Can Asia be spared another nuclear holocaust?
By Imron Cotan
JAKARTA (JP): Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan and India were once considered the "threshold countries" which possessed the technical capabilities to become nuclear weapon states.
Fortunately, after succumbing to regional and global pressures, Argentina and Brazil have both agreed to put aside their nuclear ambitions and have signed a number of regional and multilateral agreements to that effect. The international community, especially the Western world, has warmly welcomed these encouraging attitudes. Argentina has even been accorded and enjoyed a special status in the Western countries in various international negotiating forums.
In the field of nuclear disarmament India and Pakistan have consistently called all nuclear weapon states, namely the United States of America, the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom and China, to multilaterally and comprehensively negotiate nuclear disarmament. All nonaligned countries have always supported this stand.
The reluctance of the nuclear weapon states, especially the U.S. and Russia, to relinquish the nuclear weapon option is basically because they have mastered its cutting edge technology, which opens the possibility for them to design small-size nuclear weapons (mini-nukes) to be used for tactical purposes.
The ability of the U.S. to produce mini-nuke warheads (W-88) -- the technology of which was allegedly stolen by China -- is a case in point. This cutting edge technology has fundamentally changed the way the decision-makers, in particular the ones from Washington, see the military value of nuclear weapons.
The explosion of nuclear devices conducted by India, which were followed by Pakistan in 1997, were in sharp contrast to their stated goal to free the world from these weapons of mass destruction. South Asia's political realities, as well as the potential and real threats within the region, have instead forced the two countries to go nuclear.
The nuclear arms race in the region has a chain reaction nature. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which India possesses no nuclear weapons while sharing borders with China -- one of the major nuclear weapon states -- against whom India has fought a major war. The situation has recently been more alarming because China continues to develop its nuclear weapon capacity.
A similar situation is also applied to Pakistan, which shares borders with India and has overlapping territorial claims over the Jammu and Kashmir regions, over which the two countries have also fiercely fought several limited wars. This fragile security condition in South Asia is predicted to linger for a long time, and may well be one of the most dangerous flash points in the next millennium.
A way out is therefore urgently required to resolve the prevailing conflicts in the region. Their continuance will certainly disrupt the already delicate security conditions in South Asia. In a much broader context, they will also affect Asia and the Pacific region, where the countries of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are located.
Among the three Asian nuclear weapon states, India and China have publicly disclosed their nuclear weapon doctrines, while Pakistan has yet to disclose its program.
Taking into account that the nuclear weapon states will continue to determine their military might on the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence", and that the use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes is now viable, India considers it is unlikely to eventually achieve nuclear disarmament.
For these particular reasons and without totally negating first, the achievement of nuclear disarmament under a strict and effective international control, and second, the fulfillment of its national interests in the fields of politics, and science and technology, India deems it necessary to complement its arsenal with nuclear weapons in order to secure the country's national interests.
Like the other nuclear weapon states, India now believes that its security and survival are contingent upon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. However, India stressed that this doctrine is non-offensive in nature and is based on principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which inter alia guarantees "the right of self defense". In other words, India has unilaterally declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons (non-first use), and that it will only employ these weapons for retaliatory purposes.
Of the existing five major nuclear weapon states, only China has so far embraced such a policy. This doctrine requires a full capability of striking back.
Unlike the U.S., Russia, or perhaps China, India is far from mastering the state of the art nuclear technologies. Therefore, India's non-offensive nuclear weapons doctrine is presumably designed first, to send a strong signal to China that India's nuclear arsenal is not directed nor designed to threaten China, and second, to warn Pakistan against using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against India.
In an attempt to position themselves as peace-loving countries, India and China also emphasized that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state which does not have nuclear weapons and military links with any nuclear weapon states (negative security assurances). However, it is worth noting that India fails to provide this security blanket to those states which are parties to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties such as the ASEAN countries.
The situation is alarming because India has developed ballistic missiles which range beyond the Southeast Asian region (Phritvi and Agni). Therefore, there is a need for regional or globally concerted efforts to convince India -- or all nuclear weapon states for that matter -- to spare the nuclear weapon-free zones from nuclear weapon threats.
This need is even more pressing because India has decided to synergize the potentials of its navy, army and air force to support the use of these weapons. This fact merits our serious attention. Although India has committed itself to the principle of non-first use, the adoption of this policy clearly indicates India's intention to become a global power, or at least a powerful regional player.
The reelection of Prime Minister Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is expected to provide more ammunition for India to become a global power. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that India detonated nuclear devices immediately after the BJP came to power.
Taking into account that the world will no longer be able to put the genie back into the bottle, countries in the region must take a series of bold measures to prevent the South Asian theater -- or in a much broader context Asia and the Pacific region -- from experiencing nuclear disasters for the second time, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.
With the knowledge that major nuclear weapon states have mastered cutting edge nuclear technology, the world can anticipate that the impact of nuclear weapons if they were used would be far more devastating than those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is therefore an urgent task for countries in the region to convince India, as well as Pakistan and China, to exercise self-restraint and to refrain from resorting to nuclear weapons to resolve conflicts.
More importantly, there is a need to push them to jointly agree to de-target all countries that are parties to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties.
Pakistan has yet to come up with its nuclear doctrine, while India and China have both committed to the non-first use principle. It is for this particular reason that countries in the region must take a leading role. First, to immediately negotiate an international legally binding regime on non-first use of nuclear weapons. Second, to provide the security blanket not only to nonnuclear weapon states, but to all parties to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties such as the Rarotonga Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Bangkok Treaty.
ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, have proven themselves to be reliable regional peacemakers. Unfortunately, the organization has recently gone through a trying period in which solidarity among its members has significantly dwindled. Worse still, Indonesia's seemingly endless power struggle has severely trimmed its ability to contribute for many years to come to the preservation and promotion of peace and stability in the region.
If the ASEAN block manages to regain its mediating role, this region will likely be spared a second nuclear holocaust. It will in turn provide countries of the region with a much wider opportunity to develop and prepare themselves to confront the uncertain new millennium.
The writer is a former United Nations Disarmament Fellow and an expert on international peace and security affairs residing in Jakarta.