BIN problem in regaining public trust not an easy case

Ardimas Sasdi Staff Writer The Jakarta Post ardimas@thejakartapost.com

The National Intelligence Agency (BIN) seized the Bali bombings as an opportunity to defend itself against charges that it had failed to inform the public of potential terrorist attacks and the existence of terrorist cells in Indonesia.

BIN was formerly known as the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin), but changed its name in December 2000 in an attempt to distance itself from the dreaded intelligence body of the New Order era.

Muhyar Yara, a spokesman for the agency, said in a radio interview on Oct. 15 in Jakarta that the agency had informed the public a year ago of the existence of international terrorist networks in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The information, however, had been largely ignored because of public cynicism and suspicion surrounding the agency's motives behind the alert notice.

"Politicians and government officials questioned the validity of the information and even accused BIN of trying to create a new 'ghost' terrorist with the notice.

"On one occasion a year ago, I was involved in a heated argument with the chief editor of a Jakarta daily. At that time, he told me that he did not trust me and even said that he was not afraid of terrorists, but of the agency supervising terrorists. Now that the (Bali) incident has happened, I want to see the editor again to hear what he would say," Muchyar said.

The Jakarta Post ran a front-page article on Aug. 24, 2001, that carried the warning from BIN chief Lt. Gen. (ret) A.M. Hendropriyono that Indonesia was vulnerable to infiltration by international terrorists.

"Terrorism has a tendency to flourish in a country which is in transition toward democracy. So, democratization should be coupled with the promotion of surveillance. We must be alert and be prepared. It is our responsibility (to fight terrorism)," Hendropriyono was quoted in the article.

Muchyar's complaints about the negative attitude of the public in regards the warning can be understood by looking at the series of efforts taken by the intelligence agency to restore its image, including the appointment of Lt. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani as its chief during former president B.J. Habibie's administration, and outspoken, and former Golkar Party legislator Muchyar as spokesman of the agency.

The problem besetting an intelligence agency like BIN and its predecessor Bakin, which had been a tool of repression to silence critics of government for the three decades of Soeharto's regime, is not a simple matter as many people had been victimized by the security apparatus.

Like most intelligence agencies of developing countries, BIN's case is an image problem and thus is not easy for the agency to solve. The image of an intelligence agency is usually formed by the perception of a person or a group of people who have dealt with the agency. In many cases, public perception of an intelligence agency is negative.

First-year students of communication science are often told by their professors that communication is a matter of perception. This perception, once drawn, is something which cannot be changed easily unless there is strong effort by its subject for self- change or self-reform. Even so, such an attempt to redefine one's image usually requires a long period of time.

The existence of BIN as an intelligence agency was, and is, inseparable from the military, one of the backbones of Soeharto's New Order government along with Golkar. As with BIN, Golkar changed its name to the Golkar Party following Soeharto's fall from power in May 1998, after having ruled the country with an iron hand since the mid-60s.

Soeharto used his intelligence agencies to create fear among the public from the outset of his term as president, and terror was carried out by the security apparatus. An example is the fate of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which was blamed for the attempted coup d'etat of Sept. 30, 1965, that resulted in the death of several Army generals. The coup was crushed by Soeharto's loyal Army, the remaining members and remnants of PKI purged, and the party outlawed.

Soeharto continued to use terror to create fear among the public through the periodic use of violence, including the Lampung massacres and the kidnapping of student activists in the 1990s, to name a few from a long list of such cases.

Hendropriyono, who was appointed BIN chief last year, is himself a problematic figure with his alleged involvement in the bloody Talangsari incident in 1989, a military-led operation to crush followers of extremist elements. Official statements on the number of casualties give a figure of 27; unofficial sources, however, said more than 300 people, including three residents who were not members of the extremist group, were killed.

Hendropriyono, who was then a colonel and Lampung military resort commander, was allegedly responsible for this bloody clash between military resort officers and local Talangsari residents. The incident has not been, until today, properly solved through a transparent legal process at court.

Antara news agency reported on Oct. 28 that Vice President Hamzah Haz instructed Hendropriyono not to repeat the obsolete paradigm of the agency as accomplice to the government, during a meeting at Hamzah's Jakarta office. Ironically, Hamzah and his party were categorized as an "opposition party" during the New Order regime and as such, were apparently targets of strict surveillance by military and intelligence agents.

Hamzah's order to Hendropriyono came not long after President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued a decree on Oct. 22, which empowered BIN with the authority to coordinate intelligence. The decree also stipulated that BIN has a duty to guide and ensure integrated planning and implementation of all intelligence activities.

In redefining such a deep-rooted, negative image, it must be remembered that the victims of torture or of kidnappings carried out by the military are so traumatized by their experiences that they still choose not to speak about their experiences, even though the actual incident occurred a long time ago. Even activists such as Haryanto Taslam of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, who bravely challenged party leader Megawati, still keep mum when asked about their experiences under military detention.

Experiences of trauma and torture cause such emotional and psychological scars that, when the individuals contact any stimulus of pain or suffering as experienced by victims or witnesses of similar terror cases, the memories of their own experiences are forced out of their subconscious and relived.

BIN's attempt to convince the population of its intelligence findings is part of its efforts to regain public trust. In the above context, however, the road to this goal is long and bumpy as the memories of past violations by the intelligence and the military are still fresh in the minds of the public.