Can the West Mimic China's Economic Strategy Without Losing Its Identity?
For decades, China viewed the United States as its economic teacher. However, the 2008-2009 global financial crisis fundamentally altered that perspective.
During a visit to Washington in 2008, as the American financial system was reeling, Wang Qishan, then China’s Vice Premier, reportedly delivered a sharp message to US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson: “You were my teacher. But now I am in my teacher’s domain, and look at your system, Hank. We aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.”
This statement, recounted by Bob Davis and Lingling Wei in the 2020 book Superpower Showdown, marked a significant turning point. China began to question whether the Western economic model was still worth emulating.
Now, the question has reversed. After China demonstrated its ability and willingness to use its dominance in rare earth metals and global industrial supply chains as economic leverage, some Western economists and policymakers are asking: is there something the United States and its allies can learn from China?
Chad Bown, a senior researcher at the Peterson Institute for Disinternational Economics, believes the answer is yes. Bown, who served as chief economist for the US Department of State during the Joe Biden administration, and Financial Times columnist Soumaya Keynes co-authored the book How to Win a Trade War.
In the book, the authors argue that market-oriented democracies need to borrow some of the tools China has used to protect itself from state-directed economic models. These tools include industrial policy, the stockpiling of strategic reserves, and the use of export controls as economic weapons.
“The West has no choice if it wants autonomy in some of these sectors where China has already achieved market dominance that it has now shown a willingness to weaponise,” said Bown.
However, the issue is not merely whether the West should mimic China. The more complex question is whether democratic nations can adopt parts of China’s strategy at a reasonable cost and with minimal side effects. If not, Bown warns, the process could become highly chaotic.
China’s industrial policy helped drive its rise in electric vehicles, batteries, and solar panels. Through state direction, resources were poured into sectors deemed strategic.
However, this model also created problems. Chinese production grew far beyond domestic consumption capacity. Consequently, cheap goods flooded global markets, triggering defensive reactions from the United States, the European Union, India, and several emerging economies that were previously more open to Chinese exports.
Domestically, an excessive focus on industrial investment also meant that Chinese households were not strong enough to serve as a pillar of consumption. In other words, production success was not always matched by domestic demand strength.
This is the complex side of the Chinese model. It can create industrial advantages, but it can also produce overcapacity, trade tensions, and a dependence on foreign markets.
One of the most important lessons for the West comes from rare earth metals. These minerals are essential components for various strategic products, ranging from laptops and chips to fighter jets.
China is seen as demonstrating that dominance in such sectors can be used as leverage in economic conflicts. The use of supply chain power has led several Western parties to view China not just as a trading partner, but as a strategic risk.
At this point, Bown and Keynes are not calling for a total imitation of the Chinese model. Instead, they suggest ways for democracies to use these high-cost and risky tools more carefully, without undermining the rules-based open trade order they wish to maintain.
The first step discussed is the stockpiling of strategic reserves. In the context of global supply chains, reserves can serve as a protective tool during crises.
However, determining when a government should build reserves and when it should release them is no easy task. Therefore, Bown and Keynes suggest there should be explicit, pre-determined triggers.
Rather than attempting to domesticate entire supply chains, governments also need to identify truly vital bottlenecks. In the semiconductor industry, for example, attention could be directed towards raw silicon, wafers, or the chip assembly stages that represent the most vulnerable nodes.
The second instrument is subsidies. In the view of Bown and Keynes, subsidies should be used selectively. They liken it to baking a cake: if the ingredients or measurements are wrong, the result will be a mess.
Therefore, subsidies should be narrow, time-bound, and directed towards foundational technologies that have real security implications. Advanced semiconductors are one of the clearest examples.
Overly broad subsidies can lead to domestic inefficiencies. Furthermore, wars of subsidies and investment incentives can trigger friction with one’s own allies, as friendly nations compete for the same strategic projects.
The most complex instrument is export controls. This policy restricts an adversary’s access to cutting-edge technology, such as advanced artificial intelligence chips.
The problem is that export controls can backfire. When a country is cut off from access to Western technology, it may instead accelerate the development of domestic alternatives. In the long run, this could reduce the West’s own bargaining power.
Therefore, the effectiveness of export controls depends heavily on coordination with allies. If the United States restricts exports, but ne…
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/can-the-west-mimic-chinas-economic-strategy-without-losing-its-identity-1782298267)
Originally published by Media Indonesia (https://mediaindonesia.com/internasional/903858/dapatkah-barat-meniru-strategi-ekonomi-tiongkok-tanpa-kehilangan-jati-diri), translated from Indonesian