Cheap Hajj Today, Who Pays Tomorrow?

There is one figure in the agreement on the 2027 Hajj Pilgrimage Costs (BPIH) that has escaped notice. Since 2023, the House of Representatives (DPR), the government and the Hajj Financial Management Agency (BPKH) have committed to reducing the Hajj cost’s reliance on investment returns, generated from pilgrims’ deposits and managed by BPKH.

The results were initially visible: the share fell from 44.7 per cent in 2023 to 40 per cent in 2024, then to 38 per cent in both 2025 and 2026. BPKH had even projected an ideal composition for 2027: 70 per cent paid by pilgrims and 30 per cent funded from investment returns.

In reality, the target year saw the share funded by investment returns reach 44.5 per cent. Three years of progress were almost wiped out in a single season. On 7 October 2026, the DPR Commission VIII working group and the government agreed that the average cost of the 2027 Hajj would be about Rp98.5 million per pilgrim.

Pilgrims will pay around Rp54.6 million, while the remaining roughly Rp43.8 million per person will be funded from investment returns. The latter figure is almost a third higher than last year’s Rp33.2 million. It followed lengthy discussions: the government’s initial proposal of 60 per cent was adjusted to around 48 per cent in line with the President’s suggestion, before the parties settled on 44.5 per cent after considering input from BPKH and DPR Commission VIII.

With the exchange rate assumed at Rp17,500 to the US dollar and service costs in Saudi Arabia continuing to rise, holding down the burden on pilgrims is clearly no small achievement. The final instalment has fallen to around Rp23 million, about Rp3 million less than last year, helped by an APBN state budget allocation of around Rp3 million per pilgrim.

But precisely because the news sounds so welcome, one question needs to be asked clearly: is today’s relief being delivered in a way that remains fair to pilgrims still waiting their turn?

Almost a year’s returns spent

How significant is the impact? Investment returns allocated to the 2027 Hajj amount to around Rp8.83 trillion, with a further approximately Rp2.6 trillion allocated to the virtual accounts of pilgrims awaiting departure. The total is about Rp11.4 trillion, almost equal to all the returns generated by BPKH during 2025, at Rp12.05 trillion.

This is only a rough comparison, since the periods do not align exactly, and it does not mean that Hajj funds are in difficulty. But it is like a household spending almost all its monthly income: there is little room to cope with surprises, whether a weaker rupiah or investment returns falling short. At this point, caution is not optional; it is essential.

Investment returns are not a state subsidy

This year the distinction is clear: the Rp3 million from the APBN is the state subsidy, while the Rp43.8 million comes from investment returns. Economically, those returns function like cross-subsidies because they allow departing pilgrims to pay less than the actual cost.

Legally, however, the money comes from pilgrims’ own deposits. Those effectively “subsidising” departing pilgrims are fellow pilgrims, including people who will not travel for another decade or more. Article 7 of Law No. 34 of 2014 on Hajj Financial Management states that BPIH payments are pilgrims’ entrusted funds, while Article 2 requires their management to follow, among other things, the principles of sharia, prudence, transparency and accountability.

The guardrails have now become clearer. Law No. 14 of 2025 makes fairness and sustainability principles of Hajj administration (Article 2), defining sustainability as a balance between serving pilgrims today, optimising investment returns and ensuring the future of the Hajj.

The law also requires BPIH calculations to be “accountable and based on investment returns” (Article 44), and requires the Minister to consider the sustainability of Hajj finances when submitting a BPIH proposal to the DPR (Article 46(1)). Government Regulation No. 5 of 2018 also requires DPR approval for the proportion of investment returns used. Protecting the rights of pilgrims awaiting departure is therefore not merely a moral appeal, but a legal obligation.

The same concern is reflected in sharia principles. The Eighth National Ijtima of the Indonesian Ulema Council’s Fatwa Commission, Resolution No. 09/Ijtima’ Ulama/VIII/2024, affirmed the basic principle: the initial payment is the pilgrim’s personal property held in trust, so the returns on its investment must not be used to finance another pilgrim’s Hajj.

The 2024 Indonesian Hajj Deliberation set out more practical guidance: the use of investment returns must be carefully calculated, kept sustainable and distributed proportionally between pilgrims departing and those waiting. One affirms the principle of trust; the other seeks to guide practice towards it gradually. The conclusion is the same: the trust placed by waiting pilgrims must not be eroded.

Procedurally valid, but fairness must be tested

I want to consider this issue through Gustav Radbruch’s three fundamental values of law: legal certainty, justice and utility. In terms of utility, the 2027 BPIH has clearly succeeded: departing pilgrims will feel the relief directly. In terms of certainty, the process is valid, although one task remains: formal approval by the President.

The aspect that most needs scrutiny is fairness, which in Hajj financing has a time dimension. Pilgrims waiting today are the pilgrims who will depart in the future. When the share of investment returns used for the current season rises, what is at stake is the system’s ability to treat them equally when their turn comes.

Radbruch reminds us that legal certainty must not become a shield for injustice. The 2027 BPIH is far from such an extreme case, but the point remains relevant: formal legality does not automatically guarantee a sense of fairness, particularly for people who had no seat at the negotiating table. This is not about setting departing pilgrims against those waiting; they are the same people at different points in time.

A stronger middle ground

Lawrence M. Friedman’s framework of a legal system—substance, structure and legal culture—offers a clear roadmap. In terms of substance, the 2027 experience offers an important lesson: projections that are not enshrined in rules can easily be abandoned.

The aim of reducing reliance on investment returns should no longer be left to annual negotiations. It should be set out in binding rules: a ceiling on the proportion of investment returns used for the current Hajj season, a measurable path for gradually reducing that share, and a minimum allocation to the virtual accounts of pilgrims awaiting departure. The bill to amend Law No. 34 of 2014, now under consideration in the DPR, is the right place to include these provisions.

In terms of structure, a basis of trust is already in place. BPKH’s 2025 financial statements again received an unqualified opinion from the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), with managed funds totalling Rp180.74 trillion. But an unqualified opinion answers the question, “Are the accounts fairly presented?” It does not answer, “Will there be enough funds for pilgrims who depart in the future?” To address that second question, Law No. 14 of 2025 requires BPKH to be involved in discussions on proposed BPIH costs (Article 46(4)).

This involvement needs to be substantive: BPKH’s sustainability projections should be made public, for example through regular reports on the allocation of investment returns to departing and waiting pilgrims, alongside projections for the next five to ten years.

In terms of legal culture, the challenge lies in how we measure success. As long as a “successful” Hajj is judged by how low this year’s final instalment is, there will always be pressure in each season’s discussions to increase the share funded from investment returns. Policymakers and the public alike need the courage to accept that a reasonable payment today is a way to safeguard pilgrims’ departure tomorrow.

A trust waiting its turn

Every initial payment is a deposit entrusted after years of effort: savings accumulated over many years, sometimes the proceeds from selling a small paddy field. In the language of maqashid sharia, safeguarding this money is part of hifzh al-mal—the preservation of wealth—and must not be sacrificed for temporary convenience.

Procedural compliance alone is therefore not enough. Management must be mindful of pilgrims still waiting: their voices are not heard in the meeting room, even though it is the returns on their deposits that are being distributed.

The 2027 BPIH has been agreed and its implementation deserves support. But discussions in the coming years should be an opportunity to recover the progress that was lost and strengthen transparency.

Ultimately, the measure of success in Hajj financing is not how light the burden on pilgrims is this year, but whether the policy safeguards the trust placed in Hajj funds, protects the interests of pilgrims across time and sustains public confidence that the Hajj is managed fairly.