian countries to start adopting a vigorous policy of containment and pressure to induce the Chinese to be more cooperative.
At any rate, after China's sneak aggression last February, at Mischief Reef off the Philippine island of Palawan, where the Chinese unilaterally and arrogantly laid down many boundary markers, ASEAN countries should learn the lesson and never again let themselves be deluded into appeasement, or be taken by surprise.
Indonesia, even though it is a non-claimant in the dispute, should commence resettlement of transmigrants on the vulnerable Natuna island and at the same time significantly increase its defense capabilities there.
In conclusion, it would appear that the end of the Cold War and the exigencies of economic development of China have given a fresh impetus to its historically established, but recently dormant, expansionism.
Although China, in regional terms, may not constitute a military threat at the present time, the situation could well be different in 10 or 20 years, when its economy has grown considerably stronger and its naval fleet capable of ocean going operations.
MASLI ARMAN
Jakarta