Between Tables and Chairs: The Dilemma of the 'Most Actively Free'

The narrative of active free policy pursued by President of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto is indeed convincing when read from the perspective of middle power status, but it can become an analytical trap if we stop there. There are several assumptions that need to be tested carefully before we label this strategy as ‘precise’ rather than a ‘temporary balance’.

The argument that Indonesia has the capital to ‘play at several tables at once’ deserves appreciation and empirical questioning. Geopolitical bargaining power does not stand alone on the basis of population or territorial size but can relatively be seen from equivalent implementation capacity.

Indonesia’s diplomatic bureaucracy remains relatively thin for a country with ambitions as broad as this. The ratio of diplomats to bilateral partners, geopolitical intelligence capacity, and the ability to translate agreements into concrete treaties are all still far below the standards of mature middle powers like Australia, Turkey, or Brazil.

When too many tables are opened at once without adequate institutional capacity, what emerges is not multidirectional engagement, but fragmentation of commitments. This is even exacerbated by the immaturity of domestic political maturity.

The pressure for blanket overflight from the Pentagon deserves note. However, this is not a minor detail. This is a symptom of what international relations theorists call structural entrapment, a condition in which the depth of engagement with one great power gradually erodes strategic flexibility towards others, not through coercion, but through gradual incentives and accumulated dependencies.

In Indonesia’s case, deepening defence cooperation with the US, which includes weapons system interoperability, intelligence sharing, and structured joint exercises, structurally creates high costs for the possibility of ‘exiting’ in the future.

At the same time, energy dependence on Russia (civil nuclear or gas in the future) has a similar dependency logic. The problem is, when two dependencies grow simultaneously towards two hostile parties, the celebrated space for active free manoeuvre can narrow quietly.

Indonesia’s intensive engagement with Russia, at a time when most Western countries are imposing sanctions over the Ukraine invasion, brings reputational risks that are often overlooked in active free calculations.

Indonesia claims a position as a country upholding a rules-based order and is active in multilateral forums like the UN and G20. However, repeated visits to the Kremlin without a clear position on the international law violations occurring in Ukraine create a credibility gap.

Active free does not mean free from normative judgement. Middle powers that have successfully built long-term influence, such as Canada, Norway, or Singapore, have done so largely through consistency in normative positions, not just pragmatic manoeuvres.

If Indonesia continues to manoeuvre without clear articulation of principles, this risks losing trust precisely from the countries it most needs as coalition partners in multilateral forums. Why? Because many countries in the world now prioritise the principle of prudence in facing Trump’s impulsiveness.

The dimension most absent from the optimistic active free narrative is the domestic political condition as the basis for international projection. Ambitious foreign policy requires solid domestic consensus, consistently growing defence and diplomacy budgets, and state institutions that are not easily shaken by changes in political actors.

Indonesia today faces unfinished challenges in democratic consolidation, fiscal pressures from subsidy burdens and energy transition, and political elite fragmentation that can easily disrupt long-term strategy continuity.

History records that geopolitical ambitions exceeding domestic capacity tend to end in the tragic fate of the country’s leaders. A country has many international commitments but lacks the resources, cohesion, or legitimacy to sustain them.

South Korea, for example, succeeded in implementing the New Southern Policy precisely because it has a far more solid economic and institutional base as support. History records how Soekarno ended.

The active free strategy was born and successfully maintained in the context of the Cold War with a relatively stable bipolar structure, where space between the two blocs was available and manageable. Today’s global order is qualitatively different: polarisation happens faster, more personal between leaders, and increasingly linked to domestic issues (protectionism, populist ideology, strategic technology).

In this condition, ‘hedging’ that could previously be done relatively covertly now becomes much more visible, and thus triggers faster and sharper responses from each side.

Thin institutional capacity, growing dependency risks in two directions, normative inconsistency, domestic political vulnerability, and an increasingly unfriendly international context towards hedging, all are variables that cannot be ignored with optimism about geography and demographics alone.

Active free remains relevant as a principle. However, this principle needs to be implemented not only with the courage to be present at all tables, but also with the courage to acknowledge that not every chair at every table is equally beneficial and that the ability to leave a table is part of that freedom itself.