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Part 2 of 2

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Part 2 of 2

When will investors give Indonesia a break

Sisira Jayasuriya and Chris Manning, Canberra

Why then is Indonesia still ignored by foreign and domestic
investors alike, whereas other comparable countries are seen as
much more attractive investment locations. We suggest two sets
of factors that set Indonesian apart. First, international
investor perceptions are exceptionally "sticky". Once formed
perceptions change very slowly, often failing to anticipate
radical change. And second, business does not adjust well to
change, even if such change may be for the better, from a long
term perspective. "Better the devil you know than the one you
don't".

The riots and political turmoil at the time of the crisis in
1998, especially as they affected Chinese businesses, spawned a
perception of Indonesia as an unstable, "messy" state. Far
reaching political reforms, long overdue, added to this
perception, even though they were managed remarkably well by
international standards.

A recent book edited by M. Chatib Basri and P. van der Eng,
Indonesian Business: New Challenges, Old Problems (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies and The Indonesian Project, ANU,
Singapore, 2004) documents the ambitious reform agenda adopted by
the Megawati government. Although Megawati has often been
painted as indecisive, the reforms have been frequently thwarted
in practice, as in many democracies, and in line with the
experience of most neighboring countries.

What has certainly changed is the political context. The rules
of the game have changed -- as they were bound to do -- with the
demise of the Soeharto dictatorship. Business now has to deal
with many players, and to learn to play by a complex set of rules
rather than merely seek to interpret and work by Bapak's rules
(those of former president Soeharto).

Clearly there is a crisis of confidence among both domestic
and foreign investors. The contrast with Thailand is both obvious
and striking. There the Thaksin government's bold strategy to
boost the economy has raised growth rates, rejuvenated investor
confidence and put Thailand "back on the map" very quickly after
the economic crisis. In Indonesia, the political leadership seems
not to "lead", continuing low growth deepens the mood of
pessimism, and undermines political stability.

Part of the problem has been the reluctance among Indonesian
policy makers to take "risks". This was understandable for
several years in an economy and polity battered by the crisis,
when macroeconomic stability was under threat. It is much less
justifiable now.

The stringencies which the government inherited from the IMF
program, and jittery nerves about the impact of any attempt to
provide a fiscal boost to the economy, have allowed
infrastructure to run down rapidly. It can be argued that meeting
conservative public debt targets has contributed, partly, to the
vicious cycle low growth, pessimism, and low investment.

Unless growth is accelerated, there is a risk that lack of
employment and income growth will undermine the political
constituency for reforms and democratic progress. Perhaps it is
time to take some bold initiatives to boost growth.

This is not to suggest a policy of pump-priming purely to
stimulate employment and as a remedy for social ills, as
suggested by some contributors to this newspaper. One can argue
that the fundamental solution to employment problems in
Indonesia, as in neighboring countries, requires durable, "high
quality" economic growth and not simply a short-term spending
boom.

A boost in government spending on infrastructure development
could achieve the short term goal of a growth stimulus to the
economy, while consistent with a broader strategy to target
labor-intensive exports once again (which grew rapidly after the
bold reform programs of the late 1980s). It could provide
"better", more sustainable employment growth, both in
manufacturing and Indonesia's competitive export commodities in
agriculture. In short, increased government expenditure would
represent investment in longer term growth and not a rise in
consumption spending.

Employment expansion itself might be achieved more by removing
trade and labor law restrictions to enterprise and employment,
than by offering new incentives. Such initiatives from the new
government can send positive signals, and will be most timely as
the MFA preferential trade agreement comes to an end in January
2005.

Perhaps this is the strategy which Pierre van der Eng and
Chatib Basri have in mind in their discussions of the obstacles
to enterprise, and also as a strategy to counter what Chatib has
referred to as a recent trend towards "deindustrialisation" in
Indonesia.

Nevertheless, a major commitment to improvements in
infrastructure -- especially roads, bridges and ports -- may be
critical to achieving a "leap forward" in business confidence,
and of course will provide some badly needed jobs along the way.
Without such investments in infrastructure, Indonesia will face
the very real danger of being unable to compete with other labor
rich countries such as China and India in the new global economy.

Indonesia offers greater and more enduring rewards today than
there were during the Soeharto days to investors who are prepared
to meet the new challenges with patience and flexibility.
Hopefully, the leadership that emerges from the elections will
act with boldness and vigor to move the country to back to rapid
growth without jeopardizing the newly won gains of democracy and
pluralism.

Sisira Jayasuriya is Director of the Asian Economics Center,
Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, and Chris
Manning is Head of the Indonesia Project, The Division of
Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the
Australian National University).

More from 27 July 2004 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/bpart-2-of-2b-1447893297-1504733)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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