BRIN Researcher Proposes Asymmetric Regional Elections, Claims Uniform System is Inefficient

Siti, a researcher from BRIN, presented this proposal during a hearing with Commission II of the House of Representatives (DPR) while discussing the Election Bill at the parliamentary complex in Senayan, Jakarta, on Tuesday (2/6/2026). According to her, asymmetric regional elections are more efficient in implementing decentralisation and regional autonomy, as every region in Indonesia possesses different conditions.

“Asymmetric regional elections stem from the recognition of differences in fiscal, administrative, and socio-political capacities between regions. This ensures efficiency within the framework of decentralisation and regional autonomy,” said Siti. She added that a uniform election design potentially leads to inefficiency, high costs, and the weakening of local governance.

Siti explained that an asymmetric approach allows for variations in regional head election mechanisms, ranging from direct elections and elections through the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) to appointments or designations, depending on the characteristics of each region. “The asymmetric model allows for variations in mechanisms—direct, indirect through the DPRD, designation, or appointment—according to regional characteristics, as there are still preparatory regions and administrative regions,” she noted.

Furthermore, she assessed that asymmetric elections could serve as a design for adaptive democracy to ensure the effectiveness of local government. She stated that this approach aligns with Article 18, Paragraph 4 of the 1945 Constitution, as well as the principles of Pancasila and the strengthening of good local governance and local welfare.

In addition to regional elections, Siti highlighted the current open proportional legislative election system. She argued that, in practice, this system triggers expensive and transactional intra-party competition. “This provides a wide space for competition, but in Indonesia’s practice, it actually triggers expensive and transactional intra-party competition. This condition weakens the role of political parties as institutions and shifts the focus from programmes to individual popularity,” she explained. She warned that relying solely on popularity and financial resources is dangerous for the long term.

Consequently, she proposed a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system. This system combines regional representation through districts with proportional representation through political parties. “Besides open and closed proportional systems, empirical findings suggest that the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system serves as an alternative design for legislative elections. This system combines regional representation via districts and proportional representation via parties,” she elaborated. She added that the MMP system has the potential to reduce expensive intra-party competition, suppress political costs, and strengthen the role of political parties.