Bush's eventful administration

By Karim Raslan

KUALA LUMPUR (JP): President Bush's new administration has been eventful and three events stand out. All three will have serious implications for American foreign policy in the Asia- Pacific. The first is the mounting tension with China, rising out of the Hainan spy-plane incident and the administration's decision to sell a slew of high-powered weaponry (but not the Aegis battle systems) to the Taiwanese. The second is the refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The third is the American economy's impending slow-down.

The handling of these issues underlines four key lessons for those interested in business and politics in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover the direction American foreign policy is taking means Washington will have to focus more on Southeast Asia and Indonesia in particular.

The most important thing to bear in mind -- before we get over-excited over the return of the "Cold War" warriors to the White House -- is that foreign policy is of little importance within Washington DC's notoriously self-obsessed Beltway (the highway that encircles the federal capital).

Contrary to what most Asians might like to think the economy remains the President's chief concern. We, in Asia, including China, are a sideshow. Moreover George W. needs to focus on his domestic priorities -- education, tax cuts, health care -- in order to push his legislative agenda on Capitol Hill. He cannot afford to be derailed. His electoral mandate is too slim and the chances of recouping any loss momentum are even slimmer.

Furthermore, Bush has had to clean up the mess left behind by former president Clinton. His so-called "historic rapprochement" with North Korea is a case in point. Clinton frittered away too much attention and political capital on a rogue regime just as vital allies such as Indonesia were being tossed onto the rubbish tip.

The second point is the "Crouching Rumsfield, Hidden Bush" syndrome. Frankly we would all like to know who is taking the decisions in the White House. Bush's carefully staged TV interviews leave one with the impression that he is a tightly scripted performer: the political equivalent of a boy band. As a consequence when he makes a slip-up -- witness the double-speak on the American commitment to Taiwan's defense -- the results are catastrophic.

Are the conservatives (led by Vice President, Dick Cheney) directing foreign policy? Clearly many of their number are unimpressed by the President. Their bible, The Weekly Standard has accused Bush of a precipitating a national humiliation over the spy plane. On the other hand, are the internationalists, such as Powell, Jim Kelley and Paul Wolfowitz driving the agenda? No one is too sure and this uncertainty is disturbing.

The third point is that the show-down between the Americans and the Chinese has had a positive result because the new administration has injected a note of realism into the discourse.

American policy-makers and businessmen have been seduced by China. They visit Shanghai and then start swooning like teenage girls. The view from the eightieth floor of the Grand Hyatt in the Jin Mao Tower overlooking Pudong leaves them breathless. They see the numbers -- by the end of 2001 China with 130 million hand-phone subscribers will be largest mobile telephony market in the world -- and can't stop drooling.

Greed makes people do silly things and powerful US corporations have had far too much influence on China policy. In their pursuit of the elusive Chinese market they've focused on future profits whilst forgetting the present inadequacies: the terrible law and order problems, the corruption, the environmental degradation and the political uncertainties. In strategic terms American over-investment could leave these same corporations vulnerable to a sudden change in China's domestic politics.

The fourth point is that there really are serious cultural differences between the two countries. Dealing with China requires caution, intelligence, confidence and consistency. Moreover you must have learnt about Chinese culture and history. For example, the Chinese still tend to view history in terms of dynasties, many of which have lasted centuries. By way of contrast the Americans tend to see historical events in terms of presidents, ew of whom have survived for more than one term.

Learning about your adversary is the first step to comprehending his strengths and weaknesses. However, many conservatives (often funded by the influential Taiwanese lobby) argue that acquiring specialist knowledge is the first step to "commie-cuddling".

Unfortunately, these cultural differences will not be disappear as China prospers. Materialism and westernization will not make the Chinese people love the United States -- why do Americans want to be loved anyhow? While the Chinese enjoy American technology, fashion and popular culture they will never become undying fans of the Stars and Stripes.

From my experience, the younger generation of Chinese leaders, whether business, academic or political have been liberated from the limitations of Confucian strictures by the Cultural Revolution. They are bold, outspoken and aggressively nationalistic. Their confidence and articulateness is quite unlike the inexpressiveness of their Japanese equivalents.

The fourth point is that the Americans under Bush are in danger of diplomatic over-reach. Acting unilaterally they have been angering all their allies both in the Asia Pacific and Europe without exception. The United States is an extraordinarily powerful nation. However, it will need friends, especially as its economy begins to grind to a halt.

In this respect the United States' obsession with China at the expense of its traditional allies and friends in Asia is particularly foolish -- though Bush is committed to reversing this trend by focusing on Japan and Korea. However both countries will be distracted by the implementation of domestic reforms.

The new administration must extend its attentions to Southeast Asia. American policy-makers and businessmen must revisit the region. We are the bulwark to China. Whilst we are close to the Middle Kingdom we have long been wary of its strength commercially and politically. It goes without saying that we will work hard to avoid regional hegemony (American or Chinese) at all costs.

In commercial terms we remain a great market and a superb workplace. And, having undergone a measure of political transition we are well ahead of the Chinese in terms of our political stability and maturity. Moreover Southeast Asia is culturally more open and diverse than China.

If the United States is serious about its role in the Asia Pacific it must invest time, energy and money in Southeast Asia. The new Secretary of State, Colin Powell should make a point of visiting Indonesia when he visits the region next month. Stopping off in Hanoi is not enough. America must send a clear signal of its support and concern for Indonesia as a nation. This does not mean siding with either Abdurrahman Wahid or Megawati Soekarnoputri.

The United States must work to prevent the Indonesia's disintegration. It is unwise to treat Indonesia as a pariah. The ignominy of forcing the world's third largest democracy to beg in front of the IMF and the World Bank will come back to haunt the Americans. In extending the hand of friendship to Indonesia, the Americans will bolster their authority in the region.

Making friends is a sign of wisdom, not weakness.

The writer is a Kuala Lumpur-based lawyer and writer.