China operates on the basis of realpolitik

China operates on the basis of realpolitik

By Robyn Lim

Regional states should stick together in their interaction with
China.

China is at a critical point strategically, its focus having
shifted from north to south. Hitherto a continental land power,
China is beginning to develop a serious ocean-going navy. Its
territorial claims in the South China Sea affect the security of
all the ASEAN countries.

No longer pinned down by the Soviet Union, China is a major
beneficiary of the Cold War's end. Its former adversary,
Vietnam, deprived of Soviet support, seeks dubious refuge in
ASEAN. China also has nuclear weapons.

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council,
it is able to veto any UN action. China is totalitarian;
indifferent to the rights of its own citizens, it is unlikely to
be solicitous of the rights of others. Bolstered by its rapid
economic growth, China demands "respect". Oft-expressed regional
doubts about U.S. staying power feed China's growing confidence.

Assertive Chinese behavior may intimidate smaller neighbors.
China looms large because of its bulk and proximity, as well as
the economic power of its diaspora. Its claims in the South China
Sea, turned on and off at will, represent the most worrying
challenge to strategic stability in the ASEAN area. China aims to
divide the regional states, not least by seeking to settle
differences with them bilaterally.

The ASEAN countries, despite their recent economic success,
are relatively weak states with deep differences of strategic
interest among them. They have a growing economic stake in China,
and will be loath to oppose it. Not being sure of how far they
can depend on extra-regional support, or what that might involve
-- for example, a stronger Japanese security presence -- the
ASEAN states are cautious. Still, they have criticized Chinese
nuclear testing. They are also trying to engage Myanmar, lest it
has no alternative to China.

China may succeed in intimidating the smaller states, but
challenging the interests of the great powers and their allies
would invite them to combine against it. Signs are already
evident that others are beginning to resist China's ambitions as
seen in Japan's willingness to criticize China over nuclear
testing; the recent revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance
(despite continuing problems over Okinawa); the beginnings of
bilateral security dialogue between Australia and both Japan and
South Korea; and Australia's 1995 security treaty with Indonesia.

China's bluster disguises important weaknesses. Demographic
weight can add greatly to a country's power if its people are
educated and productive. But if they are poor, a huge population
is a liability, even if it provides lots of cheap cannon fodder.
China's armed forces suffer from poor training and obsolete
weapons. The country's technological base is weak, and
environmental problems are beginning to loom. Economic growth is
deepening tensions between the hinterland and the coast, and a
succession crisis could be in prospect.

China's weaknesses, and need for economic interaction with the
outside world, provide scope for channeling its ambitions in
benign directions. Multilateral dialogue through APEC and the
ASEAN Regional Forum can help engage China, and afford it a
growing stake in the regional order that has underpinned
prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.

But China, although lacking the sinews of strength and
modernity that its ambition and self-regard demand, operates on
the basis of realpolitik. It will do its best to divide-and-rule,
in the hope of delaying the formation of an opposing coalition
while building up its own military power. So the status quo
countries need sufficient strength to dissuade China from
behaving in ways that challenge regional security. It is
essential they stick together.

Regional complaints that the United States is neglecting
security in South-east Asia need to be put into perspective. Some
reduction in U.S. military strength post-Cold-War was both
inevitable and desirable. American tolerance for casualties in
foreign wars is low. To sustain political support in a democracy,
the connection of commitments abroad to direct security interests
must be palpable. But the maritime basis of U.S. security means
that the U.S. cannot ignore what is happening strategically on
foreign shores, whether in Europe or in Asia.

Vis-a-vis China, Japan's maritime security represents a
strategic interest of the first order for the U.S., given its
responsibilities under the security treaty with Japan, and the
convenience for both parties of Japan's strategic dependence on
the U.S. (That dependence indeed suits most other countries in
the region.) The U.S.-Philippine security treaty also ties the
U.S. directly to issues of strategic contention in the South
China Sea.

The U.S. has maritime and other military capabilities
possessed by no other distant state, forcing China to take
account of the American factor in pursuing its regional
ambitions. That was starkly evident in the U.S. naval deployment
in response to China's acts of military intimidation directed at
the March 1996 presidential election in Taiwan. Both Japan and
Australia expressed support for the U.S. action.

The problem for those whose interests are adversely affected
by China's ambition is how to team up, muster strength in ways
that settle China down, so as to restrain rather than inflame it.
That will demand political skills of a high order, especially in
light of trade and economic tensions among the status quo powers.
Much will be demanded in particular of Japan, which during the
Cold War had little incentive to develop the political skills it
now needs to act on the basis of wider rather than narrow self-
interests.

Dr. Robyn Lim is Professor of International Relations at
Hiroshima Shudo University, Japan.