China Hasn't Landed, Taiwan Could Be Paralysed First
The greatest threat to Taiwan in a war scenario with China is not solely the success of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) landing on its shores. The more decisive risk may emerge when the systems inside the island stop working: the power grid goes down, the internet is disrupted, communication cables are severed, fuel distribution stalls, and military units lose contact with the command centre.
Taiwan itself has begun testing this possibility more concretely. In the Han Kuang war games in August 2026, the government for the first time deliberately slowed mobile internet access in several areas to simulate conditions when civilian communications are disrupted by war. The exercise also tested the ability of civilian institutions to continue functioning amid a simultaneous crisis.
The simulation highlighted a concern that is increasingly prominent in Taiwan’s defence strategy. A country does not have to lose all of its territory first to experience paralysis. If electricity, communications, logistics and command structures can be severed simultaneously, the ability to resist can deteriorate even when most of the military and weaponry remain intact.
An analysis of Taiwan’s defence written from the perspective of the United States special operations community assesses that advanced weaponry and precision strikes are indeed important for slowing an enemy. However, these capabilities cannot replace the need for a societal structure capable of enduring when the island experiences total physical and communications isolation.
The issue is becoming more critical because Taiwan’s defence and economic ties with the United States continue to strengthen. The top US diplomat in Taipei, Raymond Greene, said on Monday (31/8/2026) that Washington’s relationship with Taiwan has ‘never been stronger’, especially as cooperation between the two sides deepens in the high-tech and advanced manufacturing sectors.
However, close ties with Washington do not erase Taiwan’s geographical problem if war actually breaks out.
Taiwan has long relied on the porcupine strategy. The concept aims to make the island a target too expensive to attack through the purchase of asymmetric, mobile and relatively difficult-to-destroy weapons.
Harpoon missiles, HIMARS, upgrades to Patriot systems, drones and various advanced combat platforms are part of this approach. Washington is also encouraging Taipei to develop capabilities that can destroy an attacking fleet before it reaches the coastline.
However, critics of the strategy remind that Taiwan is not merely an artillery platform in the middle of the sea. Taiwan is a society with a power grid, hospitals, telecommunications, ports, transport, food warehouses, fuel distribution and a bureaucracy that must all continue to function after the first missile is fired.
Taiwan’s problem is fundamentally different from Ukraine’s. Ukraine has land borders with NATO member states, including Poland, Slovakia and Romania. Weapons, ammunition, radios, medical supplies and various equipment can still be sent overland without having to penetrate airspace or waters controlled by Russia.
Taiwan has no land borders at all. The island is separated from mainland China by about 100 miles of open water. If Beijing is able to impose an effective blockade through warships, air power, anti-ship missiles and air defence systems, Taiwan’s entire operational space could potentially be closed off.